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REALIZING THE RULE OF LAW IN THE
HUMAN SUBJECT
PATRICK MCKINLEY BRENNAN*
Abstract: The dominant understandings of the rule of law, legal in-
terpretation, and judging are riddled with the untoward consequences
of misunderstanding or ignoring the human subject This Article takes
that subject as the starting point, and asks how he or she can become
lawful. Cutting a middle way between the usual analyses which look
exclusively either to language or rules as the guarantor of legal
objectivity, or to the subject as the intransigent impediment to
lawfulness and objectivity, the Article identifies the necessary and
sufficient conditions of an achievable rule of law by developing •the
implications of human subjects', desire for the real (and for conduct
consistent with it). Not even law is so objective as to get by without the
mind of the human subject, and the Article shows how human subjects
become lawful exactly by becoming authentic subjects. The analysis
proceeds by way of a deconstruction of jurisprudences, such as Ronald
Dworkin's and Justice Scalia's, uninformed by the normative im-
plications of human subjectivity itself.
* The author is Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Research at
the College of Law, Arizona State University. Prior to earning his J.D. at the University of
California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall, he studied philosophy at Yale University and the Univer-
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Bruce Anderson, Michael Berch, Patrick Byrne, Scott Cameron, Rudy Gerber, Mary Ann
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research assistance, I thank Wyatt Bailey, John Houston, Natalie Collins, and Kathryn Tom-
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The very capacity to ask the question suggests the answer [that] there is no
answer is suspect.
—Joseph Vining'
PROLOGUE
Mine may be willing to play the buffoon, but one wants to do it intelli-
gently.
—Bernard Lonergan 2
Some time ago I talked to a group of lawyers about how statutes
should be interpreted. My objectives were several. I wished to per-
suade my audience that any sound handling of statutes must take its
cues from the cognitive processes by which humans know linguistic
meaning; that those processes are very different from what often is
supposed; and that this difference has broad implications for the Rule
of Law. It was a tall order, but the discussion following my talk re-
vealed that I had been understood. This I found cheering, of course,
but not just for the usual reason that when one speaks, one likes to be
understood. I was arguing that meaning, legal meaning, can be
known; and my interlocutors' grasp of my meaning was itself some
evidence in support of the anti-skeptical thesis I was advancing. This
was all very fine. 3
Then, someone chimed in, "I didn't understand a word you just
said" and delivered immediately—before I could comb the causes of
his confusion—a soliloquy which revealed not just to me, but to all
assembled, that he understood perfectly well what I had said. This was
a gift. Had this person remained silent or said only that he did not
understand, we might have believed him in the dark, a know-nothing.
But he tried to be an intellectual terrorist—and failed! His perform-
ance demonstrated the very understanding he denied.
I JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP 18 (1995).
2 BERNARD LONERGAN, Philosophical Positions With Regard to Knowing, in 6 COLLECTED
WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL PAPERS 1958-1964, at
214, 224 (Robert C. Croken et al. eds., 1996).
'Compare the colloquy of Bernard Lonergan with an unnamed interlocutor following
a talk by Lonergan on meaning: "[Lonergan]: Do you "lean anything? Do I mean anything
when I say, 'Don't read it, it can't be fun?' Supposing I'm wrong. Questioner: Well then,
it's meaningless. [Lonergan]: Nol—because you wouldn't know I was wrong, if it was
meaningless." BERNARD LONERGAN, The Analogy of Meaning, in 6 COLLECTED WOlUtS, supra
note 2, at 183, 212.
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I begin with this vignette for three reasons. First, to a class of pro-
spective readers, part of my announced topic, the Rule of Law, will
portend a weary replay of tired arguments about the evils of judges'
"reading into" legal texts their own "subjective" values and prefer-
ences. I plan nothing of the sort, and it is critical that the reader un-
derstand at the outset, in at least a preliminary way, that although I
shall defend the possibility of the Rule of Law, I shall do so by arguing
that frequently we have deeply misunderstood what a Rule of Law
would be if we could achieve one. This Article is an extended attempt
to show how the Rule of Law is possible exactly because of, not de-
spite, the human subject. My argument, more specifically, is that the
Rule of Law is achieved not through human subjects' being "con-
strained" by something outside themselves but, instead, through their
fidelity to inner law. The notion of "inner law" will at first seem foreign
to most readers, but compliance with it is, I shall argue, the very
method by which the reader already understands my meaning at this
very moment. It was by compliance with inner law that the would-be
intellectual terrorist grasped my meaning.
Second, there is a tendency, exemplified in the terrorist's per-
formance, to flee understanding, to deny that it has occurred or even
can occur. Typically, however, the obscurantist is, as my interlocutor
was, insufficiently self-effacing. He wishes to obfuscate, but cleverly. His
very acts of cleverness betray that he has known what he denies know-
ing.
Third, such cleverness, I am duty-bound to alert the reader, will
be used against you if you deny my claims about meaning or how it is
known. If you deny my claim that linguistic meaning can be known, I
shall use the very fact of your own grasp of my claim to demonstrate
that meaning can be known. The fact will be used to prove the possi-
bility. If you deny my claim about how linguistic meaning is known, I
shall use the same sort of argument. You are then, as you proceed,
assuming the risk of being hoisted by your own performative petard.
This kind of argument, the sort that explicates the conditions of
the possibility of what you are already doing, is known as transcenden-
tal, and I shall have much to say about it below. I warn of it now be-
cause transcendental argument often irritates. 4 Transcendental argu-
ment tends, indeed is intended, to rankle in the mind. It is a radically
4 See, e.g., PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 57 (1998) [hereinafter,
SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT]; Pierre Schlag, Nornwtivity and the Politics of FOrM, in AGAINST THE
LAw, 29, 46, 93 (Paul F. Campos et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter, Schlag, Politics of Form].
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personal form of argument, argument about what you do. It invites
you to live by the implications of what you have already chosen to do.
By stopping now in response to this warning, you will also—to be
sure—demonstrate that you have understood my meaning. And it is
just this, the virtual ineluctability of the transcendental move, that
makes it rock upon which to build a Rule of Law. The rock, though, is
human, and the ineluctability only virtuak you can, instead, play the
buffoon Nothing prevents it, but nothing requires it. You are free for
either choice. And this is sufficient to my present purpose—to show
not that the Rule of Law is necessary (it is not), but that it is possible,
because human subjects call, obedient to inner law, make and know
meaning about how to live well.
I. THE QUESTION
We know that the rule of law remains deeply embedded in the rule of par-
ticular men and women. We know this, however; not as a fact that negates
law but as an argument that always attaches to the rule of law.
—Paul W. liahns
The question I wish to raise is whether the Rule of Law is possi-
ble. The answer for which I shall argue is that the Rule of Law is in-
deed possible—but only if it be understood as a specific form of,
rather than as a blunt contrast to, the rule of men. Usually written off
as a threat to the Rule of Law, the human subject emerges as the
source of the Rule of Law exactly when the subject is understood as
always already under inner law. By fathoming, rather than denying or
obscuring, the human subject's generative role in positive law, we
might reconceive the Rule of Law as worthy not of sarcasm but of
human achievement.
This Article, since it is about what human subjects can do, is in-
evitably about what you and I and the neighbors, all of us being hu-
man subjects, can do. But rather than talk about the neighbors, whose
mental lives remain mercifully opaque to us most of the time, I shall
concentrate on the mental lives you and I have the best chance of
knowing: I, my own; and you, yours. The core of this Article will be an
invitation to you, the reader, to discover in yourself the cognitive acts
by which you know whatever it is you know. That discovery will require
"self-appropriation," a taking intellectual-hold of what you already are
5 PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARDURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF AMERICA 26-27 (1997).
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and of what you already do. Offering a description of what I learn
about myself through my own self-appropriation, I shall ask you
whether and how the results of your self-appropriation differ. What I
find at the root of my mental life is the operation of what I have called
inner law, a basic norm given at the very threshold of my conscious
and self-conscious life. It is to demonstrate the operation of that inner
law in the skeptical reader that! shall use transcendental argument.
This turn to the subject as a strategy to build rather than to raze,
is a reversal of the ordinary defense of the Rule of Law. The usual
course is to start (and end) that defense outside the subject's subjec-
tivity, in the external indicia of objectivity on which the Rule of Law is
said to depend: rules, procedures, processes, plain meanings, original
understandings, legislative intents, and so forth. Whatever its differ-
ence from the usual course of legal analysis, however, the project of
self-appropriation has roots in the central Western philosophical tra-
dition stretching from Socrates through Kant, beginning with the So-
cratic imperative, "Know thyself1"6 My purpose, like Paul Kahn's, is to
"turn the Socratic injunction of self-knowledge upon the rule of law."7
But unlike Kahn, who concludes that the Rule of Law is mere myth,!
shall conclude that the Rule of Law may yet be possible. The condi-
tions of its possibility are what! explore at length in this Article.
A. Reversing the Capitals
But before proceeding any further, something needs to be said
about what the it I have in mind really is. When asking a question that
includes a concept as familiar as the Rule of Law, there is a tendency
to think we know exactly what we are talking about; indeed, there is a
tendency to think, at least before we think very much, that there is
necessarily just one thing that we are thinking about. Under the sway
of an unanalyzed Platonism, we are poised to approach the Rule of
Law with the unconscious premise that there exists out there, way out
there, a Form of the Rule of Law; having thus hypostasized the Rule
of Law, we are apt quickly, and intelligently, to conclude that some-
thing so other-worldly has zero chance of instantiation in this shadowy
world of ours. Starting with a concept of the Rule of Law drawn from
6 See PLATO, COMMODES 35 (Thomas G. West & Grace Starry West trans., Hackett Pub-
lishing Co. 1986) (164d). The imperative advocated by Socrates is, of course, older than
Socrates. For Socrates' relationship to its Delphic source, see 1 I4.W. PARICE & D.E.W.
WORMELL, THE DELPIIIC ORACLE 401-05 (1956).
7 Kmm, supra note 5, at 35.
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God-knows-where, to conclude that there's no hope for it here, is
child's play, childish even.
There will be more to say later about how the long arm of Plato-
nism raises and dashes our hope for the Rule of Laws (and conven-
iently ushers in an excuse for treating everything as a degraded form
of politics). The point to emphasize now, at the outset, is that in put-
ting the question, "Is the Rule of Law possible?," I am asking whether
we can achieve something of which we already have a notion. That
notion is fuzzy,9 but it has clear contours to the extent it invokes a par-
ticular contrast, "the familiar contrast between 'the Rule of Law' and
'the rule of inett.'"th The contrast seems so old and obvious—at least
to those who would avoid being branded lawless—as to be a "first
principle."" So timeless does that contrast seem, indeed, that we per-
haps need reminding that it entered American law, and entered
through the 1803 opinion in Marbury u Madison, where Chief Justice
John Marshall reported that "[t]he government of the United States
has been emphatically termed a government of laws and not of
men." 12 So fixed in our mind are the goals of that Marshall opinion
that we can laugh, if nervously, at Paul Campos's sarcasm, "since Mar-
bury v. Madison or time immemorial, which ever came first.""
Marshall in Marbury offered little explanation of the contrast."
Nor do those who have come after Marshall make clear the contrast's
meaning. Indeed, it is Richard Fallon's observation that "[i]n Ameri-
can legal discourse, debates about the historical and conceptual
8 Such, indeed, is the perennial sport of ridiculing the aspiration to the Rule of Law in
light of both the inevitable creativity of interpretation and the illusory character of textual
"constraints" on judges. See infra text accompanying note 319.
9
 See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 12 (1996)
("[W]e are never quite sure what we mean by the 'rule of law.'").
I° Richard H. Fallondr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
Cound. L. REV. 1,2-3 (1997).
KAtm, supra note 5, at 155 ("When the [Marbury] Court tries to articulate the con-
tent of this jurisdictional rule, it is less than successful. It cannot rely on official status
alone, without violating a first principle of the rule of law: that it is not a rule of men.").
12 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,163 (1803). For its earlier manifesta-
tions in American law, see KAHN, supra note 5, at 260 n.5.
12 Paul Campos, A Heterodox Catechism, in AGAINST THE LAW, supra note 4, at 9.
14 See KAHN, supra note 5, at 17 ("Marbury does not offer a countertheory of the mean-
ing of the rule of law. It 'proves' its understanding of the rule of law by displaying it, not
arguing about it. It is itself the operation of the rule of law. The power of the opinion is
precisely its ability to draw the reader into an appearance of law that it creates. Reading
Marbury we see only the rule of law with its claims of indifference to individual political
actors, of permanence, and of representation of the people."); see also it at 19-27.
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foundations of the Rule-of-Law ideal are seldom engaged directly." 16
What happens, instead, is that the Rule of Law gets hailed into court
as the unquestionable last word in the quotidian dispute: 16 The Rule
of Law seems malleable enough to be made to fit almost every side in
every dispute. 17 It is the meta-position on which every side would take
its well-deserved rest.
No one can be against it, but who knows what it is to be for it?
Often, to be on the side of the Rule of Law amounts to no more than
standing opposed to the rule of men. And that quickly leads to cyni-
cism about the Rule of Law's being anything more than pious hand
wringing to hide men's rule. For whatever one may say about legal
realism as a movement, its leading insights have been assimilated.
"[W] e are all legal realists now." 18 The Rule-of-Law-and-not-of-men is
not as plausible as it used to be,. and it never was. As Mary Ann Glen-
don observes, "[N]o American adult needs to be told that we live un-
der a rule of men in the sense that laws are made, interpreted, and
administered by real men and women." 19
If no American adult needs to be told that ours is a government
of men in the sense that laws are made, interpreted, and administered
by real men and women, what does remain to be told is in what
sense—if any—we might, with women and men creating, interpreting,
and administering the laws, live under a Rule of Law. Failure to an-
swer this question leads to serious-minded judgments, such as Profes-
sor Kahn's, that the rule of law is myth. It led Fallon himself to con-
t supra note 10, at 2.
16 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) ("It is not within our constitu-
tional tradition to enact laws of this sort. Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to
our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and
each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance."); k/. at 647
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing majority's assessment of the Rule of Law's claims is "proved
false" by historical practice); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-71 (1992)
(joint plurality opinion) (noting Rule of Law required fidelity to core holding of Roe u
Wade); id. at 953-55 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (maintaining that respect for Rule of Law required reversal of Roe u Wade); Pa-
pachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) Mlle rule of law ... is the great
mucilage that holds society together."); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 346 (1964) (Black,
J., dissenting) (noting "this country" is "dedicated" to the Rule of Law).
17 "No proposition is more common in a dissent than the claim that the majority has
transgressed the limits of the rule of law by making new law." Kam, supra note 5, at 20.
18 Gary Pellet., 7'he Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. Rev. 1151, 1151 (1985); see
also Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 Tex. L. REV. 1195, 1198 &
n.14 (1989) ("Me have all learned our lessons from legal realism. This is not to say that
all have learned the same lesson.").
19 MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 10 (1994).
234 	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 43:227
dude that the Rule of Law is an "ideal" that "never can be completely
attained."20 Professor Fallon, for his part, finds utility in political ide-
als that we cannot achieve, 2I much as Professor Kahn thinks the Rule-
of-Law myth worth perpetuating. One would still like to know what it
would mean for the Rule of Law to be possible, however. An assessment
of that possibility, as I have suggested, would seem to require an ac-
count of what human subjects can do and whether rule by law might
be among those possible achievements.
The argument advanced in this Article is that the Rule of Law is
possible if we break down, in a very specific and constructive way, the
contrast between the Rule of Law and the rule of men. And so both to
clarify that what I offer is not a defense of the inherited Rule-of-Law-
not-of-men notion, and also to emphasize the linkage between any
plausible Rule of Law and the rule of men, I am shifting, emphati-
cally, to asking whether a less Olympian, more lower-case, version of
the rule of law is possible of achievement. I have not yet identified
what that notion is—but it will be a more homey, indeed human one,
comfortably expressed in the lower case. This emphatic shift to the
terrestrial is intended to signal a question broader than whether some
single inherited notion, the Platonic Form of Rule of Law, is possible.
I ask, instead, whether by taking the problematic human subject as
our very starting point, we can achieve something worthily called the
rule of law.
What I shall offer here is an account of how the human subject,
as creator and interpreter and administrator of meaning, can operate
through her subjectivity, not despite it, to realize something responsibly
called the rule of law. My account will succeed if it can place the subject
at the center of law without slipping willy-nilly into a subjectivism, the
rule of men that is the contrast to the "objectivity" said to mark the
capital-letter Rule of Law. 22 To confirm the shift in emphasis and or-
der, I shall give the Subject an initial cap. The rule of law of which I
2° Fallon, supra note 10, at 38.
21 /d. at 7, 55, 56.
22 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 742, 744
(1982); cf. Paul Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. Rev. 765, 771-72 (1982) ("Try
as we will, we cannot escape the perspectives that come with our particular backgrounds
and experiences. Indeed, I imagine that not only particular interpretations but the interpre-
tive rules themselves respond to our backgrounds and experiences. The very notion of con-
stitutional adjudication as hermeneutics—a notion shared by Professor Fiss and his com-
mentators—is 'sophisticated,' not just in the sense of being complex, but in what the
Random House dictionary gives as the first definition, 'altered by education, experience,
etc., so as to be worldly-wise.'").
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find the Subject capable differs dramatically from the Rule-of-Law-not-
of-men that invites contempt for the rule of law; but, for the reasons I
shall develop, it succeeds exactly where the traditional "objective" ac-
counts fail most conspicuously, that is, in identifying what, short of
brute force, can "constrain" humans. To paraphrase Bernard Loner-
gan, a philosopher whose work lies everywhere in the background
and sometimes in the text of this Article, truth is not so objective that
it can get by without the mind of the human Subject.23 What I mean
to show is how the operation of human subjectivity can make an "ob-
jective" rule of law possible. To succeed in this account it will be nec-
essary to walk an intellectual tightrope that bypasses the inherited
anxiety that the rule of law is possible only if law is made "objective"
and "constraining" by banishing subjectivity from the law.
B. To, and From, the Question
My topic is how the Subject makes possible a rule of law. But I
shall have to begin not with the Subject, but with the subject of the
Subject. Part II is about getting to the Subject, and how law—mirroring
so much philosophy—has craved "objectivity" so much that it has
sometimes denied the Subject a place in the law as the price of mak-
ing law objective. It was, for example, the point of (what we now
summarily summarize as) legal formalism to repress the Subject and
thereby to produce a "mechanical jurisprudence," the boast of which
was law's objectivity. And while we all know that that project failed, be-
cause the Subject intransigently refused to exit, American law-types
nonetheless busy themselves with that other project: showing that the
legal realists and "crits" alike are not to be believed that necessarily the
Subject is everywhere, the law nowhere. The long and the short of
that project, however, is that for the once neglected/repressed Sub-
ject we have substituted a variously "constrained" Subject, hoping that
finally we shall have produced a Subject big enough to realize the
capital-letter Rule of Law but small enough not to make trouble for it.
The results, as I argue in Part II, are a conception of law that is unsta-
ble and muted panic that law and its rule ultimately exceed our abili-
ties.
So bent have we been on constraining the Subject with some-
thing outside the Subject—with something objective—that we rarely
reach the Subject. But we need to get to the Subject, for she is our
23 BERNARDIF. LONERGAN, The Subject, in A SECOND COLLECTION 71-72 (William F.J.
Ryan, S.J. & BernardJ. Tyrell, Sj. eds., 1974).
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only hope. In Parts III and IV, then, I take the Subject as an object of
inquiry (not a problem to be solved), asking the reader to explore
with me the cognitive acts by which he or she knows anything at all—
science, meaning, how to live. The conclusion I draw from this exer-
cise in self-appropriation is that the Subject's—your and my—cogni-
tive processes are always already assembled and structured, across the
entire range of human knowing, by what I have called "inner law."
From this conclusion I proceed to argue, in Part V, that an
achievable rule of law proceeds from fidelity to—but not constraint
by—inner law. The argument, more specifically, is that any genuine
rule of law is rooted in legal method, and authentic legal method, in
turn, is rooted in the human cognitive method that is itself structured
and assembled by inner law. To show that this claim is not as outland-
ish as it may sound upon first hearing, I show how aspects of it are an-
ticipated and applied in the work of several American legal scholars,
including Joseph Vining, James Boyd White, Mary Ann Glendon, and
Paul Kahn.
Then, in Parts VI and VII, I take a concrete problem of statutory
interpretation to elaborate and exemplify how the rule of law might
look when rooted in the method by which human Subjects actually—
not fictively—know meaning. I arrange the analysis to show how this
method solves or dissolves problems that bedevil two leading theories
of the rule of law and statutory interpretation, those of Antonin Scalia
and Ronald Dworkin.
In Part VIII, finally, I step back both to situate my project and, in
so doing, to try to meet an anticipated objection. The objection, in a
word, would be that I have an agenda;24 the objection, in several
words, would be that while distracting my readers with discourse
about something as bland as human cognition, I have smuggled natu-
ral law or even theology into the heart of the rule of law. As for the
objection regarding agenda, I shall demur now and be done with it.
My agenda is to make sense of law in light of what I take to be a per-
suasive account of how human Subjects know meaning, including le-
gal meaning. If I am wrong, I stand to be corrected by writers of briefs
for other conceptions of the place and nature of intelligence in law,
and of course by the writers of clever briefs advocating no intelligence
in law.
24 Cf. Pierre J. Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1631 (1991) ("As
you might guess, this effort is not just a completely disinterested, purely altruistic attempt
on my part to give various schools of thought something to think about. 1 have an agenda
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As for the two objections about content, natural law and theol-
ogy—the reply of course will require more detail than is appropriate
at the outset, but at least this much should be said here. One of the
theses of this Article is that the human Subject is always already under
a law operative in her by nature, what I find operative in the Subject
might, therefore, be called a natural law. Like proponents of tradi-
tional natural-law ideas, moreover, I shall argue that law that we hu-
mans make, "positive law," must, if it is to be law in the fullest sense,
be consistent with law that humans do not make, "natural law." But
the natural law on which I take my stand, and the conditions of its sat-
isfaction, differ so deeply from what "natural lawyers" have in mind,
that nominal sameness risks obscuring profound difference. The
"natural law" present to my mind consists not of natures, conformities
with nature, propositions, basic goods, or self-evidences. 25 It consists,
rather, in the conditions that the human mind itself issues for valid
knowing (and doing). 26 What my position plainly shares with tradi-
tional theories of natural law, nevertheless, is the judgment that what
we humans posit as law must conform to something more than, say,
Hartian "rules of recognition." What I shall argue is that law and its
rule, if they are to be truly lawful, must be rooted in human cognitive
method and in the law (natural, if you please) by which it is struc-
tured and po
sitionThis pos tion is similar to ones that have gotten certain law pro-
fessors accused of being covert theologians. Of the gravamen of the
second anticipated objection, then, I may also be guilty. Then again, a
demurrer may be the more appropriate move, because the
significance of the charge is not clear. At the risk of anticipating too
25 For a taxonomy and analysis of these, the most influential conceptions of natural
law, see JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL: THE ANATOMY OF A
WESTERN INSIGHT 123.43 (1999). For a much more detailed and broad statement of the
range of available notions of natural law, see generally the study by PAULINE C. WESTER-
MAN, THE DISINTEGRATION OF NATURAL LAW THEORY: AQUINAS TO FINNIS (1998).
%s My position does have common giound with hermeneutic approaches to law. In-
deed, I understand my stance as something of a middle-way between natural law and her-
meneutics, though in this Article I have hot made that case explicitly. For an insightful
case for the convergence of the neo-natural law and hermeneutic positions, see Francis J.
Mootz III, Law in Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal Argumentation, and the Natural Law
Thadition, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 311 (1999).
27 By putting my thesis thus I do not mean to obscure what I do not deny, viz., that
"positive law" not in conformity with natural law is still law in a non-focal sense of the word
"law." See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 351-66 (1980). But what I
shall deny, with Lon Fuller and others, is that assertions of such law" can, inasmuch as
they are unlawful in their cognitive origins, create a moral obligation of obedience. See
infra text accompanying notes 271, 421.
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much of my conclusion, and of misleading the reader by assimilating
my position to someone else's, I ask you to begin by pondering this
conclusion of law professor Joseph Vining:
Neither lawyer nor theologian may like any suggestion that
they are brother and sister. Theologians may not like it,
thinking that lawyers are individuals peculiarly without belief
of any kind. Lawyers may not like theology's other-
worldliness and claim of universal domination. Turning to
theology may seem a failure, a giving up of the reach to be-
come a science like the other disciplines that escaped the
domination of theology hundreds of years ago. But law that
has not become a science may, if it recognizes the fact, teach
a thing or two to the life sciences and the science of man.
Law may indeed be a science of man. And it may be neces-
sary to look into a mirror that leaves nothing out if law is to
see itself for what it is. Theology may not be law any more
than any metaphor is the same as that which it reflects. But it
has the perhaps unique advantage that, like law, it leaves
nothing out, not person, nor present, nor freedom, nor will,
nor madness, nor the individual, nor the delight of a child,
nor the eyes of a fellow human being, nor our sense of the
ultimate, in its effort to make sense of our experience and
make statements that are consistent and understandable in
light of it all. 28
My aim in this Article is to begin making sense of the rule of law
"in light of it all," but not as an encyclopaedist, saying a little some-
thing about everything. 29 Instead, my method is the one suggested by
Bernard Lonergan: "Thoroughly understand what it is to understand,
and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be
understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern,
opening upon all further developments of understanding."" To un-
derstand human understanding, and what it can and cannot achieve,
I undertake an analysis of the Subject and, more specifically, how she
knows anything at all, particularly meaning, specifically legal mean-
ing. From this analysis of the Subject's cognitive life emerges the an-
28 JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 201 (1986).
29 Cf. Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639, 692
(1990) ("Everything matters, always.").
SO BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING xxviii
(1978) (italics omitted).
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swer to my question, "Is the rule of law possible?" It is the question—or
rather the questioning that is forever driving the wondering Subject—
that operates as inner law upon the Subject. It is the question, not any
answer, that provides a fixed base from which to construct the rule of
law.
From the oblique angle of a study of human cognition we shall
have come to a central question of Anglo-American jurisprudence—
and we may have something to contribute to an answer. Law has long
been hobbled by the hand wringing and reconstructive antics of what
H.L.A. Hart felicitously termed the "disappointed absolutist,"" the
jurisprude who wants law to be so determinate and self-sufficient as to
be able to claim its own instances." Analytic jurisprudence, even a
whole lot of it, has been unable to deliver such an engine, and from
this Article too the absolute-absolutist will go away empty-handed. But
the reader should not now brace herself for a leveling, a paean to the
honor in muddling-through. This Article is, after all, an attempt to
rehabilitate the rule of law. If there is to be any leveling, it will be a
leveling up. Paralyzed by "the extraordinarily unappetizing pros-
pect"" that "we are all we have,"" we haven't gotten to know very well
what it means to be limn and women, not gods. 33 When we get to
know ourselves, we just may find that we are transcendent. Men and
women may not be cognitively capable of the absolute-absolute, but
they are capable of a limited absolute. Transcendence, as when one
Subject grasps another's meaning, occurs. That may not be what the
absolute-absolutist had wanted, but it just may be what we need.36
51 MIA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 139 (2d ed. 1994).
32 See Martin Stone, Focusing the Law: Mat Legal Interpretation is Not, in LAW AND INTER-
PRETATION 31, 34-49 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1996).
" Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE U. 1229, 1249
(1979).
34 Id.
3° HART, SK/FEK note 31, at 128 ("DAIe are men, not gods.").
sa See Williams Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property': Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 470 (1977) (using Mick Jagger lyrics to sum-
marize post-Goldberg Is Kel6) trends in administrative Due Process).
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II. GETTING TO THE SUBJECT
Sometimes it seems as if there is only one story in American legal thought
and only one problem. The story is the story of formalism and the problem is
the problem of the subject. The story of formalism is that it never deals with
the problem of the subject. The problem of the subject is that it's never been
part of the story.
Until now.
—Pierre Schlag"
Rule of Law thinkers' current orthodoxy is that the Subject is
somewhere in law. A thriving heterodoxy has it, however, that the Sub-
ject is everywhere, the law nowhere. Thinkers aspiring to the rule of
law, therefore, think a lot about how to keep the Subject without los-
ing law. The result is that the subject of the Subject is all over the legal
literature: No longer pretending that we can get by without the Subject ,
in law, many legal academics make something of a life wondering how
we can get by with the Subject. The trouble is, little of this literature
actually gets to the Subject as he is.
The most obvious reason for not getting all the way to the Subject
is that by the rule of law we mean the Rule-of-Law-not-of-men. To be
sure, we are all legal realists now; we know that behind the masks of
the law,38 subjects breathe." But, in ways that I shall elaborate below,
we think or unconsciously suppose that with those masks and other
tools we fallen women and men might reconstruct the prelapsarian
Rule-of-Law-not-of-men." With metaphors and interpretive regimes,
"reason" and "objectivity," theories and meta-theories,'" we endeavor
to carry on as much as possible as though we had not discovered the
Subject in law.
None of those tools, however, nor the combination of them, will
do the job. They precipitate the predicaments that have led not only
to the ridicule but also to the repudiation of the rule of law they were
" Schlag, supra note 24, at 1627,1743.
S8
	 generally Jowl T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO,
HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (1976).
" Set JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERI-
ENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 3 (1998).
" Cf. Gmmisrr GILMORE, THE AGES of AMERICAN LAW 111  (1977) ("In Heaven there will
be no law .... In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously
observed.").
II "Leon Lipson ... is rumored to have said, 'Anything you can do, 1 can do meta.'"
SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 4, at 148 & 148 11.8.
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created to serve. They not only make problems for the rule of law that
the Subject cannot solve; they make the very Subject a problem for
the rule of law. In Parts HI and IV of this Article I attempt to lay bare
the Subject who makes possible the rule of law. Prior to that, in this
Part, my project is to clear a path to the Subject—identifying and
critically evaluating the devices and detours that are thrown up to
make us think that we can understand and do law without first know-
ing the human Subject.
The roadblocks are not in the first instance the creations of legal
minds (though the lawyers have  been eager to chip in). Their origins
are much deeper. They are, in short, a function of the basic stances
assumed by anyone making any statement about anything, including
law. What I mean by this is that anytime anyone says anything about
anything, she brings to bear certain basic positions on three basic is-
sues: (1) what is, a metaphysics; (2) what counts as knowing, an epis-
temology; (3) what one is doing when one is knowing, a cognitional
theory. No one can say anything about anything, including law, with-
out taking a stance on each of these three basic issues. Very often,
one's stances on these issues remain implicit, or only some of them
are explicated. These general stances, however, are operative whenever
one takes a position on a specific issue of law, and these stances con-
trol, in drastic and sometimes surprising ways, one's resolution of
those specific issues. The single greatest factor in all this is the order
in which the stances are assumed, and what controls that order.
Most commonly, people begin by taking a stance on what is real.
The real seems so obvious as not to need analysis. We just talk about
what is. The metaphysical stance is developed first, tacitly. But then
the possibility of mistake is countenanced; indeed, mistakes occur.
Then, typically, a stance on the next issue is developed; the necessary
and sufficient conditions for known* the real are set out, an episte-
mology—making it possible to distinguish the genuine article from
the pretenders. Then, finally and not all that often, attention turns to
what the Subject is doing when he or she is knowing the real. Varia-
tions on this seriation are possible, but they tend to converge on one
result. When people start with the first, or with the second issue, or
with a conflation of the two, and come to the third, if at all, with
stances on the first and/or the second, the third will already seem ir-
relevant or intrusive. It is thus that the Subject comes to seem irrele-
vant to, or an outright problem for, the rule of law.
The specific burden of this Part is to explicate these three basic
stances, the sequences in which they can be taken, and the conse-
quences of the sequences in which they are in fact taken—all in law.
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What I aim to show, more precisely, is that approaches to law that start
outside the Subject lead to strange, sometimes even silly, conse-
quences. The reader, eager to get to the Subject, might be tempted to
proceed directly to Parts III and IV; the analysis in those Parts is, in-
deed, rather self-contained. But a clear inventory of the problems
generated by not starting with the Subject is a contribution to my ar-
gument that starting from the Subject is not a detour or an alternative
or a curiosity. But rather, whether we realize it or not, it is the condi-
tion of the possibility of meeting the concerns that forms the core of
the rule of law—and, indeed, of meaningful and worthy human liv-
ing.
To assemble that inventory, I canvass examples of four possible
approaches to law and its rule. I begin with accounts of law that im-
plicitly or explicitly take a stance on metaphysics first, that is, accounts
that say first what law is. Then I proceed to accounts that give priority
to the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing law, an episte-
mology. Third, I turn to a group of accounts of law that equivocate
between privileging metaphysics on the one hand or epistemology on
the other. These accounts lead to that final category, the precious few
accounts that begin neither with dogmatic pronouncement of what
law is, nor of what counts as knowing it, but by asking "What am I, the
Subject, doing when I am knowing law?" The sequence in which the
questions are answered makes the difference. By not beginning with
the question I just posed, the Subject gets squeezed into the analysis
late in the day, if at all. The results are a Subject who is a problem for
the rule of law and a rule of law that is beyond human reach.
A. Metaphysics First?
When we conclude that something just is, we need not ask how
we know it, nor what we are doing when we know it. Lots of work is
saved by this preemption. The only price is plausibility, a cost that
takes time to grasp. Meanwhile, the idea that this thing just is can
make considerable progress in the minds whose workings are being
ignored. The Rule-of-Law-not-of-men is just such an idea.
Perhaps Paul Kahn is correct that Chief Justice Marshall's opin-
ion in Marbury u Madison is itself the greatest contribution to the
creation of our regnant notion of the rule of law, the Rule-of-Law-not-
of-men. But Pierre Schlag also is on to something when he observes
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that we, the readers of Marbury, find "neither odd nor surprising"42
the opinion's inattention to the "we" who "say what the law is." 45 Mar-
shall may get the credit (or blame) for crystallizing the idea that our
rule of law is to be of the "not of men" variety, but Marshall was work-
ing from within a legal tradition that made available the conceptual
rudiments of a rule of law that was a Rule-of-Law-not-of-men." The
history of those concepts is complicated, and will concern us some
below. My immediate interest is in how they function to make law and
its rule so metaphysical, so real that the contribution of the Subject
gets made explicit, if at all, only under duress.
The law according to Christopher Columbus Langdell is not the
only, but it is certainly the favorite, example of law that just is. "Lang-
dell's work," as Pierre Schlag observes, "reads like law's immaculate
conception?* But in the case of the capital-letter Immaculate Con-
ception, at least, we are clear that there were human Subjects—Anna
and Joachim, by tradition—doing the conceiving, immaculate by
grace. In the land of Langdell, by contrast, law is made to appear on
41 Schlag, supra note 24, at 1628.
43 Marbtu y v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
44 On Marshall's reliance in Marbury on abstract ideas in preference to the text of the
Constitution, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 71-72, 74, 95-96, 197 (1985). Professor Currie observes of
the Marshall Court that the most striking fact is that most of Marshall's brethren were
nearly invisible." Id. at 194. This was no accident. Prior to Marshall, the Court had gener-
ally followed the English practice of each jurist's producing an opinion in a contentious or
difficult case. In Marshall's first term the practice was abandoned in favor of achieving
whenever possible an "Opinion of the Court." KAHN, supra note 5, at 106. The force and
effect of Marshall's own personal power on the Court dramatically undercut his Rule-of-
Law-not-of-men, of course. 'There is no 'who' under the rule of law. The most important
example of this approach to Marbury is Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch.
Bickel tries to save law by making it continuous with other forms of politics. In spite of his
attempt, this approach inevitably ends up hollowing out law from within .... [A] strategy
is a way of understanding within a contested conceptual domain. The rule of law is a series
of strategies for maintaining the appearance of law." Id. at 167. (footnotes omitted). Kahn
continues:
The law that we see hides the failures of the law that we do not see. Every ap-
pearance is both a revealing and a concealing. If Marbury represents the rule
of law, not men, it also represents the victory of law without men. We have lost
sight of Marbury himself. We are losing sight of all the real actors: Jefferson,
Madison, Marshall, and Marbury. We see in their place only 'the people.' The
ultimate victory of law is when we no longer see ourselves at all.
Id. at 174.1 would say, rather, that we achieve law by transcending ourselves through know-
ing meaning we communally create, faithful to inner law, to live by. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 427-437.
45 Schlag, supra note 24, at 1632. We can finesse Schlag's peculiar substitution for the
virgin birth which would seem more to his point.
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stage alone, the dramatis personae nowhere to be seen. To be sure, it is
Langdell who writes the treatises saying what the law of equity or con-
tracts is, and as Schlag observes,
We know Langdell. We've worked with Langdell. He's no
Stanley Fish. On the contrary, Christopher understood per-
fectly well that he was an individual subject. And he could
use the "I" indicatively and ontologically as well as the rest of
us .... [W]henever Chris addresses a matter of pedagogy in
[the preface to his contracts casebook], the "I" is all over the
place. And yet, quite mysteriously, as soon as the law makes
its appearance in the preface, the "I" vanishes. Chris disap-
pears. Dean Langdell is removed.*
At that moment there is just the law. Law is, for aught that appears,
just out them—alone, it "does it all." 47 The Subject is no part of the law
that's already out there; law has been made to seem self-sufficient. "In
Langdell's discourse," as Schlag explains,
the doctrines not only mean, they do things to each other—
frequently in a visible way. Doctrines doing things to other
doctrines is hardly a unique characterization of Langdellian
discourse. What is unique to Langdellian discourse is the
uncharacteristic visibility and frequency of this doing and its
apparent doctrinal self-actualization. Indeed, in Langdellian
discourse the doctrines seem to negate, convert, modify, and
limit each other without the apparent assistance of any social
actor—not even the author.... They arrive. They are a
growth. They are extending. Their growth can be traced. They
are embodied. The law here is rendered in animistic terms. It
is personified.... Soon it will even go so far as to make an
appearance. Watch. "[T]he many different guises in which
the same doctrine is constantly making its appearance . . . [is]
the cause of much misapprehension?"
Why does something so implausible make progress in men's
minds? The answer, as Schlag and a host of others have shown, is that
some thing as implausible as a law that exists out there seems not only
plausible but simply true, for the simple—though not the most ba-
46 Id. at 1633 (footnotes omitted).
47 See it at 1634.
48 Id. at 1647 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting C. LANGDEII., A SELEC-
TION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at viii—ix (1871)).
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sico—reason that it appears through the metaphors by which we are
always already accustomed to describe reality. The striking but simple
fact is that "I belong to my language far more than it belongs to me." 50
In the language we inherit and take for granted, we describe the
real—what really is—as a collection of spatially extended objects. For
example, when we want to emphasize their importance, our good or
bad intentions are part of the furniture of the real world. When I really
understand you, I see what you're saying. When your argument is non-
sense, I see through it. When I think things through, I balance the rele-
vant factors. We draw lines. Ideas are part of a marketplace. Wheti life is
really crummy, it's empty. When it's meaningful, it's /tam The exam-
ples could be multiplied endlessly.
If these spatial metaphors serve as aids for describing reality, they
also disserve by making us think that reality is in fact only what is spa-
tially extended. Most men and women find it almost impossible not to
identify the real—what is—with the empirical component of human
life. This easy identification is perhaps the greatest cause of a meta-
physics-first stance and the host of problems in its wake. There will be
much more to say about this below.
The point to note now is that in the (almost) unavoidable con-
text of such a metaphysics, it is (almost) unavoidable to think about
law as some thing—which, if it is real, is already out there to be seen. 52
49 See infra text accompanying notes 50-52, 121-130.
80 DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION, HOPE 50
(1987).
Al On the place of metaphor in language, see, for example, GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN,
FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE
Live BY (1980). On the place of metaphor in law, see for example, among the abundant
studies, MILNER S. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY
(1985); HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 2, 3, 5, 7, 14, 15,
186-98 (1992) ("marketplace of ideas," "wall of separation," "chilling effect," "captive
audience," "shedding rights," "fire" leading to "conflagration"); SUSAN MINER, THE ROLE
OF METAPHOR IN THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 8-20, 26-45, 86-104 (1993) (MA. in English
thesis, University of San Francisco); JUNE STARR, LAW AS METAPHOR: FROM ISLAMIC
COURTS TO THE PALACE OF JUSTICE (1992); STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOR-
EST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 43-68 (2001) [hereinafter WINTER, CLEARING IN THE FOREST);
Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaplwric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stake for
Levu 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1159-1205 (1989) [hereinafter Winter, Transcendental Non-
sense].
" Joseph Vining sees (so to speak) how all this works:
If either the speaker we hear, or what is said, consists of an arrangement of
constant and identical or replaceable units, the individuality of which ar-
rangement is the probabilistic unlikeliness of an identical arrangement be-
cause of the large number of possible arrangements of such units; and if ei-
ther the speaker or what is said, being such an object, interacts with other
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And that, predictably, is what happens. "If the meaning of law is lo-
cated in an object-form (i.e., the doctrines and principles) whose op-
erative meaning requires almost"—the 'almost' being the critical con-
cession to which we shall return—"no contribution from any
individual subject, then law itself is stable, self-identical, foundation-
ally secure and bounded; it is, in other words, just like an object?"
And once law is always already out there, object-like, the result is plain
and predictable. "[T] he individual subject emerges only as a potential
threat. "54
To get the law located out there turns out to be not so simple,
however. On the one hand, as Schlag observes, "In Langdell's uni-
verse, things happen, thoughts get thought, and the passive voice gets
used a lot. ... When it is law that is produced, the 'I' is kept out of
sight (and out of mind)."55 But the "I" can't be kept totally out of
sight. The law that is out there must, if it is to be ours, be known. If
there is to be a knowing of law, then there will have to be Subjects.
And this, of course, promptly throws law's vaunted objectivity into
doubt. "If one concedes ... that the subject is necessary to read this
order, what guarantees that this subject will read the order of the ob-
ject correctly?"56 The reading by which the Subject knows the law is
the inevitable contribution, the contribution that required the "al-
most" above. From the instant it has to be acknowledged, it should
make law's metaphysicians nervous.
But Langdell does not seem to have been the nervous sort, so the
obvious question is what kept him secure in law's objectivity. The an-
swer is that Langdell regarded law as a science.57 The view that law is a
such objects according to what are called "rules " which may change but
which are ultimately translatable from words into mathematical notations and
into the causal postulates of the physical world; then I might say the experi-
ence of Shakespeare is or would be impossible .... Then 1 would say law is
impossible and must be abandoned. "No," everyone would say. They might
ignore me as I say it, this fragment of speech. But they would not say, "So
what?"
Vining, supra note 1, at 20-2L
" Schlag, supra note 24, at 1635.
54 Id at 1636.
" Id.
56 Id.
57 "Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines ...."
LANGDELL, supra note 48, at vi (quoted in Schlag, supra note 24, at 1634); cf. Thomas C.
Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pin. L. REV. 1, 13 (1983) (noting that a fully scientific law
was an "aspiration" of Langdellians).
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science was, indeed, "[t]he heart of Rangdell's1 theory."58 But what
could this possibly inean?59 Does it amount to anything more than justi-
fying controversiak per controversialius? This all depends on what one
means by "science."
Aristotle is the person credited as the inventor of the first sem-
blance of a method for investigating the natural world.6° Sometimes
Aristotle was willing to identify knowledge generated through that
investigative method as science.61 But more often and more typically,
Aristotle restricted science to another kind and body of knowledge,
viz., certain and immediate knowledge of what is unchanging. This
meant that for Aristotle, mathematics alone was true science, for in it
alone did contingency play no part.62 The axioms of mathematics
were unchanging and, according to Aristotle, known not through ex-
perience and induction from it, nor through dialectic, but instead
"immediately" through "intuition."63 It was the availability of this infal-
lible, "intuitional," way of knowing that made true science possible,
and set it ahead of all other claims to knowledge
58 Grey, supra note 57, at 5.
59 Id. at 16 ("On first encounter, the very idea of 'legal science' held by Langdell and
his followers is baffling."). The Langdellians' aspiration to a "legal science" was by no
means unprecedented. For a compendious account of die Roman jurists' adoption of Aris-
totelian techniques contributing to a "science of law," see PETER STEIN, REGULAE IURIS:
FROM JURISTIC RULES TO LEGAL MAXIMS 33-48 (1966); on the emergence of tnedieval
"legal science," see HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 120-64 (1983).
64) W.K.G. GUTHRIE, 6 A HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY: ARISTOTLE: AN ENCOUNTER
130 (1981). On pre-Aristotelian "science," see R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE lots OF NATURE
2-3, 29-48 (1945).
el GUTHRIE, supra note 60, at 131. "Leibnitz retnarked that Aristotle was the first to
think mathematically in fields outside the strictly mathematical." COLLINGWOOD, sura
note 60, at 47.
62 W.D. Ross, ARISTOTLE'S PRIOR AND POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 14 (1949); see also id. at
51-75; GUTHRIE, supra note 60, at 47-48, 170-86; AmsronE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 2, 6
(H.G. Apostle ed., Peripatetic Press, 1981) (7169-16, 73a21).
63 ARISTOTLE, Posterior AnaRties, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 186 (Richard
McKeon ed., 1941) (11.19, 1006-10-15). G.R.G. Mure provides this translation:
Fri here will be no scientific knowledge of the primary pretnisses, and since
except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be in-
tuition that apprehends the primary premisses—a result which also follows
from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demon-
stration, nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge. If,
therefore, it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific knowl-
edge, intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge.
Id. at 108, 186. But tf. JONATHAN BARNES, ARISTOTLE'S POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 80-82, 248-
60 (1975). See generally PATRICK H. BYRNE, ANALYSIS AND SCIENCE IN ARISTOTLE 170-71,
181 (1997).
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Strange as it may seem, Langdell took half (but only half) of what
was to Aristotle true science. What Langdell affirms is that law has
premises which can be worked with like the axioms of geometry—
"not merely human constructs, but rather obvious and indubitable
physical truths about the structure of space, from which nonobvious
truths (like the Pythagorean theorem) can be proved by sequences of
indubitable deductive steps." 64 What Langdell rejected of the Aristote-
lian notion of science is the notion that law's axioms are to be con-
ceived as "rationally self-evident intuitions." Langdell understood
law's axioms instead "as especially well-confirmed inductive generaliza-
tions about the physical world." 65 As Professor Thomas Grey explains,
"Langdell believed that through scientific methods, lawyers could de-
rive correct legal judgments from a few fundamental principles and
concepts, which it was the task of the scholar-scientist like himself to dis-
cover"66
To be sure, once one has admitted, as Langdell very self-
consciously did, that there is a method of discovering law, the Subject is
on stage. There is someone providing the metaphysics. But if, as ap-
pears, the Subject's contribution did not present Langdell with a
problem for law's certainty, this should be only because Langdell
thought that law's "axioms" were grasped by the Subject as Aristotle
thought those of mathematics were, through some process that pre-
vented the Subject's intrusion 67 However, the process by which Lang-
dell's axioms are known is, again, not intuition but induction 68—a
procedure that itself can become certain only when conducted
through statistical probabilities, 69 a procedure not known to Langdell
64 Grey, supra note 57, at 18.
65 Id. (emphasis added). "For legal science" as understood by Langdell, "the universe
of data was not the totality of sense experience of the physical world, but rather the re-
stricted set of reported common law decisions—hence Langdell's often-reviled remark that
all the materials of legal science were to be found in printed books." It at 20 (footnote
omitted). See C. Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 LAW Q. Rev. 118, 124 (1887)
(quoted in Schlag, supra note 24, at 1633 n.17).
66 Grey, supra note 57, at 5 (emphasis added).
67 Trying to make Langdell's legal science" plausible, Professor Grey explores the pos-
sibility that "intuition," some "sixth-sense," provided the missing link, and notes that to
admit "intuition" would be to violate Langdell's commitment to law's being principled. See
id at 23-24.
" As Professor Grey notes, to Langdell and like-minded thinkers geometric axioms
apparently seemed verifiable by sense-perception alone, whereas sense-perception seemed
unable to validate law's axioms and conclusions. Id. at 20-21. On bare "sense perception's"
incapacity to verify anything, see infra text accompanying notes 109-115.
69 See IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY 176-85 (1984).
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(and not obviously relevant, at all events, to a normative rather than
an explanatory/descriptive enterprise)."
While imputing the prestige of science to law, Langdell and those
in his image simply fail to tell us exactly what the "legal scientist" is
doing to know law's "axioms." The Subject who would tell you the law
plunges pell-mell into telling you the law." As Joseph Vining says suc-
cinctly, "The scientist qua scientist leaves himself out of his picture of
man. Scientific jurisprudence left the judge out of its picture of law." 72
Only as an afterthought is the question, "How do you know what it is
you know?" answered, and predictably that answer—"scientific
method"—secures the legitimacy of what has already been reported.
But the vague invocation of scientific method, and the false ascrip-
tions of certainty to what is an inductive enterprise, invite the con-
tempt summed-up in Felix Cohen's remark that the devices of the le-
gal traditionalist "are supernatural entities which do not have a
verifiable existence except to the eyes of faith."73 But faith, of course,
faith even merely in humans, was what the modern "law as science"
project was bent on avoiding front the start. 74 It was the legacy of legal
realists such as Cohen to identify the actual and inevitable shortcom-
ings of the Langdellian enterpriSe. When the legal realists' critique of
"legal science" succeeded, as it did, legal science "disintegrated. "75
B. After the Fall from Metaphysics
What, then, is one to do? One alternative is to give up, and of
such despair there are examples of every stripe—from radical multi-
70 But see infra text accompanying notes 199-203.
71 "Langdell's most common form of doctrinal discourse was simple dogmatic pro-
nouncement ...." Grey, supra note 57, at 14; if Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due
Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 91 ("Scholars who spend too much time debating how to
conduct a discourse may never be able to say anything.").
75 VINING, supra note 28, at 39. Or at least it tries to. The project always fails, because it
has to. Should it be surprising that "[critics of formalism] have had little luck caging and
exhibiting mechanical jurisprudents (all specimens captured—even Blackstone and Jo-
seph Beale—have had to be released after careful reading of their texts)"? Vincent A.
Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal  Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart ft Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. Rev.
413, 430 n.106 (1987) (quoting IL DWORKIN, TAKING Itmurs SERIOUSLY 15-16 (rev. ed.
1977)).
73 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLum. L.
Rev. 809, 821 (1935).
74 On how the modern legal ambition to be rooted in science slides into faith, see
SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 4, at 19-29. The Medieval aspirations to a legal science
had, of course, a different notion of science as their model.
an Schlag, supra note 24, at 1657-58.
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culturalism to garden-variety Critical Legal Studies. A more hopeful
alternative is to admit outright that for the rule of law to be possible,
law must be knowable and known, and then to stipulate the necessary
and sufficient conditions of that knowledge, the task neglected by the
Langdellian. Professor Schlag calls that project "reconstruction," be-
cause, whether or not they recognize it, those engaged in it are trying
to put the Subject and object back together again after a disintegra-
tion—back together after. the Subject exploded out of the law that was
supposed to be a self-sufficient object waiting to be known in splendid
purity.
The reconstructionist is a legal thinker whose project is "to privi-
lege epistemology over ontology?" Epistemology is, indeed, her
trade. Having conceded that the Subject has a role in producing law,
she wants to show that somehow the Subject really can know the law
objectively. So she busies herself setting out the necessary and sufficient
conditions of the Subject's objective knowledge of law. She busies her-
self answering the question, "What counts as knowing—rather than
creating or inventing—law?"
Her answer is any number of variations on one theme: reason.
Lawyers who are epistemologists rather than metaphysicians are al-
ways explaining how "reason," a possession of the Subject, can be used
to get to law, the object, objectively, never subjectively. "[T]he effective
existence of reason can be considered a condition of possibility for
what American legal thinkers and actors take to be 'law' itself!"» As
Schlag explains,
It is the possibility of a publicly accessible and recognizable
reason that enables legal actors to claim that power, interest,
prejudice, and personal proclivities are constrained and con-
trolled by an overarching frame known as the rule of law.
Reason is thus an essential aspect of the rule of law.... From
the perspective of the rule-of-law ideal, the exhaustion of
reason is tantamount to an admission that legal actors do not
know what they are doing, that the law is, in a word, lawless."
Reason is essential to the rule of law because it is the great hope for
access to something beyond the Subject, viz., the law that is out there
objectively. The self-imposed burden of the reconstructionist is to show
76 Id. at 1661-62.
" SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 4, at 20.
78 Id. at 20-21.
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how reason can put the Subject into contact with, so that he can be
subordinated to and guided by, the object, law.
But what is this "reason" on which depends the avoidance of law-
lessness? The question may seem idle or pedantic; after all, Western-
ers have casually referred to the "faculty of reason" for almost two-
and-a-half millennia. It should therefore be easy enough to describe
it. And, indeed, to describe it turns out to have been much too easy.
Reason has been described with almost pathological frequency. And
since this marvelous faculty of reason has rarely been thought to be
physically isolable (Descartes' association of it with the pineal gland
being a conspicuous exception), the descriptions of it have varied
widely. The reconstructionist, ever eager to set things right, is at all
times ready to shift the ground about what reason is in order to en-
sure that reason is (in charge). 79 But from amidst the shifting descrip-
tions and conceptions emerges what Professor Schlag identifies as
"ego-centered reason." The world is ego-centered reason's oyster, as
Schlag explains: "As its name indicates, ego-centered reason affirms
the validity of the rule of reason as determined by the individual ra-
tionalist self.""
To understand ego-centered reason (and its consequences), it
helps to recall Descartes, the rationalist. Descartes received from his
immediate intellectual forebears the hallowed distinction between
opinio and scientia,81 and with what was passing under the latter title at
the end of the Middle Ages, Descartes was remarkably unimpressed.
Medieval thinkers allowed as scientia what was supported by the better
authorities, but the very plurality, of "authorities" convinced Descartes
that authority itself could not be the source of science. Descartes's
next move is familiar to anyone remembering Philosophy 101. Sci-
ence, Descartes concluded, could be nothing other than what he him-
" Id. at 19-29.
Schlag, supra note 18, at 1210-11. Rationalist consciousness
posits a strongly idealist conception of reason in which the rationalist self
knows few (if any) limits on its ability to understand and rationalize the world.
Ego-centered reason understands that all claims or arguments about the na-
ture of law or the world are addressed to the rational ego itself. The rational-
ist self is radically free—it need not (and should not) accept any claim that
would de-center itself or its reason in adjudicating the nature of reality.
Id. at 1211.
el Descartes was heavily imbued with the scholasticism of his period. See generally, e.g.,
ETIENNE GILSON, ETUDES SUR LE ROLE DE LA PENSEE MEDItVALE DANS,LA PORMATION DU
SYST6I CARTESIEN (1951).
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self found indubitable after calling everything into radical doubt.82
When Descartes undertook to settle what was scientific by subjecting
everything to radical doubt, he struck out on his own. "For Descartes
... what most matters in life is no longer played out in the dimensions
of community and tradition."85 Descartes sought, as Michael Oake-
shott put it, "to live each day as if it were his first!"M
"Has something close to genuine scientia been achieved in any
area of human inquiry?," asks Jeffrey Stout. "Only, Descartes con-
cludes, in arithmetic and geometry, which now become the model for
all science."85 Knowledge of this sort was, for Descartes in a way remi-
niscent of Aristotle, the result of an immediate intuition, a kind of
"mental look." For Descartes, as Stout explains: "One discovers truth
in the privacy of subjective illumination, and this truth is underlined
by a kind of self-certifying certainty. ... [Me are told, in effect, that
when it comes to objective certainty, either you have it or you don't. "86
You have it, according to Descartes, exactly if you intuit it or see it
clearly and distinctly with the eyes of the mind.87
Roughly two centuries later Alexis de Tocqueville observed that
America was the country where Descartes's precepts were "least stud-
ied and best followed,"88 and only the other day, in his The Constitution
and the Pride of Reason, Steven Smith called our collective attention to
how the Cartesian mentality worked its way into American law. The
view at the time of the founding, Smith shows, was that law was to be
the product of "reason," and reason in turn was to be the achieve-
ment of the lone and doubting individual unshackled from mere
authority, unburdened of the weight of the blind accumulation called
tradition.89
" jEFFREY STOUT, THE FLIGHT FROM AUTHORITY: RELIGION, MORALITY, AND TliE
QUEST FOR AUTONOMY 49 (1981); see also id at 25-61.
"Id. at 49.
"Id. at 7 (quoted without citation).
85 Id. at 49.
" Id. at 49-50.
87 See DESCARTES, Rules for the Direction of the Minds, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF
DESCARTES I, 7-8,33 ( ES. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross eds., 1911).
88 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMEIUCA 429 (quoted in Mary Ann Glen-
don, Knowledge Makes a Noisy Entrance: The Struggle for Self-Appropriation in Law, in 10 LON-
FAGAN WORICSHOP: THE LEGACY OF LONERGAN 119,120-21 (Fred Lawrence ed., 1994)).
88 STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON 25-30 (1998); Me
also ERNEST GELLNER, REASON AND CULTURE 157 (1992). On the complex of philosophical
positions adduced to support the Constitution, see also generally MORTON WHITE, PHI-
LOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987).
2002] 	 The Rule of Law	 253
Contemporary examples of this mentality—examples, ironically,
of summonses to regard reason the way people once did—are ready
to hand. Worried that the Right and the Left have united in a con-
spiracy to debunk reason, Suzanna Sherry commends the Enlighten-
ment notion of reason to law because of its repudiation of "the mil-
lennium of superstition, otheirworldliness, mysticism, and dogma
known as the Middle, or Dark, Ages?" Personal revelation and insti-
tutional power were no longer valid sources of authority. Instead, the
human capacity to reason, in all its splendor, would control the fu-
ture.°
One wonders whether someone writing such things could have
any first-hand knowledge of what such as Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and
John of St. Thomas managed to my about reason notwithstanding that
they had to say it, if at all, during the age some call dark. At all events,
Sherry's reason, for all its putative power, remains rather opaque and
mysterious. "In some ways," writes Sherry just a page after reason's
boast, "it is easier to describe what reason is by explaining what it is
not."92 And predictably, Sherry takes the easier way out, as do so many
others.
Though J. Harvie Wilkinson, for example, strikes a more moder-
ate tone, the "reason" to which , he tethers the legitimate exercise of
the Article III judicial power is equally undescribed. At one point he
even suggests that there is nothing to be described, because "reason"
is only a cover for more basic judicial commitments: "The law's faith
in reason must represent something more. Reasoning is a proxy for
other values and preferences: order over chaos, evolution over revolu-
tion, thought over passion, prolonged argumentation over precipitate
action."93 One wonders how this differs from saying that science is a
proxy for superstition.
Whatever is claimed for reason by such as Sherry and Wilkinson,
however, is dwarfed by the super-human reason insinuated into the
9° Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453, 456 (1996) (quoting RALPH
KETCHAM, FRAMED FOR POSTERITY: THE ENDURING PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION 21
(1993)).
91 M ; see also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADI-
CAL ASSAULT ON Timm IN AMERICAN LAW (1997).
92 Sherry, supra note 90, at 455. Sherry goes a long distance toward describing reason
as conformity with logic." Id. at 455-56. My own position, as I shall develop it infra, is ex-
actly that logic can be used to produce the propositions that intelligence produces, but
that "logic" is not itself a criterion by which to judge propositions.
Harvie Wilkinson, The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 779, 797
(1989)
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lap of law by Ronald Dworkin in the "person" of Hercules." Dworkin's
mythical judge is well-known to legal readers. So familiar with the
man are we, indeed, that we may forget that he is not man at all; the
strangeness of thinking of law in terms of a reasoning-machine never
incarnate, even in the glory-days of Sherry's Enlightenment, seems to
have worn off. But the bizarreness of the enterprise had not escaped
John Noonan when he wondered, "[Why should this imaginary con-
struct be used to explain the actions of real judges?" 95 To Dworkin
and Hercules we shall return later, but now I would just note that
Dworkin's Hercules epitomizes the reconstructionist move; so success-
ful is the reconstruction—if fiction counts as success—that what gets
built exceeds the merely human artifact that had disintegrated.
Dworkin, along with so many other leaders in today's legal acad-
emy, learned enthusiasm for "reason" at the knees of Henry Hart and
Albert Saks and their "legal process" materials. 96 Hart and Sacks and
their cooperators were not mechanical jurisprudes; indeed, they were
acutely aware that persons, and specifically their "reason," would have
to be called into service, and about reason Hart and Saks wrote with
conviction and force. Infamously, indeed, they instructed the inter-
preter of a legal text to assume, "unless the contrary unmistakably ap-
pears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursu-
ing reasonable purposes reasonably."97 What holds the whole process
together is a faith in reason.98 Reason is believed in, and its hegemony
assumed. The faith in reason is strong enough that the Black Box is
never opened." And faith remains, of course, exactly what Descartes
and the enlightened following him had meant to deliver us from.
Enlightenment rationality has become so successfully in-
grained in our processes, forms, and practices that, ironi-
cally, we have (almost) completely lost the quintessentially
" Ronald Dworkin, TAKING Rie&rrs SERIOUSLY 105 41977) ("I have invented, for this
purpose, a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience, and acumen, whom I shall call
Hercules."). See also id. at 105-30.
95 NOONAN, supra note 38, at 174.
95 See HENRY M. HARTJR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCES& BASIC PROBLEMS
IN. THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994).
97 Id. at 1378.
" See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 601,703-05 (1993); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra note 96, at
lxii—lxviii.
" See Schlag, supra note 18, at 1211-12.
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Enlightenment capacity to question.... We have come to be-
lieve in our own rationality in a fundamentalist manlier....
The rationality of the Enlightenment has become so success-
ful, so hegemonic, that it has become immobilized through
its own institutionalization. 100
The Enlightenment's faith in reason exceeds in its dogmatism any
genuine Christian conception of faith. 101
Reconstruction—the attempt to take the world by "reason"—has,
at the end of the day, less chance of succeeding than the efforts of all
the king's armies and all the king's men to reconstruct Humpty
Dumpty. The efforts are foreordained to fail because—unlike the case
of Humpty—the inherited pieces were never the pieces of some one.
They cannot be fitted back together, because they never did fit to-
gether. Starting in matins res, the legal epistemologist is saddled with a
sack of shards that simply cannot be united unless and until she un-
derstands the principle of that unity—the contents of the Black Box
that is human intelligence. That requires, in turn, that she promote
herself from an epistemologist into a student of the human Subject,
but that promotion is resisted.
C. Still Falling, for Mystery
Some legal minds are still pinning their hopes on the Black Box,
but others have given up on "reason" as a starting point. Those in the
latter camp are eager to find—or create—virtue in merging law and
law-finder, object and Subject, metaphysics and epistemology. For
these minds, "legal meaning is located neither in the subject nor in
the object, but in some unspecified synthesis, circumvention, media-
tion, or transcendence of the subject-object relation." Mystery is no
longer the embarrassment but the boast.
Consider, for example, Charles Fried's post-reconstruction
stance. Lawyers, Fried tells us, know something that even philosophers
do not. What is this knowledge known only to the cartel? "The answer
is simple: the law."103 After playing the Hart and Sacks game, one
10° Schlag, Polities of Form, supra note 4, at 73.
CI AVERY DULLES, THE ASSURANCE OF THINGS HOPED FOR: A THEOLOGY OF CHRIS-
TIAN FAITH 233 (1994) ('The assent of faith, then, can coexist with a realization that faith
is a risk and that it hovers over an abyss of nonevidence.").
102 Schlag, supra note 24, at 1660 (emphasis added).
103 Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV.
30, 57 (1981).
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might have thought that law was accessible to all (reasonable) people
of reason, but not so according to Fried: "There really is a distinct and
special subject matter for our profession." Not only that; there is
also "a distinct method down there in that last twenty feet"th5 where
lawyers alone can go.
It is the method of analogy and precedent. Analogy and
precedent are the stuff of the law because they are the only
form of reasoning left to the law when general philosophical
structures and deductive reasoning give out, overwhelmed
by the mass of particular details Analogy is the application
of a trained, disciplined intuition where the manifold of par-
ticulars is too extensive to allow our minds to work on it de-
ductively"
This, Fried hastens to add, "is not a denial of reason; on the contrary,
it is a civilized attempt to stretch reason as far as it will go.907 But it is,
as Fried himself boasts, "an artificial reason."
This is a typical post-reconstruction strategy. While seeming very
common-sensical, with lots of talk about such homegrown ingredients
as precedent and analogy, the post-reconstructionist tells us—mirabik
dicturthat there is something wonderful or magical or just-plain-
mystical that happens to make law possible. Subject and object are
brought together, for example, by "a trained, disciplined intuition."1®
In The Lost Lawyer; Anthony Kroninan has seen what this is about:
I" Id.
105 Id.
ns Id. (emphasis added).
1°7 Id.
108 When King James I claimed that law's being founded upon reason allowed the king
as well as the judges to decide cases, Lord Coke replied that cases were to be decided by
something the king lacked, "the artificial Reason" of law. Fried, supra note 103, at 39-90
n.15 (quoting E. COKE, REPORTS 63, 65 (pt. 12, 9th ed. 1738), reprinted in 77 Eng.
Rep. 1342, 1393 (1907).
109 Fried is no doubt right that judges, even judges sophisticatedly self-conscious about
the judicial process, believe in intuition. Often that belief is tacit, but occasionally it gets
explicated, as it did by Cardozo in Hynes u New York Cent. RR Co., 231 N.Y. 229, 235-3611.3
(1921) (explaining that the maxims found inadequate to decide this unusual case were
framed "alio intuilu," thus implying that an intuitus would provide the solution to this case,
too). Richard Posner takes Cardozo to task for providing in his opinion in Hynes "no rea-
son" for his decision in the case. RICI4ARD POSNER, Csanozo: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 53
(1990). Posner fortifies his own claim that Cardozo did not, in fact, have a reason present-
to-mind by calling attention to Cardozo's extra-judicial admissions about how Hynes was
decided. Id. at 53-54.
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At this point it is tempting to seek refuge in the concept of
intuition, a mode of knowing that, as Kant remarked, is dis-
tinguished by the immediacy of its relation to its objects. In-
tuition is a form of understanding, but one that is incapable
of discursive explication. Unlike other forms of knowledge,
the sense or content of an intuition cannot be conveyed by
arguments alone. To have an intuition is just to see that
something is the case, to apprehend its obviousness in the
same direct way that I apprehend, for example, the shape
and color of the book I happen at the moment to be hold-
ing. Intuition is thus, in the most literal sense, a form of in-
sight, the intellectual equivalent of physical vision. It is how
we see things with the mind's
Aristotle and Descartes, those inveterate believers in intuition, would
he delighted. In answering the simple questions, "What am I doing
when I am knowing law?," and "Why is doing that knowing law?," the
intuitionist would reply, "intuiting" and "just 'cuz." And as Bernard
Williams once observed, when the answer is "intuition," the answer is
that there will be no answer. What Fried forgets is what Professor
Stout recognized as to Descartes himself: "intuitive certainty looks
useful only when not needed."
Fried is not alone in trying to do better than Enlightenment rea-
son. I think of the promoters of "craft." Craft, we are told, is the non-
I" ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
66 (1993) (citation omitted).
Stout's observation should be given its context:
A long tradition, often eclipsed from view (even, for much of its history, hid-
den from itself), has raised analogous questions about Cartesian subjectivity.
The problem conies down to this: intuitive certainty looks useful only when
not needed. When we need a disagreement settled, inner persuasion,
whether philosophical or theological in kind, contributes nothing. Appealing
to intuition as the basic tool for the reconstruction of scientia, Descartes lands
in the same kind of dialectical corner as the Protestant proponents of inner
persuasion. In both cases we want to know how to tell genuinely objective cer-
tainty from mistakenly heartfelt conviction. But we are told, in effect, that
when it collies to objective certainty, either you have it or you don't. Rational
disputation grinds to a halt, its gears stripped of what intersubjective norms of
discourse would provide. Nothing goes further toward the undoing of Des-
cartes's philosophy than the propositions he confidently presents as intuitive
which most of us, several centuries later, are inclined to judge obviously false.
Stout, supra note 82, at 50.
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algorithmic, indeed unspecifiable, judicial relation to law.'" It seems
to be a kind of mysterious art that deciding judges, at least the good
ones, have for producing—but not from whole-cloth—the law.l"
The craft notion allows rule-of-law thinkers to maintain a de-
sired ambiguity in answering the question of whether law is
principally, or even usually, theory or practice, universal or
contextual, immanent or transcendent, and so on. Precisely
because the rule-of-law approach represents law as craft—as
a way of doing things—the approach is simultaneously easy
to recognize in gestalt terms but difficult to identify in terms
of its constitutive jurisprudential cominitments. 114
When pressed to make craft seem less mysterious and more plausible,
its peddlers are likely to compare it or reduce it to "common sense" or
"good judgment" or "practical reason." 116
But there is in this last move "something tendentious."" 6 Craft
enters the legal lexicon , as au alternative to the disappointments of
the reason-driven account of law. But when the je ne sail quoi looms too
large, when someone really wants to know what it is and whether it is
legitimate, it is fortified by some (unjustified and unanalyzed) alle-
giance with the very notion (s) it was hailed in to replace. "To say that
good judgment allows the rule-of-law thinker to 'know' which doc-
trine applies when is a bit too self-congratulatory." 117 What we need is
an account of what separates good judgment from bad. As long as
some nescioquid stands at the center of law, whether it be craft or good
judgment or even practical reason, law remains essentially "unregu-
lated"" 8—lawless. 116
112 Cf KRONMAN, supra note 110, at 211-25; See also RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING
LAw 33-80, especially 37-63, 70 (1995).
"3 See POSNER, supra note 112, at 70 ("When craft is a mystery, the identity of the
craftsman conveys valuable information.").
114 Schlag, supra note 24, at 1663.
115 See Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment: Righting an Unwritten Constitution, 64
CHL-KENT L. Rev. 1001,1013 & n.55 (1988).
116 Schlag, supra note 24, at 1665.
119 Id. Schlag continues, Is good judgment here something more than a nice name for
arresting certain potentially problematic lines of inquiry? And if so, is 'good judgment' all
that different from 'lack of imagination' or 'intellectual mediocrity?'" Id. (footnote omit-
ted).
115 Id. at 1661.
119 See id. at 1660. There are, as Schlag would be quick to concede, abundant instances
of legal theories that invoke these concepts without ending in self-conscious mystery; of
these 1 shall give some examples below. See infra text accompanying notes 120-134.
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The question that remains after metaphysics, epistemology, and
mystery have failed jointly and severally to make law plausibly possible
is this: Is there in the house a Subject cognitively competent to realize
law and its rule? The question can be avoided but not escaped; the
rule of law is certainly not inevitable, but it may be possible. To know
whether it is, the Subject himself has to come in for analysis. The Sub-
ject has to be for a moment not a problem but precisely the object of
inquiry.
D. Intimations of the Subject
Throughout this Part, I have been categorizing and exemplifying
approaches to law according to which of three issues they resolve first
(either explicitly or implicitly). 'So far, I have considered those that
primarily proceed from either a metaphysical or an epistemological
stance, or from a, studied preference for a mysterious half-way house.
So far, moreover, my analysis has paralleled that of Pierre Schlag, as
the preceding pages indicate., The reason is that Schlag's post-
modernist project is, like my project, about getting to the place of the
Subject in law. As a result of this commitment to ferreting out the
Subject in law, Schlag is among' the few legal analysts who have seen
clearly what the next step must be, after metaphysics, epistemology,
and merger fail: "a cognitive approach to law." 120
But here, somewhere in this vicinity, Schlag and I part company,
and it is important to see exactly where and why. Schlag adopts a
"cognitive approach" to law, but his purpose emphatically never ex-
tends to making familiar what human Subjects do cognitively. Schlag
adopts a "cognitive approach" because "cognition is a foreign terri-
tory for legal thinkers." 121 A "cognitive approach" is Schlag's tool for
his primarily negative project to work a "diremption" 122 from lawyers'
largely unnoticed captivity to a Black Box. So captivated by reason are
we, according to Schlag, that we, "scorn Cartesian rationalism" 123 only
to subject its successors to some version of a rationalist analysis. 124
"When one is enchanted by reason, it does not feel like enchantment
at all. Instead, it feels quite reasonable. "125
12° See Schlag, supra note 18, at 1195.
121 Id. at 1246.
122 See id. at 1208-09.
'23 Id. at 1198.
124 See id. at 1204-05.
'25 SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 4, at 1. Mary Ann Glendon has a slightly differ-
ent way of making the same point, from a very different angle:
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Schlag claims to be unenchanted, unimpressed by what is said to
be reasonable. So am I. But what I hope to show in the remaining
parts of this Article is that while Schlag is right to try to place the Sub-
ject within law, and while. Schlag is right to criticize the approaches to
law that exalt "reason" without understanding what it is, Schlag is too
quick to jettison human intelligence in its unreified form. An accurate
recovery of the cognitive processes of the Subject leads to a rehabilita-
tion, rather than a dismissal, of the place of intelligence in human life
and law. Like Schlag, I think we need to think about how to think.126
If Schlag stops well short of my project, verging on my project is
the rich and probing work of Steven Winter. Professor Winter is
among those who have appreciated the place of metaphor, and
specifically spatial metaphor, in forming the ways and contents of our
thinking" Like me, Winter wishes "to reconceptualize law in light of
what we are learning about the human mind."128 Also like me, Winter
concludes—a conclusion I have yet to justify—that "law is no different
than any other product of human cognition." Again like me, Winter
concludes that human thought is shaped—metaphorically, of
course—by the metaphors it uses" Winter concludes, finally, that
[o]it- problems with law are products of human rationality.
Because it is "LAw," it pretends to clothe itself in objectivity
and invites us to expect more than human rationality can de-
liver. Disillusioned, some overreact and proclaim loudly that
the emperor has no clothes at all. Understanding the cogni-
tive structure of law itself may help us redress our very hu-
man dilemma. We are not entirely naked, but the threads we
Comparative analysis can often shed light on a problem by throwing into re-
lief those of our own practices that escape attention just because they are so
familiar. Statutory interpretation affords a telling, though embarrassing, ex-
ample. Film buffs will understand if I put it this way: when it collies to dealing
• with statutes, we American lawyers are like Igor in the scene from Young
Frankenstein where Gene Wilder as the doctor says, "Perhaps 1 could do some-
thing about your hump"—and Marty Feldman as Igor replies, 'What hump?"
Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in A Mauer of interpretation 95 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
'" See Schlag, supra note 18, at 1205 (-The debates have become far too subdued. It is
thus no surprise that epistemological and hermeneutic inquiries in law are widely under-
stood to be about what to think (substance) as opposed to the infinitely more disturbing
how to think (form).").
127 See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 51, at 1106-07.
129 Id. at 1106.
13° See, e.g., it at 1136-59.
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wear are surely woven by human hands. We need to know
that, and to take it into account in assessing our predica-
ment. Some urge us to go further and replace law with
something else, such as a frankly political discourse. But that
would not ameliorate our predicament. We will still be who
we are."'
We shall still be who we are, indeed. But the question is, "Who
are we?" What Winter has told us, relevantly, is that law proceeds
through metaphors that the mind's make-up makes likely but not
necessary.
LAW is a purely human creation, an imaginative product of
the human cognitive capacity. To understand the cognitive
structure of LAW is ... to understand law's social meaning.
Because we "routinely speak these ideas and images to each
other," they are constitutive of our social reality. To under-
stand law as a cognitive construction from these lived dimen-
sions of experience is to see [sic] that theories of law based
on positivism and natural law are inherently wrong because
they are incomplete; each procrustean principle merely cap-
tures one aspect of a more complex cognitive dynamic." 2
That more complex cognitive dynamic, alas, is never fully re-
vealed by Winter. The contingency of the language of law is unmasked
by an exploration of its cognitive origins, but cognition itself is never
fully probed. Winter must go on to warn of law's "inevitable vio-
lence"' because he has failed to discover and follow the true norma-
tive dynamic—the inner law—that assembles and structures the oth-
erwise contingent parts of law he has identified. It is to an analysis of
that that I now turn, answering Winter's question, "Who are we?"
131 Id. at 1198.
132 Id. at 1222-23 (citation omitted). Winter's most recent work moves beyond this in
promising ways. It came to my attention too late for consideration here. See generally WIN-
TER, CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 51.
133 Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 51, at 1223.
134 Neil MacCormick also has seen that this is the question to be answered.
The point is that we must attend to the data of our own and others' imputed
consciousness in making sense of 'the world of the ought.' On this view, con-
ceptual inquiries into normative terms or concepts and the uses we make of
them stand not in contrast with, but as a variety of empirical inquiry. That
the only available data are immediately available data revealed by our self-
awareness as conscious acting subjects engaged in intelligible interaction with
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III. THE SUBJECT
Man observes, understands, and judges, but he fancies that what he
knows in judgment is not known in judgment and does not suppose an ex-
ercise of understanding but simply is attained by taking a good look at the
"real" that is "already out there now"
—Bernard Lonergan 135
The question to which I come is whether—and if so, how—the
human Subject is cognitively competent to create a rule of law. To an-
swer that, I turn to the Subject, and invite you, the reader, to explore
with Inc the operation of your own cognition." 6 The burden of this
Part is to discover you, the Subject, in your cognitive dimension.
A. Neither Linguistic Analysis Nor Phenomenology—Nor Even Scholasticism
This exercise in self-discovery is suggested and will be guided by
the work of Bernard Lonergan (1904-84), a thinker little known in
the academy in the United States today, but "considered by many in-
tellectuals," according to Time magazine in the 1960s, "to be the finest
philosophic thinker of the 20th century."ts" While Lonergan's name
and language will appear in the text, my purpose—it will not be amiss
to repeat—is less to write about some third-person called Lonergan
than to achieve something of Lonergan's own purpose, viz., to ac-
quaint people with their own cognitive processes and, by helping
them to understand how their efforts at knowing fail or succeed, to
introduce them to that "fixed base" from which knowing .proceeds
and can be criticized."8 Still, a word of introduction to this figure so
foreign to law is in order.
other like subjects does not make them less respectable or genuine than
those amassed by "external" observation.
NEIL MACCORMICR, CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: THE REDISCOVERY OF PRACTICAL
REASON 3 (1983). Maceormick and I differ on how the data of one's own consciousness
are known. See infra text accompanying notes 182-186.
135 LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 412.
136 See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 24, at 1673 ('The problem is one of the subject: is there
anyone who is normatively and epistemically competent to make the Constitution to mean
in a way that Fin might approver) (emphasis added).
137 TIME, Jan. 22, 1965, at 60.
138 JOSEPH FLANAGAN, QUEST FOR SELF KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY IN LONERGAN'S PHI-
LOSOPHY 1 1 (1997) ("Lonergan himself always insisted that his purpose was to put people
in touch with themselves so that they could learn to philosophize out of their own con-
crete, actual experiences.").
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Lonergan was a member of the Society of Jesus, a Jesuit, and
spent a long interval teaching and writing in Rome, in Latin. But if
this curious fact goes a long way to explaining the relative obscurity of
so brilliant a thinker, the reader should not infer front it that Loner-
gan was at all provincial. Much of Lonergan's lecturing and teaching
(including at Harvard), and certainly what he regarded as his most
significant books, Insight: A Study in Human Understanding (1958) and
Method in Theology (1972), were in English. The leading reason for
Lonergan's relative obscurity, apart from the sheer intellectual
difficulty of his pathbreaking work, is perhaps the related fact that he
philosophized in neither of the two leading philosophical traditions
of the twentieth century, viz., analytic philosophy and phenomenol-
ogy. Lonergan came out of the Scholastic philosophical tradition, but
his own interests and aspirations were universal and ecumenical.
"IBJecause of his own quite original understanding of the achieve-
ment in modern mathematics and science and his own retrieval of
Aristotle's and Aquinas's thought?'" Lonergan sought to establish
the unified ground of all potential human knowing. A review of Lon-
ergan's book Insight in Newsweek captured the movement of his mind:
"With that boldness characteristic of genius Jesuit philosopher Ber-
nard Lonergan has set out to for the twentieth century what even
Aquinas could not do for the thirteenth: provide an 'understanding
of understanding' that can illuminate not only the broad patterns of
all accumulated knowledge but also reveal an 'invariant pattern' for
further developments in human understanding."'" Working out the
implications of the invariant structure of human understanding, Lon-
ergan's writings ranged from logic and natural science through theol-
ogy and philosophy to economics and political science. Lonergan
never applied his insights to law in a more than passing way.
What a sustained application of Lonergan's account of knowing
promises for law is an identification of the formative and normative
role of the question in legal knowing, a most consequential fact over-
looked by most philosophizing since Socrates and little appreciated in
contemporary jurisprudence. To the extent it is informed by Loner-
gan's insights, then, this Article too cannot be assimilated to the
products of either analytic philosophy or phenomenology. What Lon-
ergan has to say about human cognition, which I am attempting to
press into law's service, cuts against the grain all the way down. The
159 M. at 12.
14° A Great Christian Mind, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 20, 1970, at 75.
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reader is asked to be patient with the project. Because Lonergan's
own language can be difficult, I shall also rely on the words of Joseph
Flanagan, one of Lonergan's most lucid yet creative expositors."'
Flanagan's work, like Lonergan's, aims to acquaint people with the
processes by which they in fact know. Flanagan's language is well-
tailored to this purpose, at least if one gives it a chalice to operate.
Further, it is neither, and aims to be neither, analytic philosophy nor
phenomenology.
Throughout, this Part is primarily an invitation to self-appropria-
don—as described above, a taking hold of the activities by which you,
the Subject, know what you know, if you know anything at all. After
the basics have been set out, I shall in a more explicit way ask you, the
reader, to conclude for yourself whether you know anything at all,
and, if you do, how you do. Whether the reader can agree with my
conclusions, or will have to revise them, will depend on the results of
her own self-appropriation. The reader is asked to assent to no more
and no less than can be verified "through research in the laboratory
of self.*D2
[T]he dynamic, cognitional structure to be reached is not
... the abstract pattern of relations verifiable in Tom and
Dick and Harry, but the personally appropriated structure of
one's own experiencing, one's own intelligent inquiry and
insights, one's own critical reflection and judging and decid-
ing. The crucial issue is an experimental issue, and the ex-
periment will be performed not publicly but privately. It will
consist in one's own rational self-consciousness clearly and
distinctly taking possession of itself as rational self-
consciousness. Up to that decisive achievement, all leads.
From it, all follows. No one else, no matter what his knowl-
edge or his eloquence, no matter what his logical rigour or
his persuasiveness, can do it for you."3
141 Some readers of Lonergan find his prose style off-putting. Others among his read-
ers find his style not only fine but compelling. Lonergan himself seems to have chosen his
language carefully. See Frederick E. Crowe, Preface to 4 BERNARD LONERGAN, COLLECTED
WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN, at xiii—xiv (Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran eds.,
1988).
'42 Michael Vertin, Is There a Constitutional Right of Thivaty?, in 16 LONERGAN WORK-
SHOP: LONERGAN AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 1, 46 (Fred Lawrence ed., 2000).
195 LONERGAN, Supra note 30, at xviii.
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This is research in the laboratory of the self; nothing more, nothing
less. There is in it no dogma, only your self.
B. What I Am Doing When I Am Knowing, and Why That Is Knowing
The famous first line of Ari4otle's Metaphysics is his report of what
he thought he knew to be true of all people—that by nature they de-
sire to know." What Aristotle thought to be true of all Toms, Dicks
and Harrys, I experience to be true of me; it may be true of you, but
only you can know that. I find thyself continually curious to figure
things out, to catch on, to know what is meant. Though I can neither
see nor hear nor smell nor taste nor touch it, I discover in myself an
active wonder—a dynamic desire to know. "Operative within ..."-
marvels Lonergan—"is the Eros of the mind, the desire and drive to
understand . ."145 So awash are we in e-mail and the Internet and
our potency to manipulate "information" that we may startle to face
the fact about ourselves that what gets the data-gathering engine jump-
started in the first place is a desire to know.
Ever fresh but unable to exhaust the basic wonder that drives use
to know, questions are its constant manifestation. "This primordial
drive (to understand] is the pure question. It is prior to any insights,
any concepts, any words, for insights, concepts, words, have to do with
answers; and before we look for answers, we want them; such wanting
is the pure question."146 These questions of mine, exactly because they
are questions, call for answers. They call for and will be satisfied by
nothing less than discovery—by nothing other, though perhaps qui-
eter, than the Archimedean "Eureka, I've got it." The questioning in
which my wonder, my natural desire to know, constantly and sponta-
neously issues is my most basic heuristic. 147 A heuristic is what guides
141 ARISTOTLE, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1552 (Jonathan Barnes ed.) (1.1,
980a1) ("All men by nature desire to know.").
14 ' LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 221. Lonergan Imew that the desire could be evaded.
As Mary Ann Glendon observes, "Our intelligence leads us to wonder, and to formulate
questions. (At least that is the way it's supposed to work. Lonergan once remarked to some
lethargic students in a Boston College class on Method in 7ieology that I audited: 'If you
don't wonder, you won't try to understand; you'll just gawkl')." Glendon, supra note 88, at
125. The fact and likelihood of evasion of the dynamic desire to know will, indeed, require
intelligent response. See infra text accompanying notes 146-153.
"6 LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 9.
" 7 'The basic heuristic is the question that guides you toward an insight by transform-
ing inner or outer sensible experiences into potentially intelligible experiences, known
unknowns. Questioning, then, is a spontaneous, a priori way of knowing your own not
knowing, and of leading you toward an insight. Questioning is not itself an a priori under-
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toward a "Eureka."'" The questions I ask are the fundamental tool by
which I discover what I do not know. They are questions, because I
lack their answers. Without these questions, there could be no an-
swers, no coming to know. 149
These spontaneouS questions do not occur in a vacuum. I not
only question; I also experience. By "experience" I mean the sensory
flow, constant while I am awake, of my sensing as well as my imagin-
ing, feeling, and remembering. Over these I have some but not total
control. Whether I like it or not, through my neurophysiological
structures I am steadily experiencing sights, sounds, smells, memories,
and so forth. 15° And regardless of whether they occur under or out of
my control, the contents of the sensory flow are for me givens—"data"
in the root sense of that word.
This experiencing is not—much of Western philosophy to the
contrary notwithstanding—knowing. If the data of my experience
themselves made me a knower, there would be no point to question-
ing them. But, as I began this section by observing, I do question, and
what I question—to begin with—are the data of my experience. And
there is to my questions a point: this questioning is heuristic; it under-
takes to discover something in what has been presented. By gawking
at or even pawing the Rosetta stone, I'll never approach its meaning;
to head toward meaning I have to question what I see.
What I am claiming may seem—because millennia of philoso-
phizing have made it seem—obscure, but it is really very plain. It is,
standing, but it does disclose that a questioned experience is an understandable experi-
ence:FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at 95.
148 Archimedes' "Eureka" is simply the first person active perfect of the Greek verb heu-
riskein, "to discover," of which the English word, heuristic, is the adjectival or, by now also
nominal, form. HENRY GEORGE LIDDELL & ROBERT Scorr, A GREEN-ENGLISH LEXICON
729 (1985) (see under heurisko); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1064 (1961) (see under heuristic).
199 1 have chosen to be guided by Lonergan's phenomenology of cognition and of the
question because it is the one I can validate in my own experience. But if no other
thinker's account of human cognition and of the place in it of the question has surpassed
Lonergan's, it should also be said that others, such as Socrates, Aristotle, and Bacon, cer-
tainly have gone far in appreciating "the question." MICHEL MEYER, QUESTIONS AND
QUESTIONING (1988); TRACY, supra note 50, at 18-27. For a rich modern analysis of the
question's place in human understanding, see 4 ERIC VOEGELIN, ORDER AND HISTORY THE
Eculunic AGE 316-35 (1974); see also R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA of HISTORY 269-74
(rev. ed. 1993); ESTHER N. GOODY, QUESTIONS AND POLITENESS 1-43 (1978); DAVID
GRANFIELD, THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAW: A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY 206-07,
217, 251 (1988); Main Lempereur, Law: From Foundation to Argumentation, 24 Comm. &
COGNITION 97, 106 (1991).
150 See FLANAGAN, SUING note 138, at 81.
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after all, only when I stop gaping at the black marks I see on the page
and ask what they are that I am on the way to knowing anything. This
questioning, though it takes many grammatical forms, is of the sort,
"What is it?" As Joseph Flanagan explains,
[t] he key to your ability to arrive at [an] answer is the way
your question orients you toward that answer, even while not
knowing what that answer is. In other words, the answer is
not simply an unknown; rather, it is a known unknown. The
question reveals your questioned experience as a possibly in-
telligible experience .. .151
As questioned, experience reveals experience to be as far as I have
come, the limit of current "knowing;" but as questioned, experience is
also transformed into an opportunity for me, the experiencer, to be-
come a knower. It transforms mere experience into a known-unknown.
The movement from experience to knowledge by way of ques-
tioning is not automatic, however. My questioning starts the process
moving, but an answer is not inevitable. Staring at the black marks
and asking, "What are they?," does not itself generate an answer. Some
flash, some catching on, is required. Lonergan calls that act an "in-
sight." What insight does is to postulate an intelligible pattern in the
given data.152 Insights, like the dYnamic desire to know, are not visible;
but they occur—at least they are a part of my conscious life, when, for
example, I think that I have caught the meaning of some cartoon, or
think that the markings on the wall mean something. These insights,
these "catchings on," are remarkable cognitive events. They transform
you, all of a sudden, from a dolt into a person with a bright idea, from
someone who simply experiences to someone who understands. As
Flanagan points out:
[O]nce Newton had grasped that problems of quadrature
were the reverse of ordering tangents, he could not under-
stand how Fertnat and Pascal could possibly have missed this
point. After all, Newton mused, it was lying right there in the
151 Id. at 17; see also id. at 158-59.
152 Lonergan would also say, and mean by it the same thing, that the, insight offers an
"interpretation" of the data. I have avoided talking this way, however, so that it will be clear
that what most legal theorists refer to as "interpretation" requires not only what Lonergan
calls interpretation but also "judgment." See infra text accompanying notes 167-173.
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diagrams on the paper in front of them. He assumed that
they must have had "bandages over their eyes." 153
What Fermat and Pascal lacked was not the experience that is ocular
vision. What they lacked was insight. An insight is what Archimedes
had, all of a sudden, in the baths of Syracuse.
Insights cannot be forced. When we try to catch on and simply do
not, insight cannot be compelled to occur. But if the exact precondi-
tions of insight cannot be specified,IM still much can be said about
how to make their occurrence more or less likely. 155 Insights can be
made more probable, as Lonergan argued strenuously, by filling the
mind with questions or, more precisely, by letting the dynamic human
eros to know unfold in questions.I 56 "[T]he mind needs to be well-
stocked more with questions than with answers," wrote Lonergan,
"else it will be closed and unable to learn."'" Socrates, by the ques-
tions he asked, made it more likely that the slave boy, Meno, would
155 FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at 16-17 (citation omitted).
154 Mary Ann Glendon, Comparative Law as Shock Theatment, 11 METHOD: J. OF LONER-
GAN STUD. 137, 137(1993) ("Insight, Lonergan teaches, is mysterious.").
155 Bruce Anderson, Current Views on Legal Reasoning: The Problem of Communication, 15
MEnmo: J. OF LONERGAN Sum. 151, 161 & n.15 (1997) ("Mary Ann Glendon ... writes
'Insight, Lonergan teaches, is mysterious.' ... In my opinion, Lonergan does not teach us
that insight is mysterious. Lonergan's book Insight goes some way toward explaining the
nature of insight."); cf. Glendon, supra note 154, at 137-39 (noting how insights become
more likely through participation in vital traditions of collaborative pursuit of knowledge);
see infra text accompanying notes 156-172.
15s As Lonergan wrote:
['Insight is a function, not of outer circumstances, but of inner conditions.
Many frequented the baths of Syracuse without coming to grasp the princi-
ples of hydrostatics. But who bathed there without feeling the water, or with-
out finding it hot or cold or tepid? There is, then, a strange difference be-
tween insight and sensation. Unless one is deaf, one cannot avoid hearing.
Unless one is blind, one has only to open one's eyes to see. The occurrence
and the content of sensation stand in some immediate, correlation without
outer circumstance. But with insight, internal conditions are paramount.
Thus, insight depends upon native endowment and so, with fair accuracy, one
can say that insight is the act that occurs frequently in the intelligent and
rarely in the stupid. Again, insight depends upon a habitual orientation,
upon a perpetual alertnes ever asking the little question, "Why?" Finally, in-
- 	 depends on the accurate presentation of definite problems. Had Hiero
not put his problem to Archimedes, had Archimedes not thought earnestly,
perhaps desperately, upon it, the baths of Syracuse would have been no more
famous than any others.
Lonergan, supra note 30, at 5.
157 BERNARD LONERGAN, Method: Trend and Variations, in A THIRD COLLECTION: PAPERS
BY BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, Sj., 13, 17 (Frederick E. Crowe ed., 1985).
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understand how to double the area of a square. In addition to ques-
tions, images are also helpful. To understand in mathematics, for ex-
ample, it may help to have diagrams. Socrates provided Meno with
some.
But in addition to the helpful but dispensable diagrams in the
sand or on a blackboard, there are the images that are indispensable
to our thought. We have already observed these in action in the
metaphors of language and of legal language specifically.156 But be-
fore they are in written or spoken language, these images (and oth-
ers) are in our mental language. Without these internal images, as Ar-
istotle long ago noticed, we cannot think.'59 For example, we define a
point as a position without magnitude, and as we think about the
mathematical intelligibility that is the point, we do so with an image, a
mental picture that has magnitude. Try thinking about a point with-
out having in mind an image that possesses magnitude; it is not, for
me, possible.
About the risks of these indispensable mental images there will
be something to say later.160 The immediate point—the critical one—
is that the images are not themselves what the mind knows. When the
mind knows, for example, a point, it knows what has no magnitude;
yet because it knows this through an image that does have magnitude,
it is tempted to think that the image itself is what is known.161 Loner-
gan refers to this as picture thinking, the notion that the pictures
through which the mind knows are the limit of what the mind in fact
"knows."162 But what the mind reaches is not just a mental picture but
the reality of which the image is a mental picture. What the mind
reaches in insight is not removed from reality but, rather, reality itself
in its intelligibility.
'58 See supra text accompanying notes 41-52.
"Aristotle found it impossible. ARISTOTLE, ST1011 note 144, at 685-86 (DE ANIMA 111.7,
at 431a14-15, 16-17, 431b1 ) CM he soul never thinks without an image?).
" See infra text accompanying notes 243-250, 355-416.
161 Flanagan writes:
To define a point as a position without magnitude means conceiving an intel-
ligibility that refuses to be limited by images. Images have size, but positions
without magnitude have no sizes, not even infinitely small sizes. The intellect
has broken through to the realm of pure intelligibility, yet intellects still need
images to think even though they can and do transcend these images. The
trick is to grasp that the images are simply heuristic or pointers.
Flanagan, supra note 138, at 38.
162 See LONERGAN, supra Hole 30, at 164-68.
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Or at least insights purport to accomplish this. Not all insights are
created equal, however. "[I]nsights," as Lonergan liked to say, "are a
dime a dozen." 163 Mary Ann Glendon puts the point more sharply:
"Some are duds."IM This point is critical: None comes stamped with
the certitude claimed for "intuition" by Aristotle and Descartes. We
can think we have caught the joke, but might the joke be on us? We
think that the graffito on the wall means that Peter was thought to be
buried there, but might it be a collection of chance markings mean-
ing exactly nothing? We can think that geometrical quantities cannot
be multiplied and divided (as numerical quantities can be), but might
we be wrong? The insight that postulates an intelligibility in the givens
of experience may be correct, or not. The understanding may be
right, or wrong. Insight and the understanding it generates are not
yet knowledge.
An understanding that may or may not be correct is not the end.
The mind is after not only understanding, not only bright ideas; it is
also after whether those insights are correct, whether the understand-
ing has gotten reality right. We wonder whether we are correct, so we
question the insight. Insight was an answer to the question, "What is
it?" The discovery whether an insight is correct or not is itself the an-
swer to another question, indeed to another kind of question, the "Is
it so?" question. We ask of what is proposed in the insight, "Is it so?"
We ask, "Is the joke really another one about lawyers?" "Does this in
fact mean that Peter was thought to lie here?" "Can geometric quanti-
ties actually be multiplied and divided?" 165 When what the original in-
sight proposes is then subjected to further questioning, it is trans-
formed into an hypothesis, an idea in need of verification. 166
144 LONERGAN, supra note 23, at 36.
164 Glendon, supra note 88, at 125.
le On this insight in the history of mathematics, see FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at 39;
see also CARL B. BOYER, HISTORY OF ANALYTIC GEOMETRY 61 (1956).
166 Flanagan writes:
The question, Is it so?, ... does two things. First, when an idea, opinion,
proposition, or scientific law is questioned in this way, it is transformed into a
questionable idea. It becomes an idea or hypothesis that stands in need of
verification. You may think you have a brilliant idea, but spontaneously you
find yourself wondering, Is it so? Once this critical wondering begins, then
your idea is transformed into a conditional idea that may or may not be true.
Second the question, Is it so?, is a normative orienting that directs you toward
a judgment that you have not yet judged. We already pointed out that a ques-
tioned experience is a known-unknown. Now we are identifying a second
known-unknown, namely, a questioned idea that is known as a possibly intel-
ligible idea, but unknown as an actually intelligible idea Thus your desire to
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"Is it so?" questions call for answers different in kind from the an-
swer to the earlier "What is it?" question. The answer to the "Is it so?"
question depends upon another—indeed another kind of—insight.
Insight of the sort I earlier described might be called a "direct in-
sight," because it proposes an intelligibility to be found in the data.
Insight of the second sort Lonergan refers to as a "reflective insight."
This latter sort of insight is the result of the Subject's reflecting on
whether the data in fact stipport the bright idea proposed by the di-
rect insight. The reflective insight is an answer to the question, "Do
the data support the hypothesis?" The issue settled in the reflective
insight is, in a word, the sufficiency of the evidence.
According to Lonergan, direct insights occur frequently and
are "a dime a dozen." But direct insights do not necessarily
discover truth. Some insights may be correct and others may
be wrong. Critical reflection ... is initiated by puzzling and
by questions that ask "Is it true?" "Is it so?" These questions
lead to reflective insights and judgments of fact. The attitude
of the inquiry is characterized by the question—"Is-it-so?"
Questioning leads to reflective insights which discover the link
between prospective judgments and the sufficiency of the
evidence for making judgments of fad regarding the truth or
falsity of direct insights and formulations. 167
The reflective insight settles the question whether the data show that
the joke is actually about lawyers, that the marks on the wall in fact
mean to identify the place of Peter's rest, that geometrical quantities
call indeed be multiplied and divided. The question is settled when,
pursuant to the reflective insight, I judge the data sufficient or in-
sufficient to sustain the direct insight. The answer to the "Is it so?"
question is a judgment. It is in judgment, and exactly in a judgment,
that knowledge occurs.
Your own experience of "judging" this or that may be familiar
enough that you, the reader, are disposed to accede to Lonergan's
question spontaneously takes you, first, beyond sensible experiences into the
field of intelligible experiences and, second, beyond possibly intelligible ex-
periences into the field of actually intelligible experiences. Wondering does
this spontaneously, normatively, and with a certain amount of nagging insis-
tence.
Flanagan, supra note 138, at 122.
167 BRUCE ANDERSON, "DISCOVERY" IN LEGAL DECISION-MAKING 98 (1996); see also
Glendon, supra note 88, at 125 (describing the process of reflection).
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claim that within our cognitive life we make judgments. But what
Lonergan claims for judgment's place in cognition' is not at all banal,
and should not pass unnoticed. Lonergan's claim is not that by judg-
ing the Subject becomes an opinion-holder, nor even that the Subject
takes possession of "justified belief." Lonergan's claim is that thanks to
reflective insight, preceded by experience and direct insight and
reflection, the Subject in judgment can become a knower.
Lonergan's explanation of how reflective insight occurs, thereby
transforming understanding into knowledge, is of the sort that has
seemed to some unsatisfying. It was, for example, only slightly out of
context that Richard Rorty grumbled (as only he can) that Thin no
case does anyone know what might count as a good 'answer." 168 And
there is, it must be said, something of a mysterious quality to reflective
insights, as there was to direct insights. But also like the preconditions
of direct insights, the preconditions of reflective insights can be un-
derstood and to some extent arranged. First, questions for reflection
must be allowed to occur. Second, all the relevant questions must be
answered. Third, the evidence must be judged sufficient or not.
Fourth, there is no fourth step. As Lonergan explains bluntly,
[A]n insight is correct if there are no further, pertinent
questions. At once it follows that the conditions for the pro-
spective judgment are fulfilled when there are no further,
pertinent questions. Note that it is not enough to say that
the conditions are fulfilled when no further questions occur
to me. The mere absence of further questions in my mind
can have other causes. ... As the mere absence of further
questions in my mind is not enough, so it is too much to
demand that the very possibility of further questions has to
be excluded. If, in fact, there are no further questions, then,
in fact, the insight is invulnerable; if, in fact, the insight is in-
vulnerable, then, in fact, the judgment approving it will be
correct. 169
To follow Lonergan's self-appropriation is to get used to the dis-
comfiting reality that questions are the sole measure of our knowing.
If, but only if, all relevant questions have been answered, the insight is
invulnerable and knowledge has been achieved in the judgment that
the evidence is sufficient. The real difficulty is to grasp—and then to
166 RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 341 (1979).
169 LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 284-85.
2002]	 The Rule of Law	 273
live by—the fact that in the process of coming to know, the asking and
answering of questions is not epiphenomenal.'" Quite simply: "[Flrior to
the criteria Of truth invented by philosophers, there is the dynamic
criterion of the further question immanent in intelligence itself."'"
This is Lonergan's stance on the second of the three basic issues
that I developed in Part II, the epistemological issue—Lonergan's an-
swer to the question, "Why is doing that—i.e., asking and insightfully
answering questions through experiencing, understanding and judg-
ing—knowing?" The reason that the process of asking questions and
insightfully answering them in judgment produces knowledge, ac-
cording to Lonergan, is that inasmuch as questions for reflection—
the "Is it so?" questions—are transcendent, so must their answers be.
Questions for reflection are "transcendent" in the sense that they go
beyond—they transcend—mere bright ideas that are a dime a dozen,
to ask whether what intelligence has proposed is really so. And thus
their answers, if there be any (one can be intellectually inert or unin-
sightful), will be transcendent, statements of what really is "[A] nswers
are to questions, so that if questions are transcendent, so also must be
the meaning of corresponding answers. If I am asked whether mice
and men really exist, I am not answering the question when I talk
about images of mice and men', concepts of mice and men, or the
words, mice and men."172 The crucial issue, of course, is whether Sub-
jects in fact answer questions, whether transcendence in fact occurs.
170 See LONERGAN, MOM note 3, at 198-99 & n.37 ("Knowing consists in answering
questions. Meaningless questions and meaningless answers are neither questions nor an-
swers. If our knowledge is constituted by answering questions, our knowledge is consti-
tuted by meaning.... Now this view of human knowing is extremely paradoxical for the
perceptionist, for a MOD like Kant—to whom our knowing is in immediate relation to the
known only through Anschauung, taking a look (for Kant, what you take a look at are phe-
nomena)—or for [Etienne] Gilson, for whom our knowledge is not merely idealist and
logical, but is of things that really exist outside the mind insofar as, beyond taking a look
with our eyes, we also take a look with out intellects. According to the formulation, or the
caricature, we look with the eyes of the body and we see particulars; we look with the eyes
of the mind and we see universals. We look again, and we see the nexus between univer-
sals, and so reach principles. We look still once more to see the connection between
propositions, and so we arrive at syllogisms. Knowing consists in looking on that view....
[Q]uestions and answers are a mere epiphenomenon, a manifestation, expression, of the
looking that constitutes knowing."). A comparison of Lonergan's and Kant's cognitional
stances is beyond lily compass here, but see generally CiovAmit B. SALA, LONERGAN AND
KANT: FIVE ESSAYS ON HUMAN KNOWLEDGE (Robert M. Doran ed., 1994).
171 LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 221.
172 BERNARD LONERGAN, Cognitional Structure, in 4 BERNARD LONERGAN, COLLECTED
PAPERS OF BERNARD LONERGAN 213 (Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran eds., 1988).
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We come to the transcendental argument of which the reader was
warned in the Prologue.
C. A Transcendental Interlude
No human need be a knower. The ground of human knowing is
not necessity but contingent fact. Whether one is in fact a knower—
whether you are a knower, whether I am a knower—is itself a question
to be answered.
So, are you a knower? The question, you will notice, does not ask
whether you know some thing. Nor does it ask whether you must or
will always be a knower. It asks, rather, that you make a concrete
judgment of fact about whether you are now a knower. This requires
what above I called research in the laboratory of the self. The
difficulty of such research is that your experience of yourself makes you
assume that you !mow yourself. But mere experience is not knowledge,
not even in the laboratory of the self. Though our experience of ourselves
is immediate, our knowledge of self is, as all our other knowledge,
mediate—that is, it is mediated through the process of questions and
answers based on insightful understanding and judgment of experi-
ence.'" There is, in my cognitive life, no "intuition" that will enter to
provide direct and certain access. To know whether you are a knower,
you have to question and insightfully understand and judge the expe-
rience of your self. This is what I have referred to as self-
appropriation.
So, the question remains, are you a knower? You may not be, in
which case you will have nothing to say—because you will not under-
stand, among other things, my question. But if you answer, "yes" or
"no," "maybe" or "maybe not," you are a knower. Why? Because you
could not (meaningfully) respond if you had not first known. Not
only that. The fact of your response is itself evidence that you know
through the pattern of acts I have described. Why? Because in the
process of responding to my question, at the very least in seeing my
black marks on the page, you will have experienced; through ques-
tioning that experience insightfully and understanding my meaning,
you will have reached an hypothesis about it; and questioning that
hypothesis and concluding whether the evidence was sufficient for
your hypothesis, you will have judged.'"
173 See FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at 134-35.
174 For more execution, as well as explication, of transcendental argument in Loner-
gan's terms, see id at 134.
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Such, then, is the transcendental argument for how you know. It
capitalizes' on your performance as a knower and on the prospect of
pointing out to you your operative self-contradiction. The point of
such argument is not to "prove" to you, in the sense of demonstrating
a mathematical proof or hitting you over the head, that you , are a
knower or that you know in the way I have proposed.1 75 Rather, my
pointing out to you that priori to argument and quite apart from
demonstration, you are a knower, and this thanks to a series of acts
structured and assembled through the questioning that issues from
the basic human eros to know, is an invitation to you to grasp what
you are already doing and to fathom its implications. Again, you may
deny my claims; you may disavow that you are a knower. Indeed, you
may not be a knower. Once you, have experienced my claims, under-
stood them, and denied them, however, you will have performed the
very activities whose occurrence you are denying. "The ultimate basis
of our knowing is," in Lonergan's words, "not necessity but contingent
fact, and the fact is established, not prior to our engagement in know-
ing, but simultaneously with it. The skeptic, then, is not involved in a
conflict with absolute necessity. He might not be; he might not be a
knower. Contradiction arises when he utilizes cognitional process to
deny it. "176
Pierre Schlag smells a rat in transcendental argument, part of
reconstructionists' conspiracy to make objectionable views of reason
seem eminently, indeed enchantingly, reasonable. Schlag claims,
more specifically, that "Nile obvious bootstrap character of this
move," the move of transcendental argument, "seems to have largely
escaped notice."'" In the case of the thinkers he mentions, Jurgen
Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel, the character of the "move" certainly
did not escape their notice. 178 And, in any event, bootstrapping it is
not. The argument does not attempt to get something it is not end-
175 See id. at 135 ("You do not 'prove' the act of playing tennis to someone."). On what
one can hope to achieve through such argument, see infra notes 176-180 and accompany-
ing text.
LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 332.
177 Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 4, at 96.
178 Transcendental argument is well-explained and contextualized (from Kant to Karl-
Otto Ape!) in FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE DIVINE GOOD: MODERN MORAL THEORY AND
THE NECESSITY OF GOD 85-153 (1990), and in; RALPH C.S. WALKER, KANT 14-27 (1978).
For other brief treatments, see T.E. Wilkerson, Thanscendental Arguments, 20 THE PHIL. Q.
200-12 (1970). For more extended analysis of this form of argument, see generally REIN-
HOLD ASCHENBERG, SPRACHANALYSE UND TRANS ZENDENTAL-PHILOSOPHIE (1982) and
TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AND SCIENCE (P. Simi et al. eds., 1979).
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tied to; it is the interlocutor's own preference (for cognitive success),
not someone else's preference, that is being used against her or him.
Transcendental argument calls attention to what you are doing when
you succeed cognitively; it identifies instances in which you are enjoy-
ing the benefits of a successful procedure while denying that the pro-
cedure is worth choosing; and it leaves open, as it must, the possibility
that you will choose to the play buffoon.
Performative self-contradiction remains always—it bears repeat-
ing, against the charge that transcendental argument seeks what it is
not entitled to—a possibility. This is, as they say, a free country: You
are at liberty to live in self-contradiction. You are free to deny the very
knowing you demonstrate. Nor is this "freedom" purely hypothetical,
as the case of the intellectual terrorist demonstrates. People resist get-
ting to know themselves; and appropriating the functions by which
they in fact always-already have succeeded as knowers. They prefer to
deny that knowledge occurs through the pattern of activities I have
described based on self-appropriation, and they continue to talk as if
knowledge were a matter of bare experience or intuition. Unmoved
by transcendental argument, people will persevere in operative self-
contradiction.
These refusals and contradictions have consequences that have to
be reckoned with. As Lonergan liked to say, anyone who denies that
the activities of knowing occur is in effect "disqualifying himself as a
... non-reasonable, non-intelligent somnambulist." But people do
not disqualify themselves. They set up institutions in which problems
are to be resolved without recourse to the activities by which humans
in fact know. Brute experience is substituted for intelligence, force is
deployed to preempt questions and answers. There will be much
more to say about this in Part VIII, in the context of what Lonergan
calls "bias" and "the flight from understanding."'"
179 BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 17 (1972).
I" See infra text accompanying notes 399-404.
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IV. THE HEGEMONIC QUESTION
We cannot endow people with intelligrnce. Intelligence fundamentally is
this capacity to ask questions, and this capacity is entirely from nature. . . .
We ask questions even with regard to the beyond.
—Bernard LonerganI81
The conclusion reached in Part III is that the answer to the ques-
tion, "What am I doing when I am knowing?," is not some single activ-
ity—such as reasoning or seeing or intuiting—but rather the complex
of dynamically structured acts of insightfully experiencing, under-
standing, and judging. It is through those acts, and those alone, that
the Subject becomes a knower. The picture painted so far, however, is
not complete, for the Subject, while always proceeding through that
invariant structure of dynamically related acts, knows in different pat-
terns. Those patterns, their conditions and their achievements, are
the topic of this Part. Exploration of them sets the stage for approach-
ing, in Part V, the specifically legal pattern of knowing.
A. Questions and Method
"We learn," as David Tracy writes, "when we allow the question to
impose its logic, its demands, and ultimately its own rhythm upon
us."182 If we do not ask, we cannot answer; and if we do not answer, we
do not know. But though the question conies from our core and is the
necessary condition of our knowing anything at all, we can—and do—
control the hinds of questions we ask; and our choice of questions
controls what we can learn. The sort of question we ask determines
not the specific contents but the generic structure of what will be dis-
covered.
This point, critical to understanding how to know the sort of
question to ask to come to know law, can best be approached first
from the angle of modern "science," where the logic of question and
answer has been most fully worked out. It was—at the risk of getting
ahead of the story—the success-story that is modern science that in
fact stimulated Lonergan's own self-appropriation, the results of
which he described as "generalized empirical method."'"
181 Bernard Lonergan, Understanding and Being, in 5 Comicren Woatts OF BERNARD
LONERGAN 164 (Elizabeth A. Morelli 8c Mark D. Morelli eds., 1990).
in TRACY, supra note 50, at 18 (emphasis added).
183 LONERGAN, supra note 157, at 140-44.
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We are accustomed to refer to "science" en bloc, to distinguish it—
whatever it is—from every other body of human knowledge. Right
below the surface of the monolithic label "science," however, there
turn out to be different bodies of knowledge. The leading division is
between (what I shall call) classical science and statistical science.IM
Classical scientists, such as Galileo and Newton, wish to discover the
unchanging function between two or more unchanging variables, and
to keep those variables from changing they abstract from particular
cases. What the classical scientist proffers as science is the classical law,
an unchanging correlation among unchanging quantities. What the
classical scientist understands of the universe are its systematic regu-
larities under idealized frequencies. 185 Whereas Aristotle had limited
science to what does not change, classical scientists found a way to
make the study of mutating nature "scientific."" 6
Generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of
sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking
into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat
the subject's operations without taking into account the corresponding ob-
jects. As generalized empirical method generalizes the notion of data to in-
clude the data of consciousness, so too it generalizes the notion of method. It
wants to go behind the diversity that separates the experimental method of
the natural sciences and the quite diverse procedures of hermeneutics and of
history. It would discover their common core and thereby prepare the way for
their harmonious combination in human studies.
Id. at 141.
104 Lonergan also observed scientists using two other methods, genetic method and
dialectical method. See FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at 103-07 These are not discussed at
this point in the text, because my purpose is only to exemplify scientific methods, not ex-
haustively to describe or explain them. The discussion here is meant only to provide the
necessary explanatory context within which to begin to differentiate the dramatically dif-
ferent kinds of questions that can be asked.
SeenAbtachx, supra note 138, at 96-97 (explaining classical method and exemplify-
ing it with Galileo's idealized conditions for measuring the times of falling bodies and
correlating those times to the distances through which they fell); see also LONERGAN, supra
note 30, at 35-46, 130-31, 136-37.
ISO Descartes was the great innovator, and EA. Bunt nicely catches the direction in
which this new scientific thought surged: "Descartes' real criterion is not permanence but the
possibility of mathematical handling in his case as with Galileo, the whole course of his
thought from his adolescent studies on had inured him to the notion that we know objects
only in mathematical terms." EA. Bunn, METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN
PHYSICAL SCIENCE 110 (1955). When Descartes undertook to doubt everything and affirm
only what he himself found to be certain, he was, as Richard Rorty observes, "fighting (al-
beit discreetly) to make the intellectual world safe for Copernicus and Galileo." Rowrv,
supra note 169, at 131.
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Classical science emerged only moments before a discovery that
made possible the emergence of a totally new kind of science. 187 The
discovery of statistics made possible a science of the probable. 188
Whereas Aristotle had limited certain knowledge to what does not
change, and whereas classical scientists had limited scientific knowl-
edge to systematic functions as they obtained in the abstract, statistics
offered the possibility of certain knowledge of what changes and
changes unsystematically. While the classical scientist identifies what
some function is under idealized conditions, the statistical scientist
identifies what the actual frequencies of those functions are.'" The
classical scientist identifies system, the statistical scientist identifies
non-systematic regularities.
What divides these two bodies of knowledge from each other is
not that each is the product of a different Black Box. Each is the
product of the same human intelligence asking and answering a dif-
ferent hind of question. The sort of question put by the classical scien-
tist is, "What is the unchanging correlation between two or more un-
changing variables?" The statistical scientist asks the different kind of
question, "How often does this function in fact occur?" As Flanagan
explains, "The difference between these two notions of science and
their respective heuristic procedures is that they ask different types of
questions, which in turn anticipate different types of insights, differ-
ent types of formulations, and verifications."'" But always behind
these drastically different bodies of knowledge, behind these different
fines of questioning, there is always already the unity that is the hu-
man mind asking and answering questions of experience. "[Moth the
classical notion of science and classical laws and the statistical notion
of science and statistical laws are based on questioning experiences,
understanding those experiences, formulating an understanding of
those experiences, and then verifying the formulations of this under-
standing of questioned experiences." What we call "science" is just a
187 See STOUT, supra note 82, at 50. The medievals, to be sure, had had a notion of
probability; indeed, the casuists of Descartes's generation made great use of it in their
theories of "probabilism." See id. at 47-48; see also JOHN MAHONEY, THE MAKING OF MORAL
THEOLOGY: A STUDY OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC TRADITION 135-43 (1989). But these ear-
lier notions of probability rested probability on the number and kind of authorities that
stood for or against a position.
188 See MORRIS KLINE, MATHEMATICS IN WESTERN CULTURE 340-94 (1953). See generally
IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF EARLY IDEAS
ABOUT PROBABILITY, INDUCTION AND STATISTICAL INFERENCE (1975).
188 See FLANAGAN, MOM note 138, at 1-17,67-68,98,100.
188 M at 98.
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working out of the question and answer method of human intelli-
gence itself, with the result that what one asks controls what one can
come to know."'
That "science" is an essay in question and answer, not the product
of some simpler act, has other ramifications. A single judgment—the
answer to a single question—is never the end of the matter. A single
question issuing in a single answer resolves only a very narrow inquiry.
Knowledge enters, and then develops, only when judgments are
added to and built upon, and where necessary correct, earlier judg-
ments. Once a natural scientist, for example, has reached the answer
to a question, she does not the next time start from scratch, living
each day as if it were her first. A successful scientist does not start
from studied ignorance of past questions and answers. 192 If, as Loner-
gan observed, it was through the development of a method shaped by
human cognitive processes that science first took off, it was the
specifically methodical character of those processes that allowed intel-
lectual progress. 193
"Method," as Lonergan explains, "is not a set of rules to be fol-
lowed meticulously by a dolt," 194 turning out recipe-like the same re-
sult every time. Method is not a set of rules at all. Method is, rather, "a
normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumu-
lative and progressive results."05 When the asking and answering of a
specific type of question occurs not episodically but repeatedly and in
light of past answers to the same type of question, progressive and
cumulative results become possible and then actual. Scientific knowl-
edge enters, as all human knowledge does, not from self-certifying
intuition as Aristotle and Descartes thought, 196 not by living each day
as if it is one's first—but from wonder, followed by questions of expe-
rience, direct insights which are in fact hypotheses, questions of those
bright ideas, reflective insights, and finally a judgment—with the pro-
cess always poised to start all over again in light of what has come be-
fore. "The wheel of method not only turns but also rolls along." 197
There is an additional reason—already implicit—that even as to
very narrow issues knowledge may enter only methodically, rather
19 ' See id. at 99-100.
192 See LONERGAN, supra note 179, at 4-5.
'9' See Glendon, supra note 88, at 119-44.
LONERGAN, supra note 179, at xi.
199 Id. at 4.
'96 See supra text accompanying notes 60-63,80-87.
197 LONERGAN, supra note 179, at 5.
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than all at once. A single judgment is the answer to only a single, nar-
row question, but still it may not be a judgment of certainty. The crite-
rion for true judgments is, as I have observed, none other than ques-
tioning, and as Flanagan explains, "The norm for true judgments is
sufficient evidence precisely as sufficient, and such evidence is
sufficient when your insights meet the issues and problems precisely
and correctly. The standard for correct insights, then, is correct ques-
tioning,"198 and correct questioning occurs, as observed above, when
one lets all relevant questions occur.'" But sometimes judgment must
be reached in the absence of answers to all relevant questions, and
then the judgment will be one short of certainty.2" But this admission
does not entail a plunge into a cognitive abyss. As Lonergan explains,
[T] he question for reflection can be answered not only by
'Yes' or 'No' but also by 'I don't know'; it can be answered
assertorically or modally, with certitude or only probability
.... The variety of possible answers makes full allowance for
the misfortunes and shortcomings of the person answering,
and by the sante stroke it closes the door on possible excuses
Ns FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at 128.
IN Flanagan writes:
Let us recall the 'emphasis I have placed on the way that asking what or why
governs and directs you toward X known-unknown that becomes known
through an insight and how the question, Is it so?, orients you to a further
known-unknown that becomes known through a judgment. Furthermore,
questioning not only motivates you, but it does so normatively. Questio g
sets the standards by which you measure your answers. Thus, your judgments
must meet the criterion of your own questioning. You keep reflecting and
wondering whether your prospective judgments really are so, and only when
all the relevant questions are answered, do you then proceed to commit your..
self to a yes or no. Not only does questioning direct you, but it also obliges
you to follow the standard it sets, and it compels you to assent when and only
when you have sufficient evidence. The normative orientation of wondering
requires that you follow its direction. You cannot know what really is so unless
you understand and correctly judge the reality in question. However, the real-
ity in question is a limited reality... .
M at 136-37.
2t)r° LONERGAN, SUPM note 30, at 272. Lonergan also notes that "the question as pre-
sented can be dismissed, distinctions introduced, and new questions substituted." Id. This
should occur when the question is headed in the wrong direction. For example, the Py-
thagoreans began to advance understanding when they substituted for the pre-Socratic
question, "What is the basic stuff out of which everything is made?," the question, "What
are the forms that make things what they are and can become?" See COLLINGWOOD,
note 60, at 51-55; FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at 27. The result of the emergence of that
new question was the flowering of understanding beginning with the Pythagoreans but
culminating in the work of Plato and then of Aristotle.
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for mistakes. A judgment is the responsibility of the one that
judges 201
When the best that we can do now is—as often happens—a probabil-
ity, there will be further questions to be answered later, to be built
upon what we have known probabilistically already. The unavailability
of certainty in the instant—as by intuition or a mental look—calls for
methodical progress, if progress there is to be.
The notion of the probabilistic judgment will have caught the
attention of the absolute-absolutists and the statisticians alike, so
something more should be said about it. 'The probability of judg-
ment," as Lonergan explains,
differs from the probability investigated in studying statistical
method. As has been seen, the probable expectation answers
a question for intelligence by assigning an ideal frequency
from which actual events non-systematically diverge. But the
probable judgment answers a question for reflection and,
though it anticipates a divergence between the judgment
and actual fact, still the ground of this anticipation lies, not
in a non-systematic element in the facts, but in the incom-
pleteness of our knowledge. Hence, judgment about things,
about correlations, and about probability expectations, may
be certain and may be only probable. 202
Probabilistic judgments, though short of certainty, are not mere
guesses. While the guess is a wayward surge beyond the evidence, the
probabilistic judgment results from rational procedures. The prob-
abilistic judgment is a closing-in on, a converging upon, complete-
ness. "What," asks Lonergan, "can be meant by such metaphors?"2°3
Lonergan answers, "No one surely makes a probable judgment when
he can make a certain judgment; yet how can the probable be known
to approach the certain, when the certain is unknown?"
Fortunately, such paradox is not as acute as it may seem. We
seek the truth because we do not know it. But, though we do
not know it, still we can recognize it when we reach it. In like
manner we also are able to recognize when we are getting
near it. As we have seen, the self-correcting process of learn-
201 LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 272.
en Id. at 299.
203 Id. at 300.
2002] 	 The Rule of Law	 283
lug consists in a sequence of questions, insights, further
questions, and further insights that move towards a limit in
which no further, pertinent questions arise. When we are
well beyond that limit, judgments are obviously certain.
When we are well short of that limit, judgments are at best
probable. When we are on the border-line, the rash are
completely certain and the indecisive full of doubts. In brief,
because the self-correcting process of learning is an ap-
proach to a limit of no further, pertinent questions, there
are probable judgments that are probably true in the sense
that they approximate to a truth that as yet is not known 204
B. Answers and Dialectic
So successful was the combination of classical and statistical sci-
ence, that today by science we almost always mean "natural science."
One goes down a rung or two when one talks about the social sci-
ences. 205 But still more discredited or at least unappreciated, since
science's success became so conspicuous, is the pattern of knowing
concerned with human living. "Living is not something we do ab-
stractly; it is concrete and particular ... ."2°6 Human intelligence pro-
ceeding by the two complementary fines of natural science—classical
and statistical—will never know the particular as such; both of these
patterns of knowing bypass the particular as such, the former in favor
of an idealized function, the latter by counting actual particular cases
only to discover the ideal frequencies from which particular cases di-
verge in nonsystematic ways. 207 There is, however, a method by which
the particular itself as such can be known, and it is a method with
which we are all experientially familiar. Lonergan calls it "common
sense" knowing.208 Common though it is, "the remarkable historical
success of mathematical and scientific knowing ... made the more
201
205 "One descends a rung or more in the ladder when one speaks of behavioral or hu-
man sciences." LONERGAN, supra note 179, at 3. Lonergan continues immediately: 'Theo-
logians finally often have to be content if their subject is included in a list not of sciences
but of academic disciplines." Id. On the relationship of legal knowing to theology, see infra
text accompanying notes 417-424.
"6 FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at 70.
267 See id. at 68.
205 Lonergan means by common sense something akin to what Aristotle meant by
phronesis and Aquinas by "practical wisdom" (prudentia). See BERNARD LONERGAN, Aquinas
lbday: Tradition and Innovation, in A THIRD COLLECTION, ROM note 157, AT 44.
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familiar and ordinary way of knowing much more difficult to appreci-
ate and appropriate.”229 Indeed, as Flanagan goes on to note, "Din
the development of scientific knowing there has been not only a
prejudice against common-sense knowing, but also a major attempt to
discredit and invalidate it."
Common-sense knowing is motivated by the desire to develop
intelligent ways of living:This way of knowing is as old as people's ask-
ing and answering questions about how to hunt, fish, build homes,
organize communities, and so on. The questions that mark this pat-
tern of knowing are those aimed at knowing how to do the tasks that
people need to do in order to live. There is nothing abstract or theo-
retical about common-sense knowing; it aims to know things in rela-
tion to us as human Subjects engaged in the business of trying to live
well.
Though not theoretical, common-sense knowing is, or at least
can be, thoroughly competent within its specialized range, nor can
scientific knowing replace it. 2" The successful fisher really knows how
to reel them in, and the scientist's knowledge about fishes cannot re-
place what the fisher knows about fishing; 212 the virtuous man knows
how to live, and what the moral philosopher can offer does not re-
place that knowledge. Common-sense knowing is as successful as indi-
viduals and communities have been in asking and answering ques-
tions about how to live well. Law, of course, is largely about common-
sense knowing, individuals and the community asking and answering
questions about how to live well 2 19 There will be much more to say
about this below. 2"
2122 FLANAGAN, mina note 138, at 69.
212 ld. at 69.
211 See id. at 69-72,90-91.
II! See LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 179 ("RI he sciences have theoretical aspirations,
and common sense has none. The sciences would speak precisely and with universal valid-
ity, but common sense would speak only to persons and only about the concrete and the
particular. The sciences need methods to reach their abstract and universal objects; but
scientists need common sense to apply methods properly in executing the concrete tasks
of particular investigations, just as logicians need common sense if they are to grasp what is
meant in each concrete act of human utterance. It has been argued [by Lonergard that
there exists a complementarity between classical and statistical investigations; perhaps it
now is evident that the whole of science, with logic thrown in, is a development of intelli-
gence that is complementary to the development named common sense. Rational choice
is not between science and common sense; it is a choice of both, of science to master the
universal, and of common sense to deal with the particular.") Id.
113 But for the ways in which too much common sense is a liability to law, see infra text
accompanying notes 396-402.
114 See infra text accompanying notes 250-265.
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Still more misunderstood and denigrated than common-sense
human knowing is symbolic human knowing, another pattern of know-
ing integral to law. Not reducible to any pattern of scientific or com-
mon-sense knowing, symbolic knowledge is the body of answers to the
question, "What does it mean?" Symbols, carriers of meaning, are, as
Lonergan often emphasized, of many kinds. The smile itself has a
meaning—and if you doubt it, savour your reaction next time the
smile of approbation mutates into the pseudo-smile of contempt. 215
But in addition to such meaning, there is the meaning of the spoken
or written word, linguistic meaning. If you deny the claim, your are, of
course, in operative self-contradiction.
The reader may be scandalized that it has taken so long and so
many words for me to get to this point of saying something about lan-
guage. Law is, as many legal scholars are by now eager to claim (with
the obligatory citation to Wittgenstein), 216 full of language, indeed
perhaps a "language game." And with much of the import of that
claim, I shall agree, for reasons that will follow in Parts V, VI and VII.
But the course and content of the analysis to this point have been de-
signed to show what much Anglo-American jurisprudence systemically
overlooks, viz., that "it is not language that explains knowing but rather
knowing that explains language. '217 What self-appropriation of human
knowing generally and of several of its specific patterns has shown us
is that symbolic human knowing is just one form of—indeed, is con-
212 Lonergan writes:
[A] smile does have a meaning. It is not just a certain combination of Move-
ments of lips, facial muscles, eyes. It is a combination with a meaning. Be-
cause that meaning is different from the meaning of a frown, a scowl, a stare,
a glare, a snicker, a laugh, it is named a smile. Because we all Imow that mean-
ing exists, we do not go about the streets smiling at everyone we meet. We
know we should be misunderstood.
LONERGAN, MOM note 179, at 59.
216 See SCHLAC, ENCHANTMENT, SUP/11 note 4, at 86-87 ("But even as American legal
thinkers and actors relax their conception of reason, even as they perform the obligatory
bow to Wittgenstein, they cannot resist adding something more .... [T1 he journey
through Wittgenstein turns out to be a detour .... We are back [where we started] be-
cause the rule-of-law thinkers never really wanted to leave in the first place. The rule-of-law
thinkers need to retain some distinction between reason and unreason in order to decide
what counts as law and to distinguish law from prejudice, dogma, rent seeking power poli-
tics, and the like."). For a fine compendious statement of how the Lonerganian and Witt-
gensteinian positions map onto each other, see Hugo Meynell, Lonergan, Wittgenstein, and
Where Language Hooks Onto the World, in CREATIVITY AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
BERNARD LONERGAN 369-81 (Matthew L. Lamb ed v 1981).
217 FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at 182 (emphasis added).
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tinuous with all—other human knowing, which is through question
and answer.
But if symbolic and common-sense knowing are each structured
by the invariant pattern of human intelligence itself, still the details by
which those forms of knowing advance are importantly different front
those by which classical and statistical knowing advance. The human
Subject asking "What should we do?" or "What does this mean?" can-
not answer those questions exactly as either a statistical or classical
scientist would answer the questions proper to his own line of inquiry.
Like those scientists, the would-be common sense or symbolic knower
will insightfully ask and answer questions about experience; but be-
cause she asks about the particular, and particularly about how to live
and what this or that means, she must anticipate different kinds of
verifications and answers.
The name for the method of human intelligence particular to
common-sense and symbolic human knowing is dialectic. Edgar Bo-
denheimer elaborates how dialectic works:
The term "dialectic" is derived from the Greek word diakges-
thai, which means to discuss a matter with sotneone, to argue
out a problem with him. Ordinarily, where this method of
communication is used, two or more parties to a conversa-
tion endeavor to arrive at the truth by means of a dialogue
or debate, by posing and defending contradictory argu-
ments. It is, however, also possible that a person will carry on
a dialectical conversation with himself, by weighing the mer-
its of opposing viewpoints, by considering the practical con-
sequences of their respective adoption, and by arriving at a
conclusion after a thorough appraisal of all facets and angles
relevant to a problem. In contrast to rigid, apodictic demon-
stration of a proposition, a dialectic discussion of a problem
by two or more persons under optimum conditions move
[sic] in an atmosphere of openmindedness and fluidity
which leaves room for a full elaboration of differences of
opinion, for a free and mutually advantageous give and take,
for concessions of points of debate and adjustments of posi-
tions.218
218 Edgar Bodenheimer, A Neglected Theory of Legal Reasoning, 21 J. LEGAL EOUG. 373,
378 (1969).
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Dialectic is the mind's way of growing in knowledge of particular
matters for which the mind's starting points, its verifications and even
its conclusions, will be uncertain. When the question is how to live,
when the question is what this means, the certainty anticipated in sci-
entific method, classical and statistical, is out of the question. But that
is not to suggest that dialectic is an exception to what I have claimed is
the invariant pattern of all human knowing. As Mary Ann Glendon
explains, dialectic is IsJimilar to scientific method ... it attends to
available data and experience, forms hypotheses, tests them against
concrete particulars, weighs competing hypotheses, and stands ready
to repeat the process in the light of new data, experience, or in-
sight.”219
Dialectic is a neglected aspect of human knowing, degraded by
the Enlightenment and for a long time largely lost to consciousness.
But it is, as it happens, how we get to know meaning and the ways in
which we ought to live. And philosophers are now in the process of re-
discovering this fact,22° as are some legal minds (as I shall observe be-
low). That process is not easy, however, for the discovery is not alto-
gether welcome. It involves getting used to the discomfiting reality
that it is only by questions and answers, and an ungainly process of
give-and-take, that knowledge of living and of meaning enters. David
Tracy brings all this together, including the place of the Cartesian
ghost and transcendental argument:
We are human beings, not angels. In medieval arguments,
angels were understood as created beings more powerful
than humans but not divine. They lacked bodies and thereby
sense knowledge, yet they functioned with extraordinary in-
tuitive intellectual powers. Their intellects sound oddly like
Descartes's model of human knowing. Angels, therefore,
have some other way of knowing than our pedestrian, discur-
sive way. Angels need only intuit to know. And each does so
alone, not in a community of inquiry, for each exhausts its
own species! But we humans must reason discursively, in-
quire communally, converse and argue with ourselves and
219 GLENDON, SUpTR note 19, at 238.
220 See, e.g.J.D.G. EVANS, ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF DIALECTIC 103-14 (1977); MICHEL
MEYER, FROM LOGIC TO RHETORIC (1986); PRACTICAL REASONING IN HUMAN AFFAIRS ( jj.
Golden &II Pilotta eds., 1986); P. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ORIGI-
NAL ARGUMENT: DEMONSTRATION, DIALECTIC, RHETORIC 197-201 (1998). Aristotle, it
should be noted, was committeditt  to dialectic as the method of knowing those forms of
being not knowable by intuition (as to which, see supra text accompanying notes 60-63).
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one another. Human knowledge could be other than it is.
But this is the way it is: embodied, communal, finite, discur-
sive. Transcendental arguments on argument can play a lim-
ited but real role in analyzing certain necessary conditions
for the contingent reality of human discursive communica-
tion.nt
C. Transcendent, Again
To some readers this may all sound like so much circularity (vir-
tuous or vicious), and to that objection I shall turn in a moment. But
first, it will be well precisely to explicate Lonergan's stance on the ba-
sic metaphysical issue, that is, Lonergan's answer to the question,
"What do you know when you do that?" What, in other words, do you
know exactly in judgment?
The answer will be a general metaphysics but of a sort very dif-
ferent from the traditional categorical ones that tell us something
about the content of being, that tell us what the stuff that we could pos-
sibly know looks or feels like. 222 What you know, in a metaphysics
grounded in self-appropriation, is a conditioned whose conditions are met
or, in Lonergan's phrase, a "virtually unconditioned." Judgment, as
observed above, transforms a conditional synthesis (of data and the
intelligibility of the data proposed in the direct insight) into an un-
conditional synthesis. The judgment is your commitment that a condi-
tioned's conditions have (or have not) been satisfied. It is in the
cornminnent—which is the judgment—that the Subject goes beyond
her interiority by transcendent knowing. As Lonergan explains,
[T]rue answers [to questions for reflection] express an un-
conditioned. Mice and men are contingent, and so their ex,
istence has its conditions. My knowing mice and men is con-
tingent, and so my knowing of their existence has its
conditions. But the conditions of the conditioned may be
fulfilled, and then the conditioned is virtually an uncondi-
tioned; it has the properties of an unconditioned, not abso-
lutely, but de facto. Because human knowing reaches an un-
conditioned, it transcends itself. 222
221 TRACY, supra note 50, at 27.
222 See LONERGAN, supra note 179, at 25.
n3 Bernard Lonergan, Collection, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 141, at 213.
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What you know by asking and answering all relevant questions is a
conditioned whose conditions happen to be met. This is a "limited
absolute."224 When you have let all relevant questions occur and have
not judged until you have answered them, then what you affirm in
judgment is what you know: not everything about everything, but that
the conditions of the conditioned are in this limited case satisfied.
You have reached the real. "The process of knowing," as Lonergan
explains,
moves beyond subjectivity by the mere fact that you reach an
unconditioned. You step in,.through judgment, into an abso-
lute realm. There is nothing outside being that can take a
look at it and have being as its object. If it is outside being, it
is nothing. You move through [the] judgment, through the
[virtually] unconditioned, to an absolute realm, and in that
realm you find not only objects but also yourself.225
The virtually unconditioned is the content of a metaphysics based on
self-appropriation, what is known through asking and answering all
relevant questions.226
Even in the probabilistic judgment, however, though a virtually
unconditioned is not reached, the mind is closing-in on it; a judgment
that a conditioned's conditions are probably satisfied is reached.
Whether the question for reflection is answered with certainty or only
with probability, that judgment is your personal commitment that the
evidence supporting the hypothesis is (or is not) probable. This is a
224 FLANAGAN, MOM note 138, at 126-27,136-37,207-08.
222 BERNARD LONERGAN, Ora note 181, at 172-73. Joseph Flanagan's explanation of
this aspect of cognitional method is clarifying:
Judging, then, borrows from the first two levels the contents for which it finds
"sufficient evidence," and so asserts, Yes, it is so, or No, it is not so. The simple
yes or no may not seem significant, but it is important to notice what the
judgment does to the synthesis of the first two levels. No longer is the synthe-
sis a conditional synthesis, since it has been transformed through judging into
an unconditional synthesis. The assertion, Yes, it is so, utters an absolute, and
when you affirm unconditionally it is because you have grasped that the con-
ditions have been given, as you have understood them to be given. This abso-
lute is absolute only because the conditions are given. In other words, it is not
a completely unconditioned absolute; rather, it is an absolute by virtue of its
conditions having been given. It is a limited absolute.
Flanagan, supra note 138, at 126-27.
226 For a working out of this metaphysics in terms more elaborate than here relevant,
see, for example, FLANAGAN, MDR note 138, at 149-93, and LONERGAN, supra note 30, at
431-87.
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far cry from the nescience that insists that we know nothing unless we
know everything about everything thanks, say, to an intuition that
grants its own imprimatur.
By now, predictably, the skeptic will have been confirmed in his
suspicion that there is dogmatism here; and the absolute-absolutist,
for his part, will be feeling the disappointment of the "limited abso-
lute" that is the "virtually unconditioned"—notto mention the bur-
den of the fact that often a probabilistic judgment is the best we can
do under the circumstances. So, before turning in Part V to work out
a legal method in light of cognitive method, a little more should be
said both to quell the complaints and to fulfill my promise to say why
the argument I have advanced on behalf of knowledge is not viciously
circular.
What I have been doing in Parts III and IV, and what I have asked
you the reader to do with me, is to use Lonergan's insights to take
possession of the cognitive processes by which you and I already suc-
ceed in knowing what we know. It is the fact that knowledge does oc-
cur that establishes that it can occur. The fact is used to prove the pos-
sibility. If the reader in fact knows nothing whatsoever, then that is the
end of the matter. But really, there is little doubt about whether the
reader does know something. The trick is to discover how your cogni-
tive successes occur and then to increase the satisfaction of their con-
ditions precedent. The trick is a difficult one, however, because of the
ingrained expectation that really to know is directly to confront, as by
intuiting or by taking a Cartesian "mental look." Self-appropriation, at
least mine and Lonergan's, leads to the conclusion that knowledge
does occur, but not by intuition or ocular confrontation. These acts of
knowledge by intuitional or ocular confrontation could, of course,
occur; there is no necessary reason for their not occurring. But the
question is whether they do occur, and Lonergan's answer and mine is
that they do not. My knowledge of my own coming to know is, rather,
by way of the compound of dynamically related acts I have been de-
scribing and explaining.
That series of acts, and the ultimate criterion that is not a look or
an intuition but simply the answering of all relevant questions, is not
viciously circular because we do succeed in knowing; we in fact reach
the limited absolute. The fact of knowledge is affirmed, but only of a
limited absolute. There is here nothing either dogmatic or skeptical.
Lonergan's powerful statement of the process, what it produces, and
what can prevent its success, is worth quoting at length:
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When Newton knew that the water in his bucket was rotat-
ing, he knew a fact, though he thought that he knew abso-
lute space. When quantum mechanics and relativity posit the
unimaginable in a four-dimensional manifold, they bring to
light the not too surprising fact that scientific intelligence
and verifying judgnnent go beyond the realm of imagination
to the realm of fact .... Our present concern is that we are
committed to [that realm of fact]. We are committed, not by
knowing what it is and that it is worth while, but by an inabil-
ity to avoid experience, by the subtle conquest in us of the
Eros that would understand, by the inevitable aftermath of
that sweet adventure when a rationality identical with us de-
mands the absolute, refuses unreserved assent to less than
the unconditioned and, when that is attained, imposes upon
us a commitment in which we bow to an immanent
Anagke. 227
Confronted with the standard of the unconditioned, the
skeptic despairs. Set before it, the products of human under-
standing are ashamed. Great are the achievements of mod-
ern science; by far are they to be preferred to earlier guess-
work; yet rational consciousness finds that they approximate
indeed to the unconditioned but do not attain it; and so it
assigns them the modest status of probability. Still, if rational
consciousness can criticize the achievement of science, it
cannot criticize itself.
The critical spirit can weight all else in the balance, only on
condition that it does not criticize itself. It is a self-assertive
spontaneity that demands sufficient reason for all else but
offers no justification for its demanding. It arises, fact-like, to
generate knowledge of fact, to push the cognitional process
from the conditioned structures of intelligence to unre-
served affirmation of the unconditioned. It occurs. It will re-
cur whenever the conditions for reflection are fulfilled. With
statistical regularity those conditions keep being fulfilled.
Nor is that all, for I am involved, engaged, committed. The
227 Anaghe is the Greek noun meaning (roughly) necessity. For a fuller account of its
senses and nuance, see LIDDED. & Scorr, supra note 148, at 101.
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disjunction between rationality and non-rationality is an ab-
stract alternative but not a concrete choice. 228
The "immanent Anagke"—the criterion that is the further question—
is the inner law that sets the conditions of the possibility of the human
Subject's coining to know anything at all. 2  By the same stroke it sets
the general conditions for the pursuit of a rule of law.
V. THE RULE OF LAW OF METHODICAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
The question what the law "is" is not so very different from the question
what we "arc "
—Joseph Vining 2513
From the conditions of being a generally self-appropriated
knower I turn now to those of being a self-appropriated specifically
legal knower. By proceeding in this order, from the activities of human
knowing in general to the activities of legal knowing specifically, it be-
comes possible to accomplish several, related purposes: first, to pro-
vide a normative account of a rule of law in terms of legal method
that takes its shape from the conditions of human cognitive method;
second, to identify what in current notions of "rule of law" and "legal
method" reflects self-appropriation; and third, to exemplify how a
rule of law and legal method thoroughly grounded in self-
appropriation—the inner law—solve predicaments generated by simi-
lar notions untutored by self-appropriation. Having begun with an ac-
count of human knowing in general, I am in a position to say some-
thing about how specifically legal knowing must work (if it occurs at
all), and thus to distinguish self-appropriated legal notions from those
built upon simplifications or evasions of the actual process of human
knowing.
A. The Legal Questions; the Thgal Data
In the context of an argument against the widespread notion that
knowing meaning is (at best) really just a matter of brute experience,
Lonergan used the process of coming to know specifically legal mean-
ing as an example.
228 LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 331-32.
229 For a philosophically rich account of the place of "inner law" in legal practice, see
generally GRANFIELD, supra note 149.
23° VINING, supra note 1, at 128.
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[lif you want to do a study of law courts and go in with a ma-
chine that will measure the decibels of the sounds made by
the different speakers or the arrangement of the people in
the room on different sides and places, and so on, you will
not understand anything about the law court.231
What you will have missed is the meaning. "To get a start" at knowing
that meaning, Lonergan continues, "you have to have a common ap-
prehension of what a law court is and what its function iS. "2" To be-
come a knower of legal meaning, in other words, is not merely to ex-
perience something. To become a legal knower is, rather, to ask and
answer the right questions of the right data. To become a legal
knower is to understand and judge the data of legal meaning.233 What
I have just said in summary I shall now take in stages.
The question—with an important qualification to be noted
shortly—is first. As I have emphasized, the questions you ask deter-
mine the kind of knower you can become. People become scientists
by choosing methodically to ask and answer certain kinds of ques-
tions—about the functions between variables under idealized condi-
tions, for example, or about the actual frequency of occurrences—of
the data of the natural world. People become common-sense knowers
by methodically asking of the data of experience how life is to be lived
well, and then insightfully answering. People become symbolic know-
ers by methodically asking of data of experience their meaning, and
then insightfully answering. To become a specifically legal knower one
must begin by asking of the right data, "What is the legal meaning?,"
and then go on insightfully to understand those data and then judge
that understanding as true or false, probable or improbable. And one
must do so methodically.
The sort of question you ask determines the generic structure of
what you can know, while the data of which you ask those questions
determine what will be the contents of your answers. It is in this sense
that the data, not the question, are primary. To reach legal meaning
one has to ask the right questions of the right data. What the right data
are, however, is not itself—because nothing is, pace John Finnis—self-
evident. To be asking for "legal me g" is already heuristically to be
231 LONERGAN, supra note 3, at 204.
232 ht
2" After his observation that one must have a "common apprehension of what a law
court is and what its function Lonergan continues: "Any scientific knowledge of the law
will be a further understanding that will presuppose that meaning that pertains to the
constitution of data for a human science as such." U.
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aiming for not just any meaning but for the one that is legal To de-
termine what are the right data to question for that legal meaning,
requires an inquiry that ends in a judgment about the meaning of the
word "legal"—and as Joseph Vining understands, "What one means in
saying 'court,' for instance, or 'the law,' is not fixed by rule or diction-
ary. There is no absolutely necessary answer to the question what one
means or someone else means (though much in law turns on the an-
swer)."254 To ask for "legal" meaning already is to deploy a meaning of
the word "legal." Without—to borrow Lonergan's phrase quoted
above—a "common apprehension" of the meaning of that and related
words, one cannot know whether the data one questions are the car-
riers of legal meaning at all. Perennial notions of justice, or something
called a Restatement (Second), may or may not contain evidence of
"what the law is." The person who would say what the law is—that is,
the person who wants to know legal meaning—must begin by deter-
mining what "legal" and related words mean; only then can she pro-
ceed to determine what the right data are.
What, then, is the "common apprehension" about what the data
of legal meaning are? Vining's candid answer will provide a starting
point:
Lawyers do riot have nice specifications of what evidence can
be looked to when inquiring what the law is on a matter.
There is a technique, which is to focus upon a canon of texts
and, if they are available, upon central texts generated by an
institutional arrangement that is usually hierarchical in
form. But in reading those texts, reading them seriously to
understand them, lawyers do not "exclude evidence" (as a
litigating lawyer would say), close their eyes to evidence of
meaning (or lack of meaning). Some of that evidence is of
the form we call sociological. All the evidence is about the
life of the aspirations and ways of thinking with which law-
yers work.... There is as a consequence no notion of the
"purely legal." Legal discourse is not a closed system. The
meaning of texts is a real meaning. 235
234 VINING, SUpra note 1, at 12; see also ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 103 (Yale Univ. Press 1986)
(1962) ("No answer is what the wrong question begets, for the excellent reason that the
Constitution was not framed to be a catalogue of answers to such questions?).
its3 VINING, sup-a note 1, at 75-76.
2002] 	 The Rule of Law	 295
What Vining here designates "a technique"—the reading of authorita-
tive texts—is in fact the primary technique of the American legal sys-
tem,239 as the whole of Vining's work elegantly reveals.
But if we are agreed that law proceeds through the reading of
authoritative texts, still we must know what it means to "read." We
must, in other words, ask and answer the question—to Vining's mind
"that deepest of questions ..."—"[W]hy turn to texts in the first
place?"239 The profundity of the question, as well as the very need to
put it, stems from the plain fact that "the text" is, at one level at least,
merely a group of spatially ordered black marlcs. 238 These are what we
see when we look to the text. "Words and sentences on paper are as
such no different from the branches of a tree. They are tracings,
marks, contrasts of light and dark." 239 But we look to the text for more
than we can see; to know legal meaning—to become a symbolic hu-
man knower—is not merely to gape at something. Beyond what we
can see is language, the range of possible meanings of those black
marks. But what "lawyers are paying attention to [in the text] is most
certainly riot the words, which in themselves are sounds like sounds of
the sea."240 Beyond language's words, the possible meanings, is meaning
itself o
The "beyondness" of meaning is hard to stay with. 'There is al-
ways an enormous difficulty, an enormous struggle in law particularly,
to recall and keep in mind that language is evidence of meaning, not
meaning itself."242 The difficulty is in living with the fact that what we
are after is invisible. "We cannot see meanings." 243 Even when it is law
we seek, what we are after is legal meaning, so what we seek eludes our
gaze, our touch, our ear: "[T]here is no law which anyone can take
236 See, e.g, Steven Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, in AGAINST THE LAW,
supra note 4, at 157, 159 rite activity of law is devoted to the interpretation of authorita-
tive texts: judicial opinions, statutes, and constitutions.").
237 VINING, supra note 1, at 113.
2" See LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 582.
232 VINING, supra note 1, at 59.
240 Id. at 115.
"I See id. at 90-91 ("How can meaning be 'beyond language'? 'Beyond' has been well
crafted by its users, though like so many old metaphors its roots are in the physical and the
geographical. Its resonances help it convey how it itself can be used, how its use—the use
of the word 'beyond'—is the very denial of the silence to which 'meaning beyond lan-
guage' might be thought to relegate anyone who thinks of attempting to speak. Is 'what is
beyond' beyond the grasp? It is, if the grasp is physical. That 'what is beyond' is beyond the
physical—beyond the marks, the sounds—is precisely what leads to the reaching and main-
tains the hard effort of reaching.").
242 VINING, supra note 1, at 239.
243 FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at 91.
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you by the hand and point to."244 To move from what we can see,
through the meanings that language makes possible, to the real mean-
ing—this is to move from experience through understanding to
knowledge in judgment thanks to insight.
B. The Legal Answers
There is a risk that by now what I am arguing will have started to
seem so inevitable as to have been the reader's excellent position
from the beginning. In talking to legal academics about what you
have been reading here, occasionally I hear them say that they do not
see what makes my stance significantly different from the standard
accounts almost all of us, after all, are talking (and talking and talk-
ing) about how law is reached through (interpretive) judgment. So, am
I saying anything that is different except in the eccentricities of ex-
pression?
My answer is both yes and no. On the one hand, there is much in
law, and even in current theorizing about "interpretation," that
reflects some amount of self-appropriation. Vining's work comes im-
mediately and powerfully to mind, and other splendid examples of
varying kinds will follow in due course. On the other hand, there is
little—though there is a little—in the books and articles that clearly
reflects what self-appropriation discloses, namely, that knowledge oc-
curs in judgment, not in experience nor even in understanding.
Those who rather readily think they "basically" agree with me should
reconsider that agreement, fathoming that my claims that if you in-
sightfully ask and answer all relevant questions about legal meaning,
you have reached a limited absolute, a conditioned whose conditions
are met; and that if you are converging on the virtually uncondi-
tioned, you have reached a probabilistic judgment about a limited
absolute. We do not ordinarily talk this way—and so doing so helps to
clarify just what is at stake.
The ordinary course of the mind is to think that knowledge is by
ocular confrontation, and when pressed about how knowledge occurs
to suppose that it is by some sort of occult mental look (what Lonergan
called "picture thinking") or intuition. Self-appropriation, however,
reveals that there are no "intuitions" or "mental looks," that seeing is
just one aspect of experience, and that by itself experience is never
knowledge. Knowledge requires questioning of experience, resulting
211 VINING, supra note 1, at 223.
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in a direct insight, which is itself questioned so as to determine
whether the evidence in fact sup Ports the direct insight. Knowledge of
any kind, including of meaning, is the consequence of asking and an-
swering questions. Reality is known, if at all, in judgment—and judg-
ment is the answer to the question, "Is it so?" If someone knows legal
meaning, it is because she has insightfully asked and answered ques-
tions that led her to a virtually unconditioned. If you have not asked
and answered questions about legal meaning, you cannot—I submit—
know legal meaning.
The process of insightful asking and answering questions to know
meaning can be spelled-out in greater detail. The person who reads a
text to know its meaning, whom I shall refer to as the interpreter—
keeping in mind that by an interpretation I Mean a judgment of mean-
ing—will be asking what the text's meaning is. The text—the black
marks—is not itself meaning. "Language is evidence, and all evidence
is in the past."2" To move from the evidence to what it is evidence of,
the interpreter requires insights about what the creator of the evi-
dence thought about what evidence was needed for the persons to
whom that creator wished to communicate meaning to move from
evidence to meaning. The evidence of meaning may be more or less
adequate. People sometimes do not say what they mean, and some-
times we nonetheless know whauthey meant.246
This process of knowing meaning is work enough, but there is yet
more, for the interpreter ordinarily will wish to communicate to some
new audience the meaning she has discovered242—to say "what the law
is." And to do that she will have to judge what evidence (what black
marks, what sounds) will be necessary for her audience to grasp her
meaning. Her black marks or sounds, her language, will succeed not
simply by echoing the language of the original, interpreted expres-
sion whose meaning has been known, but only if it can convey its
meaning to a new audience.2" That, in turn, is a matter of knowing
245 Id. at 91.
248 Lonergan works this out in deep and precise detail ill INSIGHT, supra note 30, at
556-57.
247 Here my usage differs from Lonergan's. This communication, not the prior judg-
ment of meaning, is what Lonergan means by "interpretation" in INSIGHT. See hi. at 562—
63. By an interpretation, Lonergan also soinetimes means the direct insight. See id.
248 See FLANAGAN, SUP/12 note 138, at 182-83 ("LH udgments arise from the question, Is
it so?, and they do so within a context of earlier judgments. A context implies a set of re-
lated judgments that provide answers to a set of related questions. Since judgments
emerge in response to questions, it is imperative in grasping an author's meaning to know
the orienting desire that directed the questions that he or she was asking .... A major
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the habitual intellectual development and insightfulness of the audi-
ence;249 different audiences will grasp different meanings upon scru-
tiny of the same evidence. To reach a judgment about what evidence
of meaning must be given for one's meaning to be known, judgments
will have to be allowed to build upon judgments. 25°
The difficulty, first of knowing and then again of communicating
legal meaning, should not be underestimated; it will concern us con-
siderably below. 251 Here the point to note is that what self-
appropriation discloses is that to know something (say, a meaning), it
is not necessary to know everything about everything. To know some-
thing, it is both necessary and sufficient to reach a virtually uncondi-
tioned, and this is accomplished by answering all the relevant ques-
tions. The affirmation in judgment of this limited absolute is itself
knowledge of what is affirmed. 252 No "look"—not even a "super-
problem for Socrates was that the words, through which the new contexts of knowing and
meaning were to be expressed, were the ordinary, familiar words that were expressive of a
quite different context of meanings. This problem illustrates that meanings, while carried
in words, depend primarily not on the words themselves, but on the prior acts of knowing
that explain and ground the acts of meaning. Meaning is the same as knowing, except that
meaning adds to knowing the problem of expressing our knowing to an audience through
different linguistic forms. Expressions of any knower's knowing may be adequate or in-
adequate, clear or obscure, but such expressions by themselves are not true or false. The
truth or falsity of statements lies in the acts of judgments made by knowers, who then ex-
press those judgments in any language that these knowers may choose and in any appro-
priate combination of the words and phrases of that language.").
249 See, e.g., LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 562.
25° Lonergan writes:
(lit is all very well to talk glibly about the habitual intellectual development
and the deficiencies of the original and the present audience and the deter-
mination of the differences in the practical insights governing the original
expression and the simple interpretation. But it is quite another matter to set
about the investigation of such obscure objects, to reach something better
than .a mere guess about them, and to find an appropriate and effective man-
ner of communicating the fruits of one's inquiry. Reflective interpretation is a
smart idea a beautiful object of thought. But is it a practical possibility? Has it
ever been achieved?
Id. at 563.
251 On the question of legal communication, see ANDERSON, supra note 167, at 151-68.
252 Steven Smith finds this diet unsatisfying. Having persuaded me that the metaphys-
ics on which much of our law is premised is discredited (see SMITH, supra note 89, at 15-
72), Smith thinks I cannot then attempt to reconstruct it through recourse to
epistemology. I agree, and that is why I bypassed epistemology in favor of human cognition
as a starting point. Smith then objects that my starting point and the general metaphysics
in which it results (the "virtually unconditioned") does not "answer, deflect, or dissolve the
metaphysical question." But that is true only if one starts with metaphysics. If you start with
human knowing and then identify the real as that which is affirmed in correct judgments,
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look"—just to "make sure" that what is affirmed in judgment is really
so, is either necessary or possible. 253 Even short of the virtually un-
conditioned, moreover, there is the probable judgment. And while
judgment itself is a simple act (rooted in what was referred to above as
a "reflective insight," a grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence for
what is proposed in the direct insight), the process of arriving at the
reflective insight is not itself simple or algorithmic. It is, as observed
above, dialectical.
C. More Questions; More Dialectic
But if, as I have been suggesting, people find law by asking the
right questions of the right data, still this picture remains incomplete.
Women and men seeking law—on and off the bench—are asking
questions not just about meaning, but about how to live and live well.
They are asking, to be sure, about meaning, what has been said to be
"the law;" but they, like those who earlier said "what the law is," are, at
the end of the day, after answers to the questions of common sense.
The process of seeking the meaning of legal texts is always already
part of the human enterprise of learning how to live; it is already, if I
may say so, "an extension of inner law to the outer law that would
that is a metaphysics—as much, I think, of a metaphysics as one can get (and as much of
one as one needs). The real just is what is affirmed in correct judgments: To ask for more
is to ask for a resurrection of the metaphysics whose death Smith has announced. And to
be satisfied with the best products of human intelligence is not to be a fideistic believer (cf.
Steven D. Smith, Believing Like A Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041,1098-1137 (1999)) (arguing
that what lawyers affirm implicitly or explicitly in their legal practices is best described as
an exercise in "belief"), but an intelligent human. See infra text accompanying notes 423-
445.
2" Lonergan was thorough in his rejection of the position that knowledge occurs and
is verified by way of a look:
You cannot settle this question of the difference between the given and the
abnormally produced by saying that when you are normal you are able to take
a look to see what is there, and when you are not normal you look and see
what is not there. In either case all you have is the look, and to know whether
you are normal or abnormal you would have to have a super-look in which
you would look not merely at your looking but at what it was looking at. The
difficulty would recur with regard to the super-look. Some super-looks might
be normal and others abnormal. There is no solution on the side of the look.
The solution has to be on the side of inquiry, intelligence, working out the
characteristics of abnormal and normal states, and making the judgment that
when these characteristics arise the man is out of his head, and he will not be
held responsible for what he says and does.
Lonergan, supra note 181, at 175.
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measure and order our common life so that we can live, live with
other peoplewell.
Take the example of the common law judge. What judges in that
image were doing—though it is not all they were doing—was me-
thodically asking and answering common-sense's questions, and they
did so with a view toward cumulative and progressive results. Anglo-
American common law itself was, indeed, a working model of self-
appropriated, methodical human knowing, in fact, of dialectic. 254
What the common-law judge did was to ask common-sense's ques-
tions, and reach reflective insights by a dialectical process of sorting
and shuffling, converging for the most part on judgments that were
only probably true. And he did so, moreover, not by living each day as
if it were his first, but by building on what had gone before. The cu-
mulative and progressive results of the common law process were pos-
sible because its judicial and other practitioners saw themselves as
contributing to the development of a tradition—building on, and po-
tentially correcting, what had gone before. The progress was possible
only because the judge did not resolve each case by creation of a rule
ex nihilo.255 As Professor Glendon observes, paraphrasing Lonergan:
"The wheel of dialectical reasoning not only turns but also rolls
along."256
That the method of the common law was dialectic has been little
appreciated, in part because its best practitioners were so busy suc-
cessfully performing it that they did not stop to appropriate it. 257 But
there can be little doubt that dialectic is what they were doing. In-
deed, as it happens, many of the metaphors by which we describe dia-
lectic itself come from legal practice. Flanagan observes, for example,
that the reflective insight is preceded by a process metaphorically re-
ferred to as a "weighing of the evidence," during which "you cross-
examine the adequacy and validity of your own understanding."258
154 GLENDON, supra note 19, at 237.
25.5 On the place of tradition in the development of law, see Glendon, supra note 88, at
119-41; see also Peter Stein, Logic and Experience in Raman and Common Law, 59 B.U. L. Rev.
433, 441-51 (1979) (arguing that Roman law and English common law each advanced
through selective application of logic and experience to what had gone before).
256 GLENDON, supra note 19, at 239 (attributing phrase to Lonergan). See supra text ac-
companying notes 183-221.
257 See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 19, at 231 ("[T]eachers and scholars of law had never
[before the 1970s] consciously appropriated the foundations and dynamics of their own
discipline. They could 'do' law very well, but they were tongue-tied when it came to ex-
plaining and defending their ingrained, habitual doings."). But there were important par-
tial exceptions, as Glendon notes. Id. at 131-33.
258 FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at 123-24.
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And it was the habitual practice of this sorting and shuffling by the
likes not only of Benjamin Cardozo and Learned Hand, but of the
countless other judges who toiled in anonymity, that gave the com-
mon law that greatness that is still its boast.259
And their method simply did not include "certainty" among its
excellences. Dialectic, in law as elsewhere, contents itself with, indeed
specializes in, the dubitable. It doesn't leave the dubitable where it
found it, however. "[Dpalectical reasoning begins with premises that
are in dispute. It ends, not with certainty, but with determining which
of opposing positions is supported by stronger evidence and more
convincing reasons. "26° And this, as Professor Glendon notes, is what
has earned dialectic the contempt of those thinkers who measure
"knowledge" by the standard set by Descartes.261
Dialectical reasoning's weakness ... is that it can never yield
the satisfaction of a mathematical proof. But, as Aristotle
pointed out long ago, no other form of reasoning is of much
use "in the realm of human affairs." In law and politics,
premises are uncertain and one can't be sure of being right,
but it is crucial to keep trying to reach better rather than
worse outcomes. Dialectical reasoning is a leaky vessel. But
it's what we've got.262
"° SeeGininox, supra note 19, at 124-29.
26° Id. at 238; see also LONERGAN, 5/4//a note 30, at 408-11 (identifying absurd and un-
expected consequences of Descartes's precept of universal doubt).
261 See GLENDON, IUMII note 19, at 238; see also Marcelo Dascal & Jerzy Wr6blewski,
Transparency and Doubt: Understanding and Interpretation in Pragmatics and in Law, 7 LAW SC
PHIL. 203,203-09 (1988).
The pragmatic concept of clarity (urged by the authors against the Cartesian
concept] permits a reinterpretation of the traditional maxims interpretatio ces-
sat in clads and clam non runt interpretatzda within the framework of a prag-
matically oriented theory of legal interpretation which fits the description of
the current use of legal language. Neither as a starting nor as an ending point
of the understanding of a text is clarity an absolute given. Consequently, legal
language has to tolerate the existence of interpretative doubt, even concern-
ing the question of whether a text must or must not be interpreted.
Dascal & Wroblewski, supra, at 222.
262 GLENDON, supra note 19, at 238 (citation omitted). For a rich understanding of the
place of dialectic ill legal thinking, see C/IAIM PERELMAN, Justice, LAW, AND ARGUMENT:
ESSAYS ON MORAL AND LEGAL REASONING 107-13,125-47 (1980), and THE NEW RHETORIC
62-72 (1979); see also PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE 85-124 (1987); Bodenheimer,
supra note 218, at 373-402.
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Science aims in the long run for certainty, but specific legal
knowings occur always under the press of time. We cannot postpone
our living until we have learned everything, let alone with certainty.
"What the law is"—legal meaning about how we should live to-
gether—must be established within the available time. 263 Sometimes,
in my experience, judges take years to decide the meanings of statutes
(whilst prisoners languish in the penitentiary); but usually within
hours or days or, at most, months, the judge must say "what the law
is." A probabilistic judgment of meaning likely will be as much as the
seeker of law can produce. "If one demands certainty, one is assured
of failure.... But we can achieve a good—that is, a relatively ade-
quate—interpretation ... Somehow conversation and relatively ade-
quate interpretations suffice. As Hilary Putnam reminds us: in some
situations, 'Enough is enough, enough is not everything.' Sometimes
less is more."264 The probable judgment is not—for all the reasons I
have been developing—a mere roll of the lexicographic dice. And
though each case must come to an end, still that need not be the end
of the matter. Legal knowledge can grow, if, but only if, there is
method—that is, a normative pattern of recurrent and related opera-
tions yielding cumulative and progressive results. 265 But do we sys-
temically deny ourselves this aspiration
D. The Structure of a Different Common Law for the Age of Statutes
Whatever the glory of the common law, now we live in a legal
world composed largely of statute law, and the pressing questions have
become, "What is to be done with statutes? How are they to be inter-
preted?" The lack of a generally accepted approach was diagnosed
more than a half-century ago, 266 but as Justice Scalia wrote not long
263 Collingwood puts the analogous point about knowing facts this way:
If any juror says: "I feel certain that a year hence, when we have all reflected
on the evidence at leisure, we shall be in a better position to see what it
means," the reply will be: -There is something in what you say; but what you
propose is impossible. Your business is not just to give a verdict; it is to give a
verdict now; and here you stay until you do." This is why a jury has to content
itself with something less than scientific (historical) proof, namely with that
degree of assurance or belief which would satisfy it in any of the practical af-
fairs of daily life.
Cou.inowoon, supra note 149, at 268.
264 'fluor, supra note 50, at 22-23 (citation omitted).
265 See supra text accompanying notes 183-221.
266 HART & SACKS, supra note 96, at 1169 ("Do not expect anybody's theory of statu-
tory interpretation, whether it is your own or somebody else's, to be an accurate statement
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ago referring to the interpretation of statutes, "We American judges
have no intelligible theory of what we do most." 267 Yet there is—un-
derstatement here is unavoidable—a surfeit of books and articles
about interpreting statutes. What has been missed in most of them,
however, is an appreciation of some or all of the following proposi-
tions for which I have been arguing: (1) human knowing occurs and
advances through a cumulative and progressive set of activities pro-
pelled and structured by the dynamism of questioning, not by one
simple act; (2) common-sense and symbolic knowing are, like classical
and statistical science, distinct patterns of knowing, which anticipate
their own patterns of reflection and verification; (3) human knowing
primarily explains language, not the reverse; (4) human intelligence
can sometimes reach certain knowledge, but about meaning and how
to live only probabilistic knowledge is likely; (5) the probability of
such knowledge-claims can be increased through the dialectical, me-
thodical process of question and answer that is simply one application
of the basic question and answer method that grounds and advances
all human knowing.
One reason for resistance to the requirement of dialectic is the
supposition, which I have emphasized, that knowledge occurs by some
simpler process. We are forever looking for ways to cut off the ques-
tioning or at least to reduce it. We prefer to be released from the exi-
gent demands of the question. But even when there emerges an
awareness that knowledge amounts to no more than answered ques-
tions, to hand ourselves over to dialectic is not easy. We long, it seems,
for more certainty than dialectic delivers.
And one of the reasons for the emergence of statute law is, of
course, to clarify and limit the starting points of judicial reasoning,
and thereby to increase law's certainty; and it is no doubt true that in
general a judge confronted with a statute has a surer starting point
than a judge working within a vast body of exclusively judge-made law.
Much of the reduction of law to statutes goes forward in the name of
maintaining (or creating) democratic rule and legislative suprem-
acy—and there is, no doubt, something to this. 2" It also goes forward
of what courts actually do with statutes. The hard truth of the matter is that American
courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory
interpretation.").
887 A,nmrin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF INTERPRE-
TATION 3, 14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
"8 Flow much "democracy" it delivers depends, of course, on what one means by that
word. See, e.g., (lacy R. Sunstein, justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 530-
33 (1997) (book review) (Justice Scalia's formalism is not in fact empirically defensible as
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in the name of the Rule-of-Law-not-of-men—and there is no doubt
something to that as well.
The fundamental mistake, however, one against which this Article
is directed, is to think that a "statute," or any black marks, can obviate
the exigency for questioning. Whatever its content, and whatever its
source, law is meaning (about how to live well), and meaning is
known, as is everything else that can be known, in the judgments that
are answers to questions. The black marks that emerge from the legis-
lature simply are data which do not themselves resolve the question of
how the legal meaning of which they are evidence is to be found. 269 If
a statute is a surer starting-point for saying "what the law is," this can-
not be because of any property of the black marks as such. A common
law for the age of statutes would recognize the place of dialectic in
gaining legal knowledge, the "balancing" and "weighing" and "cross-
examination" that precede the ordinarily probabilistic judgments of
meaning.
Relatedly, it would recognize the point systemically missed when
analysis of "the law" starts with black marks rather than with the Sub-
ject. Law is in the first place answers to questions about how to live.
Often those answers are cast in the form of text, but the text remains
in service of—or at least should, if it is not to defeat the purpose for
which it was created—human Subjects' intelligently working out ways
to live well. To the extent participants in our legal culture mean for
law to contribute to progressive and cumulative answers to the ques-
tions about how to live well with other people, then the data of legal
meaning will be understood not as episodic shots in the legal dark but
as potential contributions to a methodical advance in ordered liv-
ing.270 "As we seek order, we can meaningfully remind ourselves that
order itself will do us no good unless it is good for something. As we
seek to make order good, we can remind ourselves that justice itself is
impossible without order, and that we must not lose order itself in the
3 (1997) (book review) (Justice Scalia's formalism is not in fact empirically defensible as a
democracy-forcing tool of interpretation).
" See GLENDON, supra note 19, at 185 (characterizing statutes as "data" produced by
legislatures).
27° The critics, as Mary Ann Glendon has noted, imagine that law is exempt from the
requirement, which everyone concedes to "science," to build on and correct what has pre-
ceded. See GLENDON, supra note 19, at 138-43. Pierre Schlag is typical as he misses the
point: "Conservatives always appear bearing the gifts of tradition and the past, asking us to
conserve these gifts and thereby to preserve our communities, and perhaps even our very
identities." Selling, Politics ofFarr; supra note 4, at 80.
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attempt to Make it good."271 The answers to questions about how to
order our living not only in the present, but the morrow as well, do
not admit of easy answer; worthy answers to today's questions build on
and potentially correct the answers to yesterday's questions. A "legal
method" that was not methodical would not, I think, produce law at
all, for reasons to which I now turn in the final three Parts.
VI. INSISTING THAT LAW BE MEANINGFUL
Nothing is clear in law except that method makes it so. To the extent that
there are unresolved problems of method, there are unresolved problems of
meaning, and following on these are unresolved problems of authority, obli-
gation, and obedience.
—Joseph Vliiing272
The activities by which we know law are the same basic activities
by which we know anything else, we might know. For the reasons de-
veloped above, however, the person who would know law faces chal-
lenges unknown to, say, the statistician.273 An example of the process
of knowing law may help (1) get straight the place of the question in
legal knowledge, (2) show how legal method should be shaped consis-
tent with the place of the question, and (3) demonstrate how an ap-
preciation of the place of the question dissolves or vaults some other-
wise intractable problems for law. I take an example in administrative
law because of its particular capacity to illuminate the fault-lines in
the current debate about "statutory interpretation"—and with the
lines thus clear, to show something of what a self-appropriated legal
knower would do about them. I take an administrative law example,
moreover, to provide the background to an issue to be explored in
Part VII, viz., how carefully legal texts, even "bureaucratic" texts,
should be read.
271 Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Rep& to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
630, 657 (1958); see also J.M. Balkh', Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and
the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE U. 105, 112 (1993) (-The study of subjectivity is
important to jurisprudence because we must recognize the different contributions we
make to the object of understanding when we approach it for different purposes. Legal
understanding is not simply the apprehension of preexisting properties of an object. It is a
purposive activity of subjects. It is something that 'we do.").
272 VINING, supra note 28, at 214.
273 See supra text accompanying notes 200-204.
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A. "The Meaning the Statute Intended"?
Section 203(a) of Title 47 of the United States Code requires
communications common carriers to file tariffs with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), subject to section 203(b) which
authorizes the Commission to "modify any requirement" of section
203.274 When AT&T lost its hallowed monopoly because competition,
as from MCI, materialized during the 1970s and 1980s, the FCC re-
sponded by relaxing filing requirements for nondominant carriers—
that is, for every carrier save AT&T. In due course, AT&T challenged
the agency's order, which the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit then vacated. 275 The Supreme Court
granted MCI and the government's petition for certiorari, and then
affirmed the Circuit's decision in an opinion by Justice Scalia, from
which Justices Blackmun and Souter dissented in an opinion by Jus-
tice Stevens. 278 The case presented the question, wrote Justice Scalia,
"whether the Commission's decision to make tariff filing optional for
all nondominant long distance carriers is a valid excuse of its
modification authority:177 The Court's answer was in the negative.
To say whether the answer to that question should be yes, or should
be no, is not my present purpose. What I am after is an account of
what Justice Scalia thinks he is doing when he is knowing law, his
stance on the most basic of the three basic issues. The data for deter-
mining Justice Scalia's answer are available not only in the example
and explanation of his opinions; there is also his scholarly writing. In
his essay, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and the Laws, Justice
Scalia begins by asking, "What are we looking for when we construe a
statute?"278 The Justice's answer to this question—what he regards as
"the basic question" 279—is at the same time an answer to Joseph Vin-
ing's "deepest question. "28°
Scalia's very asking the question reveals that he knows that the
Subject turning to a statute must do something. This is not, then, a
simple metaphysics-first notion of law. In textualism, Justice Scalia's
274 47 U.S.C. § 203(a).
275 MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 512 U.S. 218, 223 (1994).
276 it at 219. Justice O'Connor did not participate. Id.
277 It at 220.
278 Scalia, supra note 267, at 16.
279 Id,
28° See supra text accompanying note 237.
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"philosophy of interpretation," 281 the Subject is on the scene; what a
Langdellian concedes under duress is admitted outright. The Subject
must "construe" the statute. Scalia, though a "textualist," knows with
respect to Congress what Joseph Vining posits with respect to another
lawmaking body: "The piece of writing that emerges from Parliament
is not the law. It is evidence of the law, which is used in the course of
arriving at a statement of law."282
o On the way to a statement of law, what Scalia's construer is af-
ter—the known-unknown to be discovered—is "'the meaning which the
subject is authorized to understand the legislature intended.'" 285 Statutory
interpretation is not "psychoanalysis of Congress;" 284 the construer is
not after that elusive beast, "legislative intent." But it does matter
whether that much-maligned species is not merely elusive but mythi-
cal, for the textualist construer is after its cousin: "a sort of 'objectified'
intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text
of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the carpus juris."285 But
does that beast—the "objectified intent"—exist? Has Scalia avoided
the "intentionalist fallacy?"286
Justice Scalia's tactile metaphor ("place(' alongside") is unfortu-
nate287—unfortunate because it masks the difficulty of the procedure
by which, according to Scalia, law is known. This becomes clear as Jus-
tice Scalia goes on to distinguish textualism from the rude theories of
statutory interpretation with which, it seems, sometimes it is
conflated. Textualism, Justice Scalia explains, is the view that "[a] text
should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leni-
281 Scalia, supra note 267, at 23.
282 VINING, supra note 1, at 26.
285 Scalia, supra note 267, at 17 (emphasis added) (quoting JOEL. PRENTISS Btsnoe,
COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 57 (1882) (citation
omitted)).
284 United States v. Pub. Util. Conim'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring).
285 Scalia, supra note 267, at 17 (initial emphasis added).
286 See Frank Easterbrook, Statutes' Dotnain, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 533, 535 n.3 (1983); see
ahoJeremy Waldron, Legislators' Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND INTER-
PRETATION 329, 353 (Andrei Marmot' ed., 1995) ("Where is simply no fact of the matter
concerning a legislature's intentions apart from the formal specification of the act it has
performed"); Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 633, 645-46 (1995)
(explaining why "legislative intent" does not exist).
287 CI United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1935) ("When an act of Congress is ap-
propriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the
judicial branch of government has only one duty; to lay the article of the Constitution
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter
squares with former.").
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ently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly
means."288 Reason has been invoked and relied on, but is never ex-
plained; and the text—presumably the two-dimensional black marks
on the page—has been said to be containers of meaning. That is not
all, however, because Justice Scalia then clarifies that what he is after
in the container is not the meaning simpliciter but, rather, "the original
meaning of the text ...."289 "This exercise," as Professor Merrill ob-
serves, "places a great premium on cleverness." 29°
Anticipating just such cleverness in the Court's approach to the
case, the MCJ petitioners provided in their briefs the following
definition of "modify" from Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary
(1988): "to make basic or fundamental changes in, often to give a new
orientation to or serve a new end."291 Aggressively conceding that
most other dictionaries gave no such wide definition of "modify," and
likewise conceding that the very dictionary cited included other, nar-
rower definitions of modify, petitioners observed unexceptionably
that "Chevron controls here," which meant that for the Court to re-
verse, it would have to conclude that Congress itself settled on some
other meaning or at least ruled out the meaning settled on by the
agency.292 As Justice Scalia wrote in MCI:
Reviewing courts may forego Chevron deference only if the
statutory term at issue "cannot bear the interpretation
adopted by the [agency]." Where, as here, Congress has not
t'38 Scalia, supra note 267, at 23 (emphasis added).
"s Id. at 38.
°° Thomas Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
351,372 (1994).
291 See Brief for Federal Petitioners at 16-17, MG, 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (No. 93-356);
Brief for Petitioner MCI at 20, MC/, 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (No. 93-356).
292 Chevron U.SA. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)
("When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construc-
tion ott the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpreta-
tion. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the ques-
tion for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.... Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question
is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case a court may not substitute its own construc-
tion of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of
an agency." [citations omitted]). For further discussion of Chevron, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 365-366.
2002] 	 The Rule of Law 	 309
merely left an issue open, but has expressly delegated discre-
tion to the agency, deference is at its Zenith. It cannot be ar-
gued that the "plain meaning" of Section 203 forecloses
permissive detariffing. 293
By citing a dictionary definition both supportive of their own under-
standing of the statute and admittedly inconsistent with other diction-
ary definitions, petitioners hoped to serve up evidence showing both
the reasonableness of the FCC's interpretation of the statute and the
ambiguity necessary to trigger Chevron deference. Scalia saw the point.
"In short," he wrote, "they [petitioners] contend that the courts must
defer to the agency's choice among available dictionary
definitions."294
Justice Scalia was having none of it:
The word "modify"—like a number of other English words
employing the root "mod-" (deriving from the Latin word
for "measure"), such as "moderate," "modulate," "modest,"
and "modicum"—has connotation of increment or limita-
tion. Virtually every dictionary we are aware of says that to
modify means to change moderately or in a minor fashiort. 295
Justice Scalia proceeded to cite six dictionaries giving as a definition
of modify to make "minor" or "small" changes. But what of the
definition cited by petitioners? Did it not establish at least that "mod-
ify" is ambiguous and that, therefore, the FCC's interpretation per-
missibly resolved an ambiguity? Not so much, according to Justice
Scalia. The dictionary cited by petitioners was a derivative of Webster's
Third New International (1976), that was itself "out-of-step."2" Which
meant, apparently, that it was wrong—for Justice Scalia went on to say
that "it is hard to see" how "'modify'" could mean "both (specifically)
major change and (specifically) minor change," and then concluded:
[W]e simply disagree [that modify could have both mean-
ings]. "Modify," in our view connotes moderate change. It
might be good English to say that the French Revolution
"modified" the status of the French nobility—but only be-
293 Brief for Petitioner MCI, supra note 291, at 20 (citations omitted).
"4 MCI, 512 U.S. at 226.
295 Id. at 225.
296 Id. at 227.
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cause there is a figure of speech called understatement and a
literary device known as sarcasm.297
Not willing to let well-enough alone, Justice Scalia went on to opine
that it must have been "an intentional distortion[], or simply careless
or ignorant misuse, [that] formed the basis for the usage" reported in
the out-of-step dictionary.298 Finally, by discovering that the narrower
definition of modify was the only one given in dictionaries contempo-
raneous with the enactment of section 203, Justice Scalia ended up
pitching the result on a lexicographical ground after al1.299
Or did he when he wrote, "We have not the slightest doubt that
this is the meaning the statute intended"?399 Do statutes intend? "To
intend," in common and correct modern English usage, is for a mind
to make a move of a certain kind—something presumably not possi-
ble for a statute. "To intend" also sometimes means in correct modern
English usage "to mean" or "to signify."891 And one can easily see how
either meaning can be reached by modest extension of the other—as
well as that that extension obscures the question critical in this con-
text, viz., the question as to whether what is the issue is meaning or
(legislators') collective mental content. But this in fact is no instance
of catachresis, for we do know what Justice Scalia meant—and we
know this without needing to deny that the word "intend" can mean
what Scalia does not here mean.
B. Living by the Ipse Dixit
Leaving aside for a moment whether the textualist project works,
there is no secret about what Justice Scalia is up to. He begins from
the position that the people through their elected representatives are
to make law which the judges are to apply. That is how Justice Scalia
reads the Constitution; that, if you like, is his "meta-position."392 And
in consulting a meta-position to decide how to approach statutes, Jus-
tice Scalia is in not only good, but the only, company to keep once the
Subject is on the scene. The Subject needs to know what to do about
the black marks, needs to know what to do when he turns to the text.
297 Id. at 227-28.
298 Id. at 228.
299 MC/9512 U.S. at 228.
/d.
301 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY(3d ed.), s.v. Intend."
302 Se e Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 108 HART. L. REV. 593 (1995).
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What Jane Schacter might call a "meta-position" is what William Esk-
ridge and John Ferejohn call an "interpretive regime,"" 5 what Robert
Cover calls a "secondary text,"594 what James Boyd White calls "a lan-
guage, ... a way of reading and writing and speaking," 305 what Joseph
Vining calls "legal method"398—each of these regards what the Subject
is to do with the black marks, what he is to do to know what the mean-
ing (that known-unknown) is. Each of these, to the extent it reflects
self-appropriation, would be an attempt to indicate the data to be
questioned, the questions to be asked, and the method of the ques-
tioning. Each of these, to the extent it imagines that the black marks
are something other than evidence to be questioned for meaning, is
after and will deliver something short of meaning.
There is no difficulty in placing Justice Scalia. As I have observed,
he regards the black marks as containers, bins of objectified intent. As
he does so, Justice Scalia is perfectly aware that the black marks them-
selves do not determine what is to be done with them. What the Sub-
ject is to do is, in Scalia's language, what the Subject is "authorized" to
do. For his part, Justice Scalia is working to alter the scope of the
authorization, not by fiddling with Congress's black marks, which is
not an option for the judge 9 07 but by "changing the judicial cul-
ture,""8 which may indeed be the option of the textualist judge.'" In
common-law courts, the judicial culture allowed, indeed called for, a
wide judicial authorization; common-law courts, as Justice Scalia un-
derstands, made law what it ought to be. 519 Aware that the judicial
power is not "a Platonic essence," 5" Justice Scalia cannot cite the lone
language of Article III itself, "the judicial Power," 312 for his authoriza-
"3 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of Law,
in NoMos XXXVI: THE RULE OF LAW 265, 267 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
364 Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
Ilhuv. L. REV. 4, 53 (1983).
"3 JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF
THE LAW 78 (1985).
106 VINING, supra note 1, at 109-18.
367 VINING, supra, note 1, at 6.
368 Cordon Wood, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 49, 63 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1997).
306 Cf. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and The Supreme Court,
1978 SUP. CT. Rev. 345, 405 Cerise procedural foundations of the judicial process were laid
long ago, and the basic role of the courts seems firmly established by both tradition and
constitutional prescription.").
31° Scalia, supra note 267, at 8-9.
311 Paul Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under
Article 111, 65 IND. U. 233, 265 (1990).
112 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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tion to stop Article III courts from doing what courts did at common
law, viz., asking and answering common-sense's questions guided only
(loosely) by precedents" Justice Scalia describes his meta-position as
the Constitution's structure and, above all, democratic source and pur-
pose.3" And democracy is the idea, according to Scalia, that "the ma-
jority rules"315—which, according to Justice Scalia, requires textual-
ism, the hegemony of legislatively-created receptacles of objectified
intent.
It is Justice Scalia's hope that something so much sturdier than
mere meaning—which it is conceded does riot stand up to anyone
who does not wish to respect it—will better resist the anti-democratic
antics of the would-be activist judge. "Our legal culture," Professor
Glendon is no doubt right, "explains why many American friends of
democratic and rule-of-law values have been driven to espouse what
most civil lawyers would regard as excessively rigid forms of textual-
ism."3" But so much does Justice Scalia want laws to be sturdier than
the activist-judge is cunning, that he does not ask what the statute
means.
The magnitude of the omission merits emphasis. Meaning, which
is something only persons make, has been banished, driven out to be
replaced by the black marks that (we are told) contain objectified in-
tent. (Scalia, you will recall, had the statute itself "intend[ing].") 3"
Though bizarre, this reductive progression is predictable, for the rea-
son grasped by Paul Kahn:
Understanding the legal meaning of an event is a problem of
interpretation. Interpretation always has the quality of reach-
ing for a meaning that is already there—even if we don't
know where. Interpretation is not an act of poetic creation.
313 Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword. The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARR L. Rev. 22, 87 ("justice Scalia's model for judicial rulemaking in
constitutional law is not that of the common law, but of the civil code. Here is the codifier
at work: first, state the general rules; second, rationalize the existing messy patter of cases
by grandfathering in a few exceptions and doing the best you can to cabin their reach; and
third, anticipate future cases in which the rule might be thought problematic and dispose
of them in advance ....").
314 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 267, at 9 ("All of this (judge-made law] would be an un-
qualified good, were it not for a trend in government that has developed in recent centu-
ries, called democracy.").
315 Antonin Scalia, Of Democracy, Morality, and the Majority, Address at Gregorian
University (May 2, 1996), in 26 ORIGINS 82, 88 (1996).
316 Glendon, supra note 125, at 113.
317 See supra text accompanying notes 265-266.
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Neither is it the presentation of a meaning that already exists
in some other mind—perhaps the mind of the text's author.
Nevertheless, it is easy to see why legal interpretation often
falls into the language of intent. This language creates a
metaphoric space in which the idea can be imagined as wait-
ing to be discovered by the interpreter.'"
But this is only imaginative, because there is nothing to be discovered
in space that does not exist. While talking about text, original mean-
ing, and objectified intent, Scalia has bypassed the meaning—the
known-unknown—that was to be known. Indeed, rather than knowing
meaning, Scalia is creating it.
The magnitude of the self-promotion merits emphasis. What
Scalia has done is to say what the black marks must mean, regardless
of what they do mean. What they must mean is called their "original
meaning." But their "original meaning" turns out to be what they will
mean, regardless of whether they in fact mean something eke. Recall that in
MCI, Scalia tells us what "modify"—and thence the statute—must
mean and "mean" that it will, from that time forward, because Scalia
and four other judicial votes said so.319 The corpus juris drops out, to
be replaced by the corpus (vel mensque arbitrium) Scaliae. 320 The process
by which Scalia becomes the autonomous lawmaker is subtle, but Pro-
fessor Merrill was on to it when he observed that "the textualist inter-
preter does not find the meaning of the statute so much as construct
318 1“14N, supra note 5, at 92; cf. Paul E Campos, Against Constitutional Tlwory, in
AGAINST THE LAW, supra note 4, at 119 ('To imagine that one should read a text so as to
discover what its author intended by it is to mistakenly assume that it is possible to do any-
thing else But ... any reading of a text that is really a reading of that text simply consists of
a search for authorial intention ...."). Joseph Vining understands that it is not so simple:
"Writing is not conveyance of an inner state, but of something of which the inner state at
any time is evidence sometimes more and better; sometimes less and worse." VINING, supra
note 1, at 343.
519 Gordon Wood draws this consequence from the role Scalia has assigned the judge:
"Textualism, as Justice Scalia defines it, appears to me to be as permissive and open to
arbitrary judicial discretion and expansion as the use of legislative intent or other interpre-
tative methods ...." Wood, supra note 308, at 63. "Justice Scalia's claim is that the new
textualism imposes mow reliable constraints on judges. Justice Scalia fails to make his case,
... the new textualism is no more constraining than the traditional approach." Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 98, at 676. "Justice Scalia's methodology is a return to the nineteenth
century treatise approach to statutory interpretation." William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 n.11 (1990).
320 I put the point thus to show—pace Scalia—that it is not the Latin of the maxims of
construction that sets my course against textualism. See Scalia, supra note 267, at 25 ("Many
of the canons were originally in Latin, and I suppose that alone is enough to render them
contemptible.").
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the meaning. Such a person will very likely experience some difficulty
in deferring to the meanings that other institutions have devel-
oped."3" Scalia apparently forgot, when he was framing his philoso-
phy of interpretation, that "he who lives by the ipse dixit dies by the
ipse dixit."322
C. The Tyranny of the Meaningless
The antidote is, as so often happens, worse than the ailment. Re-
sponding to the "mindless" charge that textualism is a form of formal-
urn, Scalia chants "Long live formalism. It is what makes a government
a government of laws and not of men."'" The mindlessness, as it hap-
pens, is on the other foot. Formalism is out of touch—not to mention
"out-of-step"—with itself and with everything else that moves and
breathes. "'Formalism,'" as Joseph Vining explains, "pretends that
evidence of the way a term or notion works in the world is not rele-
vant to what the term or notion may be or may mean in law, and that
law is a closed system ...."324 The pretending is predictable, but con-
sequential: "There is always the temptation in law to approach a stat-
ute as if its words had meanings in themselves and by themselves—the
authoritarianism sometimes shown by those devoted to maintaining
the supremacy of democratic politics and legislative authority."3" By
the authoritarian, Vining means claimed authority behind which
32' Merrill, supra note 290, at 372.
522 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Sunstein, su-
pra note 268, at 567 ("There's nothing wrong with justice Scalia's arguments in the ab-
stract. And in an imaginable world, not unrecognizably far from our own, sonic or all of
those arguments might become convincing. But there's also nothing right about Justice
Scalia's arguments in the abstract. Whether those arguments ale convincing depends on a
range of practical and predictive judgments about the capacities of different governmental
institutions. justice Scalia does not defend necessary practical or predictive judgments or
even identify them as such. He writes instead as if his particular, sometimes radical, conclu-
sions can be grounded in apocalyptic arguments about the slippery slope and in high-
sounding abstractions about democracy."). I agree with Sunstein that Scalia's justification
needs to be more empirical, but I depart from Sunstein inasmuch as I think that the pri-
mary empirical data are cognitive, not institutional. See also Philip E. Rickey, From the Big
Sleep to the Big I kat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 258
(1992) ("In my judgment ... the great virtue of the new textualism—its rigidity—is also its
essential vice. I lack the faith of the new textualists that human beings can come up with
one reading of a statute that compels the human mind to accept it ...."). Professor
Frickey's deepest mistake is to think that the d must assent to anything. See infra notes
441-445 and accompanying text.
'2' Scalia, supra note 267, at 25.
'24 VINING, supra note 1, at 76.
'25 a at 240.
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there is no meaning, no mind, no person. Language, the language of
law, is made authoritarian by the removal of the persons who with that
language mean something. As we heard Vining say above, "Legal dis-
course is not a closed system. The meaning of texts is a real meaning."
Vining then goes on: "To the degree it is not, what is put forward is a
species of tyranny."326
For questions and answers about legal meaning, textualist-
formalism substitutes judicial creation masked as judicial discovery.
"[T]extualism triumphant would," in the first place, "lead to a per-
manent subordination of the Chevron doctrine"322—judges saying
"what the law is" without the assistance of agencies, except where the
judges allow that the text is "ambiguous."328 But the price is not only
the allegedly democratic one, that "judges are making law." The price
also is the introduction of the authoritarianism that is lawless in order
to secure the rule of law. No matter how much we want it to be, "[t] he
rule of law ... is not," as Paul Kahn explains, "a thing (not even in
someone's mind) but a way of seeing and understanding." 322 Law and
326 It at 76; see also KAHN, supra note 5, at 153 ("Nor does Marburg pursue the cynical
tautology that law is whatever those with political power decide it is .... Rather, the rule of
law is a common vision .... It is a way of apprehending the political order that is common
to all members of the polity.").
327 Merrill, supra note 290, at 371-72.
3" It is Scalia's view, as Professor Merrill explains, that:
[TI extualism is a more objective Method of interpretation than intentional-
ism, and thus generates less 'agency-liberating ambiguity' that requires courts
to move beyond step one .... As long as each of these rival groups seeks to
persuade swing Justices that its preferred method is more restraining of
judges than the other method, each group has an incentive to avoid the con-
clusion that any given statute is ambiguous, and thus that deference to agency
interpretations is appropriate. The second explanation, which is longer term,
focuses on the style of interpretation associated with textualism. Textualism
tends to approach problems of statutory interpretation like a puzzle, the an-
swer to which is found by developing the most persuasive account of all the
public sources (dictionaries, other provisions of the statute, other statutes)
that bear on ordinary meaning. This in turn tends to make statutory interpre-
tation an exercise in ingenuity—an attitude that may be less conducive to
deference to decisions of other institutions than the dry archival approach as-
sociated with formalism .... This active, creative approach to interpretation
is subtly incompatible with an attitude of deference toward other institu-
tions—whether the other institution is Congress or an administrative agency.
In effect, the textualist interpreter does not find the meaning so much as con-
struct the meaning. Such a person will very likely experience some difficulty in
deferring to the meanings that other institutions have developed.
Id. at 354,371-72.
322 KAHN, supra note 5, at 92.
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its rule are no thing; nor are they "out there," thing-like. "[B]ut the
plain fact," as Lonergan put the point powerfully, "is that there is
nothing 'out there' except spatially ordered marks; to appeal to dic-
tionaries and to grammars, to linguistic and stylistic studies, is to ap-
peal to more marks.""0 All a dictionary can offer even the most care-
ful reader are "empirical descriptions of a probabilistic kind.""
The rule of law goes forward, if at all, through our best efforts to
create and then living by our best efforts to know real legal meaning
(meaning about how to live together well). It is Subjects—not black
marks—who mean. The Subject looking for legal meaning nmst be
looking for the meaning of which the black marks are evidence—and
to find it, she must be asking and answering the questions that legal
method itself makes the right ones. At the end of the available day, as
observed above, the answer to the question, "What does this statute
mean?," may admit of answers only of a probabilistic kind. But though
short of certainty, it has the advantage of being about what the rele-
vant legal speakers meant, rather than about what a universe of
speakers have meant by this individual word in contexts now lost to
us. David Tracy understands this:
[T] ems are not dictionaries. In texts, words do not have
meaning on their own .... We converse with one another.
We can also converse with texts. If we read well, then we are
conversing with the text. No human being is simply a passive
recipient of texts. We inquire. We question. We converse.
Just as there is no purely autonomous text, so there is no
purely passive reader. There is only that interaction named
conversation. Whenever we allow the text to have some claim
upon our attention, we find that we are never pure creators
of meaning. In conversation we find ourselves by losing our-
selves in the questioning provoked by the text. We find our-
selves by allowing claims upon our attention, by exploring
possibilities suggested by others, including those we call
33° LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 582.
331 VINING, supra note 1, at 56; el id. at 85 ("A literal meaning of a word is merely a
possible meaning. Only agreement between speakers could conceivably produce a literal
meaning that was anything more than a possible meaning. There is no legislative power in
some majority of speakers that could make a possible meaning into the actual meaning.").
On the trends in the Supreme Court's use of dictionaries, see, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Law
of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L J. 275, 275 (1998); Note,
Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 Harm L. REV. 1437, 1437 (1994).
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texts. If we want to converse with the author, that is another
conversation. 332
When what we are after is the real meaning of purportedly legal
texts, there is no short-cut—no time-saving –ism—that will bypass the
ungainly, untidy congeries of procedures that is legal method. "If there
is to be law it must be the product of legal method." 333 But to know
legal method is to know nothing less than, as James Boyd White un-
derstands,
a way of making a world with a life and a value of its own.
The conversation that it creates is at once its method and its
point, and its object is to give to the world it creates the kind
of intelligibility that results from the simultaneous recogni-
tion of contrasting positions. 334
Legal conversation, our discursive engagement in legal method,
not only settles how we shall live, but also contributes to making us
who we are to be. Law is constitutive rhetoric. 333 To participate in law
is, in James Boyd White's terms, to be part of a rhetorical community,
and to be a part of a community is to create oneself.
Our Lonergan-inspired self-appropriation led to the same con-
clusion differently expressed. To know law is to know legal meaning,
and to know legal meaning is insightfully to experience, understand,
and judge the data of legal meaning; this requires, in turn, knowing
what the right—the legal—questions and data are. To become a legal
knower there is no neat pattern to follow, just as there is no algorithm
to follow to know the data and questions that allow one to become a
scientific or statistical knower. But people become these all the time,
by learning the language of the relevant community—the "scientific
331 TRACY, supra note 50, at 60.
3" VINING, Mira note 1, at 135.
"4 JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RE-
CONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 267 (1984).
335 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 138-42
(1987); WHITE, supra note 305, at 28-48. Joseph Vining puts it this way:
If we create by faith, what we create is the meaningful world. The fact we cr e-
ate it and must create it to live does not entail that it is not real or really
meaningful. It is all we know. There is no comparison to be made of the (da-
tive reality of a meaningful world We create and the reality of a world we do
not create. The world we know is the world where we live, the world where we
live is the world that allows us to live, the world that allows us to live is the
world we create.
VINING, Mira note 1, at 141.
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community"—and at the same time reconstituting the community
and themselves.338 The fact proves the possibility.'" And the move-
nient from possibility to fact is important:
Meaning is constitutive not only of communication but also
of the human being, of the man. For those who are not in-
fants, morons, knocked unconscious, insane, meaning is
constitutive of living. Not only does meaning constitute
communication, it constitutes us insofar as we are specifically
men and women, specifically human beings. It is not the sole
constituent. A man in a coma is still a man. A man in an in-
sane asylum is still a man. All that is missing is the meaning.
But when you say that all that is missing is the meaning, you
realize that meaning constitutes the significant or important
part of human living.338
To know law is to participate in legal community, and not to partici-
pate in legal community is not to know law.
VII. PUTTING THE SUBJECT BACK AT THE CENTER
It is strange to talk of Hercules when your starting point is Harry Black-
mun.
—John T. Noonany.3"
Ronald Dworkin's conception of law comes in some respects
close to the self-appropriated one to which I have been contrasting
Scalia's. But the differences are profound.34° To explore these differ-
ences, with a view toward exposing what in Dworkin's approach ex-
emplifies, and what in Dworkin's approach lacks, self-appropriation, I
return to my example: the judge faced with the question, "whether
the Commission's decision to make tariff filing optional for all non-
336 See, e.g., BERNARD LONERGAN, Time and Meaning, in 6 COLLECTED WORKS: PLOSO-
PHICAL AND IIIEOLOGICAL PAPERS, supra note 2, at 94-121; LONERGAN, supra note 30, at
200-03.
337 TRACY, SUPYG note 50, at 63 (citation omitted) ("Whether we notice or not, society
and history are always already there. They are there every time 'someone says something to
someone about something.'").
3 LONERGAN, DOM note 336, at 196.
333 NOONAN, supra note 38, at 174.
340 Dworkin's position has shifted over time; so shifty is he, indeed, that "to pin him
down" seems not to be possible. See Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 Mien. L. REV.
104, 108 (1989). When I refer to "Dworkin's position," therefore, what I refer to is my best
attempt to identify where Dworkin stood on these issues the day before yesterday.
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dominant long-distance carriers is a valid exercise of its modification
authority." This, the reader will recall, is the question with which
Scalia began, although in the end he answered the very different
question, "What will the word 'modify' mean in section 203(b)?"
A. A Judge of Method
Scalia began by stating a "question" because it is judicial custom
to say that the case or controversy before the court presents a ques-
tion. But having put the question, Scalia stopped asking and answer-
ing questions. Pierre Schlag describes such a procedure as "prera-
tional," because "it asks no questions and takes things as given. It is
extremely secure in its understanding of the world; it does not allow
the internal intellectual distance that would permit self-reflection." 3"
Proceeding this way, Scalia looks to the black marks, inevitably discov-
ers there no meaning, and then declares what the law will mean un-
less "overruled" by Congress.
Dworkin, by contrast, insists that our legal practice, or at least the
aspect of it that Dworkin contmends to us, "consists in an approach, in
questions rather than in answers ...."342 Dworkin is aware that there
are many legal practitioners at bench and bar who imagine that what
"the law is" is "out there,"343 to be known by looking in the books
where authoritative words lies" "recalcitrant."'" Textualists, if one
believes their story that they are discovering rather than creating law,
fit this category. But to proceed this way misses, to Dworkin's mind,
what most judges within our legal practice are in fact—and what all
judges within our legal practice ought to be—doing when they turn to
legal text. Dworkin's meta-position, Dworkin's understanding of the
legal method of judges in "our own political culture," 3" is that they
are creatively to interpret the text so as thereby to create a community
of principle. "Embedded" in statutes and the legal practice and the
Schlag, supra note 18, at 1208.
342 RONALD Dwomtirs, Law's EMPIRE 239 (1986).
343 See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 172 (1985).
344 DWORKIN, supra note 342, at 7 (On the plain fact or semantic view of law, 'The law
is only a matter of what legal institutions, like legislatures and city councils and courts,
have decided in the past. If some body of that sort has decided that workmen can recover
compensation for injuries by fellow workmen, then that is the law .... So questions of law
can always be answered by looking in the books where the records of institutional decisions
are kept."). For an insightful summary of Dworkin's statement of the "plain fact" view of
law, See STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN 125-26 (1991).
343 Dwostmx, supra note 343, at 169.
346 DWORKIN, supra note 342, at 216.
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doctrinal area of which they are a part, according to Dworkin, are legal
principles, and these the interpreter is to discover. 347 It is exactly
"through interpretation, of more concrete enactments that we can
identify the principles which we have together embraced ... "348
The interpreter is to be no mere midwife, however. What the in-
terpreter's efforts are to yield is a construction. "[C]onstructive inter-
pretation is a matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in
order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to
which it is taken to belong ... :149 In performing all of this principle-
maximizing, the judge is to be guided by an overall demand for "in-
tegrity." As he goes about his constructive work, the judge is to take
into account as much as possible about not only the "local" area of the
litigation and the immediate legal practice, but also about the whole
body of law and the legal system—so that his resolution of the case
before him contributes to the development of a principled body of
law and "community of principle."35°
Shouldering this weighty task, the judge often must make many
hard choices about the most difficult questions of politics and politi-
cal morality, with the result that much of what he produces will be
controversial. Though his responsibility is not to introduce his private
morality into law but instead to unpack and develop the principles
already embedded in law, his conceptions of those principles are
bound to be controversial: "A judge must ultimately rely on his own
opinions in developing and applying a theory about how to read a
statute .... He knows, of course, that his opinion ... is itself contro-
versial .... [But tips own political convictions, which the[] various
questions [before him when he interprets a statute] engage, are the
only ones he has." 351 What the judge must do is to reach a judgment.
Whereas the plain fact or semantic approach to law imagines that the
law will be plain and there to be seen by the judge (and other partici-
pants), Dworkin's judge resolves a conflict.
Integrity does riot enforce itself: judgment is required. That
judgment is structured by different dimensions of interpre-
tation and different aspects of these.... The interpretive
judgment must notice and take account of these.... The in-
347 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory (The Order of the Coif Lecture), 29
Muz. ST. L4. 353, 355-57 (1997).
Me Id. at 373.
349 DWOIIKIN, SUpra note 342, at 52.
33° See id. at 188, 264.
331 Id. at 334.
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terpretive judgment must notice and take account of these
several dimensions; if it does not, it is incompetent or in bad
faith, ordinary politics in disguise. But it must also meld
these dimensions into an overall opinion: about which in-
terpretation, all things considered, makes the community's
legal record the best it can be from the point of view of po-
litical morality.352
This is a long bill of particulars—so long, indeed, that Dworkin
explicates it through Hercules, the "imaginary judge of superhuman
intellectual power and patience" who, as we saw, moved Professor
(now Judge) Noonan to ask why we should talk of Hercules when our
starting point is someone—each one of us—so much more ordi-
nary.353 Noonan's point is not pedantic—particularly if we are after a
rule of law of which humans are capable. Dworkin is anxious to meet
it. "Hercules," as Dworkin tells the story, "shows us the hidden struc-
ture of their [real judges'] judgments. ... He has no vision into tran-
scendental mysteries opaque to them.... He does what they would do
if they had a career to devote to a single decision .. .." 354 Dworkin's
Hercules does have the advantage, from the perspective of plausibility,
that he does not know by intuition or mental looks. He is, com-
mendably, "a judge of method."355 And his method, as we have seen, is
to ask questions, which he answers in judgment, 356 with new questions
methodically building on what has gone before. Moreover, he knows
his questions and the data to question because he interprets the legal
practice of which he is already a part. So far, so good. 352
352
 Id. at 410-11.
33' NOONAN, supra note 38, at 174. See supra text accompanying note 339.
354 DWORKIN, supra note 342, at 265.
355
 Id. at 240.
336 By which I do not mean to suggest that Dworkin has in mind anything like the "vir-
tually unconditioned." See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, PHIL.
& Pun. An. 87 (1996) (arguing inter a/ia against the possibility of Archimedean epistemol-
ogy). Considerations of space rule out undertaking a thorough analysis of these complex
matters here, but at least this much should be said. A self-appropriated epistemologist does
not seek a view-from-nowhere, a place outside being from which to look down at being. To
that extent he sides with Dworkin. But against Dworkin he would insist upon the virtually
unconditioned (an Archimedean point not allowed by Dworkin) and would thus avoid
replacing genuine objectivity with the admonition "You'd Better Believe it "
357 In the interest of simplifying the argument, I leave to another day the question
whether Dworkin thinks that his judge "knows" law in anything resembling Lonergan's
sense. I suspect the answer is in the negative. But cf. Dwomm , supra note 342, at 235 ("We
might say ... that the constraint is 'internal' or 'subjective.' It is nevertheless phenome-
nologically genuine .... We are trying to see what interpretation is like from the point of
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B. "Our"judicial Practice?
But has Dworkin correctly interpreted "our" legal practice, the
point of "our" legal method? He paints, it seems, with too broad a
brush. The judicial authorization in the New York courts in 1889,
from which comes Riggs v. Palate" Dworkin's favorite exem-
plification of legal method, was rather plainly in the common-law
model as Justice Scalia describes it.' 32 But even if there is dispute
about the details of the judicial authorization with respect to statutes
in Article III courts today, there can be no question that it is not as
broad as at common law. That, at least, is the point of Erie R.R. Co. u
Tompkins,360 as well as the judicial opinions leading up to Erie361 and
the cases leading away from it to the present.362 Among the cases lead-
ing away from it, of course, are those showing the marks of Justice
Scalia's (purported) attempts to narrow the federal judicial authoriza-
tion. There are also, to be sure, the cases showing the marks of Jus-
tices who take a more expansive view of what the federal judicial
authorization is and ought to bC.363 And what this establishes at the
view of the interpreter, and from that point of view the constraint he feels is as genuine as
if it were uncontroversial, as if everyone else felt it as powerfully as he does.").
358 22 N.E. 188, 189 (1889) (murdering legatee could not inherit because the statute
that did not on its face make an exception for murdering legatees in fact prohibited them
from inheriting as the statute was read in light of the legal maxim that no one is to profit
by his own wrong).
359 See supra text accompanying note 268.
36° 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (IThus the doctrine of &rift a 'Tyson [that federal courts sit-
ting in diversity have a general common law making power in the absence of state constitu-
tional or statute law] is, as Mr. Justice Holmes said, an unconstitutional assumption of
powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opin-
ion should make us hesitate to correct.'"). See general51 Tow PREFER, THE SWIFT 8c ERIE
CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981).
3431 See, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. vlohnson, 293 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1934); Burns Mort-
gage Co. v. Fried, 292 U.S. 487, 495 (1934); Black & White Taxicab &Transfer Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 390-411 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
362 See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996); Boyle v. United
Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988); Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1945)
(considering Rules of Decision Act merely declarative of what law would have been any-
way); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Hinderlider v. La Plata
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (deciding on same day as Erie to
uphold special federal common lawmaking power of federal courts sitting ilk diversity).
363 See Charles Fried, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 PACE L. REV. 303, 305-06
(1992); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 805 (1989); cf. Wallis
v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966); MARTIN Ransx, THE FEDERAL
COURTS DI THE POLITICAL ORDER 29-46 (1991); Thomas Merrill, The Common Law Powers
of the Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm. L. Rev. 1 (1985); Thomas Merrill, Thefitdicial Prerogative, 12
PACE L. Rev. 327, 330-31 (1992); Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Coin/se-
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very least is that the federal judicial authorization is contested in a way
that Dworkin's monolithic, generic conception of the judicial role—
which makes no distinction even between state and federal judging-
eclipses.$M
But the contest is not simply about what federal, as opposed to
state, judges ought to do when turning to statutory text. The contest
also concerns what federal judges should do when turning to those
specific statutes that Congress creates to be administered in the first
place by agencies. Although Dworkin arguably goes some distance
toward handling this with his instruction that the judge is to give ef-
fect to the principles of the body of law to which the relevant statute
belongs, I know of nothing in Dworkin's writings that suggests he
knows that there is a "counter-Mat-bury, for the administrative state, "365
the rule of Chevron. That case has the agency interpreting the statute
in light of its mandate and experience, with the court saying "what the
law is" only when the statute is said by the court to be unambiguous
and not in need of, and not admitting of, interpretation in light of an
agency's experience. Hercules appears never to have heard that
"there has never been a pervasive notion that limited government
mandated an all-encompassing judicial duty to supply all of the rele-
vant meaning of statutes. Rather, the judicial duty is to ensure that the
administrative agency stays within the zone of discretion committed to
it by its organic act."sue
fence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797,
802-04 (1957).
sa See Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263,
280.81(1992) (noting that much post-1789 state common lawmaking was authorized by
state statutes of reception, of which there is no analogue for Article Ill courts).
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLDM. L. Rev. 2071,
2075 (1990).
' Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLOM. L. Rev. 1, 33
(1983); see also ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POUi'ics 90 (1975) ('There are
legal systems in which the line between legislation and adjudication is hazy from the start.
This is especially true in a tradition ofjudge-made law like the Anglo-American common
law. A system in which judges both make the law and apply it is hot selfcvidently inconsis-
tent with a situation of legal justice as long as some screen can be interposed between rea-
sons for having a rule and reasons for applying it to a particular case ")• Bator, supra note
311, at 264, 265 ("It is history and custom and expediency, rather than logic that deter-
urine what needs to be the participation of the judges in this enterprise.... The judicial
power is neither a Platonic essence nor a pre-existing empirical classification. It is a pur-
posive institutional concept, whose content is a product of history and custom distilled in
the light of experience and expediency. "); cf. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Co-
VIM. L. REV. 945, 952 (1955) ("When a court or agency develops law or policy, it is acting
legislatively; the courts have created the common law through judicial legislation ....
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Pouter in the Administrative State,
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What I have been suggesting is that Dworkin misreads or at least
silently resolves many hotly contested questions about the scope of the
federal judicial authorization. Dworkin has the judge doing with the
black marks much more than there is agreement he should. And
Dworkin is surely at least as entitled as Antonin Scalia to try to alter
the legal culture, though he would be more credible were he to admit
the degree to which his enterprise is normative rather than merely
descriptive. From this line of analysis, I want now to turn to another,
and ask whether Dworkin's implicit normative claim about the judicial
role is consistent with self-appropriation. The answer, I think, is
mixed, but largely in the negative.
Hercules, as I noted above, is a judge of method. He is methodi-
cal in the sense that he seeks law by asking questions, rather than by
merely gaping at the black marks or by enjoying vision "into tran-
scendental mysteries." He is methodical in the additional sense that
he is not living each day as if it were his first; his answers are built on
prior answers. Hercules, however, is not a team-player. "The man
works alone."367 He does not engage in dialogue. But what is more,
the man who works alone is, in fact, no man at all. And while Dworkin
is at pains to convince us that the mythical Hercules lays bare the pat-
tern by which real judges know law, the fact is that he does not. David
Tracy's encapsulation of the method of human knowing is again rele-
vant: "[W]e humans must reason discursively, inquire communally,
converse and argue with ourselves and one another. Human knowl-
edge could be other than it is. But this is the way it is: embodied,
communal, finite, discursive." 368 To be sure, Hercules does reach
judgments that are answers to questions, and in this respect he bears
more resemblance to a real judge than does, say, Charles Fried's intui-
tional judge; to this extent, Dworkin's own future work would be
fortified by his rooting it clearly in the facts of human cognition
rather than in Herculean fantasy. But starting with Hercules misleads
89 CoLum. L. REV. 452,487-88 (1989) ("[Al key assumption of Chevron's 'judicial usurpa-
tion' argument—that Congress may give agencies primary responsibility not only for mak-
ing policy within the limits of their organic statutes, but also for defining those limits
whenever the text and surrounding legislative materials are ambiguous—is fundamentally
incongruous with the constitutional course by which the Court came to reconcile agencies
and separation of powers."). Morton J. Horwitz traces the "rule of law" anxieties generated
by the emergence of the administrative state in his TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870-1960, at 213-46 (1992).
3°7 SCHLAG, supra note 18, at 1213 n.76; see also Frank I. Michelman, Traces of Self Gov-
ernment, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4, 76-77 (1986).
3€6 TRACY, supra note 50, at 27.
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Dworkin. Hercules' mandate—to make law the best it can be all by
himself—is formed in light of an almost angelic view of intellect and
the time available to such super-human species. What the human
judge who lacks even sufficient opportunity (let alone limitless time)
needs to know is what to do in the time available. That is not simply to
make the most of what we have. 369 Dialectical reason is too leaky a ves-
sel. Minds that work mostly through probabilities require a more
modest mandate. And such minds must work together, not in splen-
did isolation.
C. More of What?
There is a final, related problem with Hercules and his labors.
Hercules never learns, at least not in any fundamental way, from ex-
perience. He spends his time, as Dworkin would have him, trying to
give effect to the principles already embedded in law. His universe is
just as closed as—if rather wider than—the one Scalia would have us
believe confines the textualist. Concentrating on principles, moreo-
ver, Hercules has cut himself off from the minds of Subjects and their
meaning—and he thus has severed himself from what gives authority.
As Steven Smith has observed, "it is hard to think of any recommen-
dation for a regime of law created by the 'interpretation' of disem-
bodied words that have been methodically severed from the acts of
mind that produced them. Such a regime would represent a step back
in the direction of the rule of fortuity." 370 What it may have to rec-
ommend it, of course, is someone's fondness for the principles alleg-
edly embedded in law right about now. The enterprise is (as Michael
White felicitously phrases it) one of stopping history where one likes
it. 371
My objection is not simply aesthetic. Under a self-appropriated
legal method, the Subject looks to the data of putatively legal mean-
ing and then proceeds by question and answer, methodically building
on prior answers, while remaining existentially open, meeting the
demands of the eros to know, to answer new questions—common
369 See, e.g., VINING, supra note 28, at 115-16.
5Th Smith, supra note 340, at 119; see also id. at 112 ("If the statute is understood not as
the expression of a collective decision by the established political authority but rather as a
kind of thing-in-itself, a free-floating text, then why is its right to command any greater
than that of, say, the political treatise or the science fiction novelr); Smith, supra note 236,
at 180-88.
3" See MICHAELI WHITE, PARTISAN OR NEUTRAL?: THE FUTILITY OF PUBLIC POLITICAL
THEORY 81-121 (1997).
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sense's questions—about fresh data. Conventions about the width and
depth of the appropriate openness of the federal judicial officer—the
data to be questioned, the questions with which to question them, and
the identity of other authoritative creators of meaning—shift, through
contested fights about the meaning of grants of authority. The best
reason for not shifting in Dworkin's direction is that Dworkin has the
judge doing both too much and too little. He has Hercules trying to
make the most of what we already have, and nothing of anything
else.'" To follow Dworkin is, as Paul Kahn observes understatedly, to
"lose[] sight of law's politically contested character."'"
To follow Dworkin is also, less glamorously but at least as
significantly, to lose sight of the point—the contested point—of the
modern administrative state sought to be entrenched through Chev-
ron. Agencies are delegated power to solve problems that do not ad-
mit of, or at least will not receive, detailed Congressional solution,
and the meaning of statutes by which that power is delegated is
"suppffied1"374 not by the legislature alone, nor simply by the judici-
ary in combination with the legislature, but by agencies in concert
with the courts and Congress. Thus, more concretely, for a court to
"answer" a question about an administrative statute's meaning by pro-
ceeding directly to a dictionary definition, or for a court to take such
a statute as a spring-board for maximizing the principles it finds in the
legal context, is to overlook what the Court long ago recognized
about what Congress may mean when enacting administrative statutes:
372 Cf. EWEN, supra note 5, at 92 (The present meaning of the legal order always ap-
pears to be fully constituted by its own past. Ronald Dworkin's image of the judge as some-
one who is writing a new chapter in a chain novel is a close approximation of this experi-
ence. Yet Dworkin confuses reading and writing in the process of interpretation. Legal
interpretation reads the event as if it were a chapter in a book that is already written yet
previously inaccessible. To say that the legal meaning of die event is exhausted in its possi-
bility is not to say that we know these possibilities before the event occurs. Legal interpreta-
tion is a reading of possibility out of actuality. We see through the event itself to the rule of
law that was always there, even if unrecognized.").
373 Id. at 45.
The rule of law is indeed a complete account of our experience of the politi-
cal. It is, nevertheless, a contested account. Dworkin's overwhel g focus on
the problem of judicial discretion presents a picture of law's rule, on the one
side, and of the personal preferences or beliefs of the judge, on the other. But
the important contest is not between law and the personal or private aspects
of the judge. Rather, it is between conflicting appearances of political mean-
ing.
Id. at 45-46.
374 See sup-a text accompanying notes 365-366.
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'The word [in the statute] 'is not treated by Congress as a word of art
having a definite meaning ....' Rather it 'must be read in the light of
the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.'" 375
In every case, the question includes what Congress means, but
what Congress means is not to' be found in a dictionary. "A literal
meaning of a word is merely a possible meaning. Only agreement be-
tween speakers could conceivably produce a literal meaning that was
anything more than a possible meaning. There is no legislative power
in some majority of speakers that could make a possible meaning into
the actual meaning."376 But as for the actual meaning of the statutes,
to the extent Congress has created the agency to be a source of legal
meaning, no longer can the ffiffistion be exclusively one of what Con-
gress means, nor of what the judicial officer alone would have it
mean. Determining the actual meaning of the statute cannot be sepa-
rated from the task of determining who all the relevant speakers of
legal meaning are and what they have said. And to know this, one
must—as I first observed above, objecting to the lonely eminence
shouldered by Scalia's textualist—be participating in legal commu-
nity:
In the law ... every speaker is particularly located, both
rhetorically and socially. He or she is a lawyer or judge, a
judge of state or federal court, a lawyer arguing to a jury or
making a motion to a judge, and in every instance is situated
as well with reference to a set of prior and arguably authori-
tative texts: constitutions, statutes, earlier cases, and the like
.... The authority of the legal actor is never self-established,
375 NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944); see also Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S.
402, 411-13 (1941) ("In a matter left specifically by Congress to the determination of an
administrative body, as the question of exemption was here ..., the function of review
placed upon the courts ... is fully performed when they determine that there has been a
fair hearing, with notice and an opportunity to present the circumstances and arguments
to the decisive body, and an application of the statute in a just and reasoned manner ....
It is not the province of a court to absorb the administrative functions to such an extent
that the executive or legislative agencies become mere fact finding bodies deprived of the
advantages of prompt and definite action .... To determine upon which side of the me-
dian line the particular instance falls calls for the expert, experienced judgment of those
familiar with the induitry. Unless we can say that a set of circumstances deemed by the
Commission to bring them within the concept 'producer' is so unrelated to the tasks en-
trusted by Congress to the Commission as in effect to deny a sensible exercise of judg-
ment, it is the Court's duty to leave the Commission's judgment undisturbed."); Louis L.
Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239, 263 (1955) ("[P]roperly under-
stood the doctrine in Gray u Powell is as traditional as it is sound.").
376 VINING, supra note 1, at 85.
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but always rests, at least in argument, upon prior texts, which
provide the standards that govern the authority they estab-
lish. This means, among other things, that the legal speaker
must always look outside himself for his source of authority;
that his every action rests upon a claimed interpretation of
those sources of authority; and that these interpretations, of
necessity, are compositions to which he asks that authority be
given. 377
But if he looks outside himself to find something to interpret to estab-
lish his own authority, he must look inside himself to know the norms
to comply with in order to produce an authoritative interpretation of
the ground of his authority. The authoritarianism that is tyranny can
proceed without this authority. But an authoritative rule of law is
achieved, I have argued; only as putative authority proceeds in fact
from inner law that ever insists upon replacing nescience with knowl-
edge, not stopping short of transcendent meaning (about how to live
well). Lonergan summed up the consequences of this insight: "Hu-
man living really is a struggle for meaning, an effort, because mean-
ing is constituent of human living. The effort to live is fundamentally
the struggle for meaning." 378
D. Caveat Lector
After all that I have written about statutes and their interpreta-
tion, it may be well to remind the reader that I am under no misap-
prehension that I have provided a "theory of statutory interpretation"
or even an interpretation of section 203(b). What I have sought to
provide is an account of what form such a theory must take if—but
only if—saying "what the law is" is to be a matter of knowing and then
pronouncing legal meaning (rather than, for example, merely creat-
ing meaning or entrenching principles) in the context of our put-
posive efforts to order human living. What I have argued is that no
matter how much we would like legal language to be a "constraint"
upon legal actors, there is no getting around the fact that there is no
road higher than fidelity to the meaning of texts as created by all ac-
3" JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 96 (1990). 'The rule of law subsumes
discretion not by insisting on a single answer but by locating the meaning of the discre-
tionary act outside the decision itself—for example, in the allocation of the authority to
decide." KAHN, supra note 5, at 83; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 49 (1994).
0)8 LONERGAN, SUP/ti note 336, at 106.
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ton with authority, which authority itself is affirmed only by knowing
the meaning of the grants of that authority to create legal meaning."
Resisting the urge to simplify, a self-appropriated approach to statutes
will inevitably make contestable claims about the relevant sources of
legal meaning. 388 "As for law, it ... partakes of the radical uncertainty
of the rest of life, the want of firm external standards." 381 The identi-
ties of the authoritative texts and authoritative speakers have to be
settled, and the speakers will have to put the right questions to the
right data. 382 These are not activities I have performed in this Article.
379 As Paul Kahn has explained, the strength of Marbury and its view of the rule of law
is won by treating law as something that can be seen, and reading as seeing: "In a paradox
of power, the Court denies that it is even reading the Constitution. Marbury seeks to create
an appearance of 'just seeing,' even when what it sees is a text .... One need not learn
how to read this law; it need only be sighted. Reading introduces the possibility of error;
sight is pure." KAHN, supra note 5, at 223.
sm See generally DENNIS PATreason, LAW AND Thum (1996). From a very different
starting point, Patterson anticipates conclusions in some respects close to my own. The
theory of "dynamic statutory" interpretation worked out by Professor Eskridge clearly has
common ground with my own position. See generally ESIUUDGE, supra note 377; William N.
Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). But Eskridge's
position differs from mine in the critical foundational respect that any approach to statutes
is from the angle of the normatively dynamic mind that creates and interprets then,. By not
studying the mind itself (except in the limited context of a discussion of hermeneutics),
Eskridge's position lacks a normative justification deeper than making the best of a social
practice in which we happened to be engaged. See EsiutinGE, supra note 377, at 58-68.
For examples of accounts that refuse impatiently to cut short the search for
meaning See KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUES-
TIONS (1999), and Robert Araujo, Method in Interpretation: Practical Wisdom and the Search for
Meaning in Public Legal Texts, 68 Miss. L.J. 225, 240 (1998) (rooting statutory interpretation
in the method of human intelligence). A similar approach is implicated in Gary Lawson's
acute observation that knowing law is like knowing fact. See Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L.
REV. 859, 861-77 (1992). What Lawson finds lacking in law—a standard of proof for claims
of legal meaning—I have supplied from self-appropriation: the virtually unconditioned
and the judgments that converge on it. CI Larry Alexander, Proving the Law: Not Proven, 86
Nw. U. L. REV. 905, 913 (1992) (discussing Lawson's position and criticizing Dworkin's
legal theory on the ground that "there is nothing in the world to which to ascribe prob-
abilities" that a principle "fits" a set of legal facts).
"I WHITE, supra note 377, at 267.
MI Statutes that concern administration present a particularly rich and ripe opportu-
nity for exemplifying the irreducibility of the problem of settling 011 who the authoritative
creators of meaning are. The Supreme Court has sometimes submerged or skirted the
issue by transmuting the question about who in the administrative state will "say what the
law is" into a question about whether a statute is "ambiguous" or not. See, e.g., Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1985) ("[I]f the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute .... Sometimes the
legislative delegation to an agency is implicit rather than explicit.") Michael Hen, Deference
Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 Ansa L.J. 187, 189
(1992) ("Its detractors portray Chevron as itself a delegation, one that abandons to adminis-
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And even once they have been performed, by me or by you or by the
nine Justices of the Supreme Court, disagreement about meaning will
occur. "How is this disagreement to be faced, by the judge applying
the law, by the believer trying to follow it?," asks James Boyd White:
The traditional Muslim answer has been that all of the sev-
eral readings are valid, notwithstanding their inconsistency,
if they are each reached by a mind diligently engaged, in
good faith, in a search for its meaning. The judge or the be-
trative agencies the judicial authority and obligation to 'say what the law is.'") What this
overlooks is that you cannot settle the question of ambiguity without first knowing who all
the relevant meaning creators are and what they have said. What the Court treats as the
issue of whether the statute is "ambiguous" is, in other words, a question of legal method
and, more specifically, the question of who authoritatively creates the meaning of the stat-
ute, and how. The Court has come closest to recognition of this in connection with how an
agency's power to interpret its organic statute differs from its power to interpret the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. See, e.g., Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, Dep't of
Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994) (finding that "burden of proof" in
the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), was to be defined by the Court); United States v. Ha. East
Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 236 11.6 (1973) (concluding that APA "is not legislation that
the Interstate Commerce Commission, or any other single agency, has primary responsibil-
ity for administering.").
But by generally not facing the issue directly, that is, by not asking the extent to
which the agency has the power to create statutory meaning, the Court has been led to
treat meaning-creation by the agency as a virtually all-or-nothing proposition: either the
statute is "unambiguous," in which case the agency is not to contribute to its meaning; or it
is "ambiguous," in which case the agency's interpretation is to receive maximum defer-
ence. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 977
(1992) ("In effect, Chevron transformed a regime that allowed courts to give agencies def-
erence along a sliding scale into a regime with an on/off switch."). The trouble with the
Court's approach is not that it fails to give effect to the principles of the relevant legal con-
text (see Melvin A1011 Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 Loy. LA L. REV. 13,35 (1995); Rich-
ard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and
Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Count. L. REV. 749, 777-78 (1995); see Ity
Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023
(1998)), but that it uses a fiction about binary legal clarity to decide the contested issue of
who the authoritative meaning creators are. Peter Strauss was exactly right that in MCI, "the
root issue for Justice Scalia is one of delegation," but it was an issue that Scalia purported
to resolve on wholly other grounds On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 9
SUP. Cr. REV. 429, 495 (1994). See CASs R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 143 (1990) ("An ambiguity is not a delegation of
law-interpreting power."). Occasionally the Court approaches this stance. See, e.g., ABF
Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994) ('When Congress expressly delegates
to an administrative agency the authority to make specific policy determinations, courts
must give the agency's decision controlling weight ...."); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104,
114 (1985) ("At least in those instances in which Congress has not spoken and in which
the issue falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the
fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of sound ad-
ministration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the
issue in question.").
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liever can follow any of them and still follow the law: but his
choice too must arise from a good-faith search for meaning,
within his capacities. A world of difference is thus created; it
is kept from the prison-house of "single meanings"—of
thinking that meanings translate directly from text to text—
by honest attention to language, to particularity of phrase
and context; it is kept from the chaos of indifferent relativ-
ism—of thinking that nothing can be known or understood,
no common values held—by a principle of humility and sin-
cerity ... . 385
More dangerous than the Subject who merely does her best is the per-
son who would do nothing until she can (pretend to) get it exactly
r ights84
VIII. TRANSCENDENT; THEREFORE, NOT NONSENSE
The content of the law, the obligation to obey it, and the specification of
what obedience consists of emerge not one after another in the mind—or in
legal analysis—but together
—Joseph Vining585
From talk of transcendence and method we passed to the nitty-
gritty of administration and the question of how to know the meaning
of a specific; not at all exotic, statute. The starting point was not sub-
lime, but the way-station might well be ridiculous. Administration is
ridiculous—though powerfully efficient and efficiently powerful—if it
proceeds through something short of Subjects' creating and knowing
legal meaning, meaning about how to live together well. And, as it
happens, legal theorists and actors on all sides are cutting short the
creation and search for the real meaning of legal sources, in order—it
is said—to provide the "constraints" thought requisite to a Rule-of-
Law-not-of-men.
But women and men cannot be eliminated if a rule of law is to be
achieved; text, even "legal text," cannot rule ex proprio vigore. To keep
,183 WHITE, supra note 377, at 268.
384 Cf. Waiting for Langdell I: Interview of the Authors by Sandy Levinson, in AGAINST THE
Law, supra note 4, at 25 ("In 'A Heterodox Catechism' I (Paul Campos) argue that it's no
coincidence that Hart and Sacks weren't able to publish The Legal Process. They literally
couldn't get to the end.,They literally couldn't stop. I try to tie it in with a kind of modernist
illness that since you have to be Cod and you have to get it right, you can never actually do
it.").
385 VINING, supra note 1, at 246.
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men but dish meaning, moreover, is to remit men to an authoritarian
hollow of their own making. Joseph Vining and James Boyd White, on
whose work I have placed so much emphasis, refuse to settle for less-
than-meaningful law. Their work shows beautifully how self-
appropriated human Subjects go about fashioning a rule of law.
The work of Vining and White has come in for sharp criticism
exactly for its hope to find meaningful law even in the bureaucratic
state. The detractors urge that there is nothing or precious little to be
found there—and that the game is, in any event, not worth the can-
dle.386 The objection is most plausible when it suggests that Vining
and White (among cognate others) seek to make us believe or hope—
because certainly no one can know such a thing—that the emperor is
clothed after al1. 387
My response is that Vining and White at least give us an em-
peror—or rather, in this period in history, they show us the possibility
of democratic rule by human Subjects under inner law. 388 They give us
back to ourselves. And if we find ourselves, what we find is that we can
lead lives that are hollow or lives that are meaningful and worthwhile.
The choice is ours—but it is a choice. Through methodical questions
and answers, we can reach the limited absolutes that are judgments of
real legal meaning, the authoritative speakers of legal meaning en-
gaged in answering questions about how to order our common life.
Or, we interpreters and potential speakers can instead obnubilate or
gape or guffaw or declare. We can pretend to read—while creating
instead a little something from nothing. Something as meaningful as
a Hallmark card can pass for law, for awhile.
In this final Part, I round out the notion of the rule of law em-
bodied in questions and answers as I briefly assess the claim that natu-
ral law or theology has crept into my account of the rule of law. I be-
gin by considering from a new angle the place of texts in our legal
practice. From there I turn to the question of where that sine qua non
of the rule of law, objectivity, has gotten to in my account. And finally,
386 See, e.g., SUMAC., ENCHANTMENT, supra note 4, at 94; Schlag, Polities of Form, supra
note 4, at 29-31, 49-51, 64-66, 98-99; Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, in AGAINST THE
LAW, supra note 4, at 218, 234).
387 See, e.g., VINING, supra note 1, at 5, 15-16, 22, 34, 107; JAMES Bon) WHITE, ACTS OF
HOPE (1994).
388 See VINING, supra note 28, at 145. The position faced with texts behind which there
is no mind "is worse than that of a courtier of the emperor who wore no clothes, passing a
sock to hint knowing all the while that there was no sock. At least there was an emperor."
Id.
2002] 	 The Rule of Law	 333
I return to my claim that to know legal meaning is, whether we like
the sound of it or not, to transcend ourselves.
A. Texts in the Context of Human Bias
The unifying objective of this Article has been to explain what a
rule of law would be like if it were rooted in the way Subjects in fact
know—and know specifically how to live together well—rather than in
inherited metaphysical and epistemological misunderstandings. Fol-
lowing Lonergan's lead, I used the heuristic structures and methods
of natural science to point toward the structure and method of all
human knowing. But if all human knowledge is on a continuum with
"scientific" knowledge, because any human knowledge is the body of
answers to a body of methodical questions, still the pretensions of sci-
ence of the natural sort hobble our efforts to grasp the legitimacy of
other bodies of knowing. Even as natural science itself is convulsed by
questions about what is really going forward in "science," the scientistic
mentality prevails. One not only descends a public rung or two 389
when one talks of "unscientific" subjects. One also risks not being
"understood" by the science Ph.D.'s—"I didn't understand a word you
just said ..."—whose official stance is that they care not to understand
what is not "scientific."39°
Of the several dynamics at work in the ascendance of the scientis-
tic mentality, several require mention if we are to understand what
stands between ourselves and a rule of law of questions and answers.
Lonergan calls the mental pathologies that prevent our living by ques-
tions and answers "biases," and I shall follow him in this usage, though
not in the details of his taxonomy. As we have "seen," we know in
judgment but we think we know by sight. And after we have spent time
unlearning the consequences of our spontaneous love of our vision,
we easily regress to supposing that sometimes, somehow, vision—
"mental looks," the "super-look," "intuition" or (in Thomas Nagel's
phrase) the "view from nowhere"—will enter to provide certainty.
Ocularity is the Western notion of how knowledge occurs 391—from
589 See supra text accompanying note 205.
390 SeeVINING, supra note 1, at 144-45,186; FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at 69; see alsojo-
seph Vining, On the Future of Total Theory: Science, Antiscience, and Human Candor, 23-25,
(Inaugural Lecture at the Erasmus Institute, Notre Dante University, 1999) (published and
circulated as one of the "occasional papers" of the Erasmus Institute and available from
the Institute).
"I See LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 412; see generally RUDOLPH ARNIIEIM, VISUAL THINIC-
ING (1969); MARTIN JOY, DOWNCAST EYES: THE DENIGRATION OF VISION IN TWENTIETH
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Plato to Descartes who, as we "saw," imagines himself reaching cer-
tainty by "mental loolcs."392 In Ian Hacicing's judgment, "the Cartesian
world was thoroughly visual,"393 and if there is any doubt about what
world we live in, recall that what Descartes initiated—and what is
commended to us by law's reconstructionists—is the Enlighten-
inent.394 What cannot be seen simply does not exist or is at all events
discounted. What is seen is supposed to be true. Mental activities other
than seeing are epiphenomenal with respect to knowledge.
What the ocular bias ensures is that when we want something we
can rely on, what we reach for mentally is something we can hold with
our gaze. "Millen literate cultures are in crisis, the crisis is most evi-
dent in the question of what they do with their exemplary written
texts."3" And so, in law, we reach for texts considered as black marks—
supposing that law is some thing that we can see or touch. "Written
texts seem to provide stability for literate cultures. At the same time,
written texts are exposed to great instability when intellectual and
moral crisis occurs."396 The instability results from the disruption in
the habitual patterns by which such texts are created and approached.
One attempt at stabilization—that is itself caused by and causes a
destabilization—would reduce law to a thing, a textual repository of
(say) "objectified intent." We might refer to the bias that insists that
what really is, is out there, the bias of extroversion. When this bias
obtains, metaphysics is first, and Subjects are little in evidence. Nor is
meaning, which can never be seen, anywhere to be found.'"
The two biases I have described lead—and, as observed above,
have led historically—to the denigration of symbolic and common-
sense knowing. But common sense itself, despite what I have said in
favor of its competence for getting things done here and now, begets
CENTURY FRENCH THOUGHT 21-82 (1993); Hans Jonas, l'he Nobility of Sight: A Study in the
Phenomenology of the Senses, in THE PHENOMENON OF IAFE: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHICAL BIOL-
°GT 135-56 (1982).
392 See supra text accompanying notes 85-87; see also Roan, supra note 168, at 45 ("Mil
the Cartesian model, the intellect inspects entities modeled on retinal images .... In Des-
cartes's conception—the one which became the basis for 'modern' epistemology'—it is
representations which are in the 'mind.'").
393 IAN HACKING, WHY DOES LANGUAGE MATTER TO PHILOSOPHY? 32 (1975).
394 See supra text accompanying notes 76-101.
393 TRACY, SUpra note 50, at 11.
396
397 `The transcendent produces such agony now, that we want to deny it .... The
principal way of avoiding the transcendent has been to conceive or define thought as rep-
resentational. Words or images come to mind. They appear, we are something of a recipi-
ent or observer of them." VINING, supra note 1, at 329.
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a kind of bias, a bias against what is not about the here and now. The
common-sense knower as such is interested in the hic et nunc, and so
long as one is engaged only in common-sense knowing, one will not
plan for the future. Bare common sense ignores the question of how
to order things in the long run.
Not only that. The Subject who is strictly a common-sense knower
denies the prerogatives of other specializations. The common-sense
knower disavows the legitimacy of differentiated consciousness, trying
all the time to reduce everything to common sense 9 98 When Subjects
whose consciousness is informed primarily by common sense get hold
of what is not primarily common sense, their next move is to install
common sense instead. Bias working itself out manifests what Loner-
gall calls "the flight from understanding." 399
Consider the pattern in law. Legal communities emerge in order
to provide for peaceful and intelligent ordering of human life, first
through decisions and then through rules." The legal community is
constituted by shared meaning, and as the legal community grows, its
meanings complexify, and the list of authoritative speakers is regular-
ized.401 This is full of promise, for as Flanagan observes, nothing less
than the "stages of human historical process ... depend on the meth-
ods that people have developed to deliberately control their lived
meanings But decline is at least as possible as progress. When,
inpatient with language it does not understand, common sense sup-
plants other forms of language produced by other forms of con-
sciousness aimed at other forms of meaning, decline is not knocking
but thundering at the door." To replace the developed language of
308 See, e.g., LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 207-44. Lonergan writes:
Even in the sphere of practice, the last word does not lie with common sense
and its panoply of technology, economy and polity; for unless common sense
can learn to overcome its bias by acknowledging and submitting to a higher
principle, unless common sense can be taught to resist its perpetual tempta-
tion to adopt the easy, obvious, practical compromise, then one must expect
the succession of ever less comprehensive viewpoints and in the limit the de-
struction of all that has been achieved.
Id. at 234.
399 See, e.g., id. at xi—xii, xiv.
199 I mean this claim to be descriptive not normative. See e.g., STEIN, supra note 59, at
1-25 passim.
191 Seel/MITE, supra note 387, at 96-97.
102 FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at 256.
403
 Compare Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HART. L.
Rev. 417,417-18 (1899) (d g that when interpreting legal sources including stat-
utes, "we ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of
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law with the simple language of common sense is to hollow out and
shrink law from within. "[C]ommon-sense knowers," as Flanagan ex-
plains, "must realize and acknowledge their own limitations and agree
to cooperate with knowers whose insights and ideas have their source,
not in short-term objectives and practices, but in long-term concerns
and consequences."04 How this cooperation is to be arranged will
concern us shortly.
B. Objectivity, "Authentic Sutyectivity," and Natural Law
But first I would re-affirm that while law is the result of the emer-
gence of a community of specialized meaning, law does properly con-
tain its own element of common sense. Law, as I have observed re-
peatedly, is not just about texts and their being read and given
coercive effect; it is also, more basically, about Subjects' asking and
answering questions about how to live together well. But living is not
just—we hope—today. Law is properly concerned with the here and
now, but law's ambition is also to extend its ordering into the future.
Thus, as Mary Ann Glendon explains, building on Lonergan's in-
sights, "[t] he life of the law is not logic, but neither is it raw experi-
ence. What animates the law is the habit of critical, ongoing, reasoned
reflection on the contents of common sense." 405 To the extent that
the concerns of common sense are taken up and subjected to long-
term, progressive solution—as they were at common law, through the
asking and answering of questions about not only the present but also
the future—progress may occur. To the extent that bias deems the
methodical processes of human intelligence irrelevant to the prob-
a normal speaker of English, using then, in the circumstances in which they were used
."), with POSNER, THE PROBLEM OF JURISPRUDENCE 241 (1990) (noting Holmes's "apho-
ristic style ... may reflect a ... skepticism about the power of rational thought."). Justice
Frankfurter knew the reason not to give statutes an "ordinary language" meaning across
the board. "If a statute is written for ordinary folk, it would be arbitrary not to ass that
Congress intended its words to be read with the minds of ordinary men. If they ale ad-
dressed to specialists, they must be read by judges with the minds of the specialists." Felix
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 536 (1947).
404 FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at 87.
4°5 GLENDON, supra note 19, at 238.
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lems of human living, decline has set ill.4°6 "The problem," as Loner-
gan concludes, "is real."407
Nor is it at all remote. In this world in which we are all legal real-
ists, what lawyers of every stripe—from Scalia to Dworkin—are after is
what Plato himself aspired to: the rail that runs surely through our
judgments. 408 Scalia's rail is the "objectified intent" contained in the
text, which he hopes to extend as far as possible in a rule of law that is
the law of textual rules. 4°9 Dworkin's constraining rails, law's "princi-
ples," are already as broad as one could hope; their boast, indeed, is
that they leave no gaps in law's empire. Both Scalia and Dworkin,
each in his own way, find little place for dynamic intelligence in law.
Scalia is hoping—in the name of democracy, ironically—pretty much
to eliminate the need for it, through the proliferation of textual rules
and recourse to the objectified intent they contain/IN And in
Dworkin's case, it is "theory"—not human intelligence—that "must do
the real work"411 in securing law's dominion. What Plato was after, and
what Scalia and Dworkin think they have supplied (each in his own
way) is, in a word, objectivity. What has been the consuming issue of
philosophy since Plato has been the consuming issue of American ju-
risprudence since at least Langdell. "[T]he problem of constraining
the subject," as Pierre Schlag understands, recurs in most of the con-
ventional problematics of legal analysis:
delimiting judicial review
constraining interpretation
confining judicial activism
preventing judicial tyranny
securing objective meaning in adjudication
curtailing judicial discretion
4°6 See LONERGAN, supra note 30, at xiv—xv ("What is worse, the deteriorating situation
seems to provide the uncritical, biased mind with factual evidence in which the bias is
claimed to be verified. So in ever increasing measure intelligence conies to be regarded as
irrelevant to practical living. Human activity settles down to a decadent routine, and initia-
tive becomes the privilege of violence.").
407 Id. at 632 .
408
 See Stone; supra note 32, at 37-49.
46° See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1175, 1187
(1989).
410 Scalia, supra note 267, at 25 (arguing that "formalism" is "what makes a government
a government of laws and not of men").
411 Dworkin, supra note 347, at 371; see also Patrick McKinley Brennan, Discovering the
Archimedean Element in (Judicial) Judgment, 17 LAW & PHIL. 177, 190-91 (1998).
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and so on up until the present day.412
What the standard accounts—from Scalia to Dworkin—fail to
grasp is that "constraint" simply does not lie on the side of the object,
no matter how "objective" it is. The solution lies instead on the side of
the Subject. The truth, again to paraphrase Lonergan, is not so objec-
tive as to be able to get along without the mind of the human Subject.
Objectivity is a characteristic not of things "out there," but of the Sub-
ject's judgments. Judgments are objective inasmuch as they reach a
virtually unconditioned. They reach a virtually unconditioned exactly
if all relevant questions are answered; they merely converge upon, but
do not reach, a virtually unconditioned if they are closing in on the
end to relevant questions. Objectivity, then, is a matter not of running
into something hard—but of answering the questions of experience
and of reflection." Objectivity—as Lonergan liked to say—is a matter
of "authentic subjectivity."414 To put this the other way around,
authentic subjectivity—and, if my self-appropriation is correct, only
authentic subjectivity—gets the Subject to the real.
Authentic subjectivity is, in turn, a matter not of intuition or tak-
ing a mental look, but of insightfully experiencing, questioning, un-
derstanding, more questioning, and then judging only to the extent
that relevant questions have been answered. As I observed above,
when all questions have been answered, the Subject transcends mere
interiority to know what is real: "You move through judgment,
through the unconditioned, to an absolute realm, and in that realm
you find not only objects but also yourself:415 Lonergan's sloganistic
way of identifying the conditions of the Subject's achieving transcen-
dence is to say that she or he must follow the "transcendental pre-
cepts." These are four: Be attentive, to experience; Be intelligent, in
the ways you understand the data of experience; Be reasonable, when
you judge; Be responsible, when you choose.'"
The first three of these transcendental precepts are just
specifications of what we have already explored, viz., the activities that
Schlag, supra note 24, at 1638.
415 See LONEAGAIV, SUpYR note 182, at 170-80.
414 see, e.g., LONERGAN, supra note 179, at 292 ("Genuine objectivity is die fruit of
authentic subjectivity. It is to be attained only by attaining authentic subjectivity. To seek
and employ sonic alternative prop or crutch invariably leads to some measure of reduc-
tionism. As Hans-Georg Gadamer has contended at length in his War/wit und Methode, there
my no satisfactory methodical criteria that prescind from the criteria of truth.").
415 LONERGAN, supra note 182, at 172-73.
416 see, e.g., LONERGAN, 51117M note 179, at 20.
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must be performed and performed well if the Subject is to achieve
knowledge: experiencing, understanding, judging. The final precept
concerning choice, however, goes beyond the conditions of knowl-
edge to the conditions .of correct conduct, a topic to which Loner-
gan's contribution is substantial. To explore choice in detail here
would take us beyond the already broad scope of this Article, though
something more will have to be said about it in the next section, for
common-sense knowing and law are, after all, about how we (should)
choose to live 4 17
But there is a prior point that must be observed here: Reports of
natural law from the ancients through John Finnis have the natural
law telling us what we should do or avoid. The natural law, on these
theories, amounts to an incrementally revealed list of both prescrip-
tions and proscriptions of conduct. 418 On Lonergan's account, by con-
trast, we encounter "natural law" long before we ask for specifications
of correct conduct. We encounter it in the exigence that is the dy-
namic eros for the real as it is worked out through the precepts corre-
sponding to the several levels of human cognitive process. "[B]efore
they are ever formulated in concepts and expressed in words, those
precepts have a prior existence and reality in the spontaneous, struc-
tured dynamism of human consciousness." The natural law is, on
Lonergan's account, that "immanent Anagke," the unrevisable exi-
gence of the further question. Compliance with that inner law leads to
as many answers as we have questions. "Natural law is not constituted
by an 'objective code'; it is constituted by a set of dynamically related
operations on the part of each individual person." 420
When natural law is underStood in these terms, the wall usually
alleged to separate "positivist" and "natural law" legal theories turns
out to have been a ruse. 421 If to know legal meaning requires compli-
ance with the natural law in its first three precepts, then to call for a
4" The full basis and implications of Lonergan's ethics are well worked out in KEN-
NETH R. MELCHIN, HISTORY, ETHICS, AND PROBABILITY (2d. ed. 1999) and KENNETH it
MELCHIN, LIVING WITI1 OTHER PEOPLE (1998).
419 See COONS & BRENNAN, supra note 25, at 123-36.
919 id.
470 Michael Novak, Bernard Lonergan: A New Approach to Natural Law, 41 PROC. Am.
CATHOLIC PHIL. ASS'N 246, 248-49 (1967); see also LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 604
(NM he root of ethics, as the root of metaphysics, lies neither in sentences nor in proposi-
tions, nor in judgments but in the dynamic structure of rational self-consciousness ....
Such a method not only sets forth precepts but also bases them on their real principles,
which are not propositions or judgments but existing persons ....").
471 For a statement of the traditional natural-law-versus-positivism problematic, see, for
example, LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 2-3 (1987).
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law without natural law is to call only for confusion. It is possible to do
so—and it happens all the time. Such people are like the intellectual
terrorist with whom I began; they intelligently comply with the natural
law in order persuasively to advocate chaos. But one should never
overlook that those who advocate confusion in the public square
rarely settle for it in their own bacicyards9 22 Natural law, in the sense
stated, is the root of any genuine rule of law.
C. Faith—in Law?
"[N]o one wants to be called a natural lawyer. "423 But perhaps
even more to be avoided, in the legal academy, is a theological ap-
pearance. To the run-of-the-academy lawyer, theology amounts to a
repository of benighted authoritarianism. But the contempt is bilat-
eral, not unilateral. Though the academic lawyer is little aware of it,
the theologian views many lawyerly creations as both benighted and
authoritarian 924 And it is no doubt true that some religions and some
legal systems all the time, and other religions and other legal systems
some of the dine, are both benighted and authoritarian.
My immediate interest, however, is in what law can be, and what I
have been suggesting is that law becomes worthy of respect through
its authority. Law's authority I have rested, in turn, on law's being the
known meaning of the Subjects authorized to answer our questions
about how to live together well and thereby incrementally to contrib-
ute to the creation of a legal and lawful community—complete legal-
ity depending for its realization on all Subjects' engaging authenti-
cally in the community's shared search for worthwhile living.
To settle for anything short of our best knowledge of real mean-
ing about how to live well is to settle for something unworthy of re-
422 See LONERGAN, supra note 30, at 599-600 (wile average mind can invent lies about
matters of fact; it can trump up excuses; it can allege extenuating circumstances that min-
gle fact with fiction. But hypocrisy is no more than the tribute paid by vice to virtue. It falls
far short of the genuine rationalization that argues vice to be virtue, that meets the charge
of inconsistency not by denying the minor premise of fact but by denying the major prem-
ise of principle. But the revision of major premises is a tricky business; it is playing fast and
loose with the pure desire to know in its immediate domain of cognitional activity; and so
the majority of men, instead of attempting rationalization themselves, are content to cre-
ate an effective demand, a welcoming market, for more or less consistently developed ...
myths and ... philosophies" not rooted in self-appropriation.).
4" Ronald A. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 165 (1982).
424 Cf. VINING, supra note 28, at 195 ("Moral and political philosophers with whom law-
yers consort tend to have a view of theology as authoritarian, trading on mindless and fear-
ful obedience, very much the kind of view, it should be said, that theologians have of
law.").
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spect. I have described the process of knowing legal meaning—legal
method—as a practice of methodical question and answer about how
to live well. Such legal method, I observed, is transcendental method
deployed in a specific context. Legal method is transcendental to the
extent that by it, Subjects transcend the confines of their solipsistic
interiority by knowing real meaning about how to live together well.
The legal method I have advanced, with the help of the work of Pro-
fessors Vining, White and Glendon, has as its justification nothing
more or less exalted than the dynamically structured pattern of cogni-
tive activities by which the Subject is in fact transcendent. The legal
implications of generalized empirical method for which I have argued
are neither exotic nor mysterious. For such bizarre notions as intui-
tion and law's "artificial reason," for untutored incantations of "rea-
son," there has been substituted a detailed phenomenology of human
knowing.
But apart from the paranoid reasons for seeing theology or queer
transcendental entities in my account, there are indeed sound and
sufficient reasons for finding in my approach affinities to theology.
There is, first, the careful reading of texts. Several legal analysts, in-
cluding Joseph Vining, have recently emphasized the similarity be-
tween the lawyer's and the theologian's close reading of authoritative
texts,425 and whether either professional is flattered by it, the similarity
seems hard credibly to deny. That lawyers follow such a method may
seem odd, as Vining observes:
Looking up what some old men said, jumping when some
new men speak—these things need to be explained. They
need explanation, as a mother jumping when her child calls
and a scientist looking to what an experimenter said long
ago do not, at least in the modern world. So, too, does law-
yers poring over what these individuals say, whether new or
old, need to be explained.426
The explanation is that what these old women and men produce is
our evidence of the law, and if we turn to their texts to find the law,
423 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 16, 17 (1988); Thomas C.
Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. Rev. 1, 3, 17 (1984); see also MICHAEL J.
PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND IAN , 136-45 (1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITU-
TION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 97-100 (1982).
4" VINING, supra note 28, at 153-54.
342 	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 43:227
there will be no way other than a close reading.427 Real legal meaning
is known only through fidelity to the transcendental precepts. "The
ordinary legal text stands somewhere between piece of journalism
and sacred text or studied work of art. Legal method holds it
there."428 If meaning is what is sought, then a posture approaching
Talmudic slouch is not optional. "Lawyers are as attentive as priests to
the details of a recorded statement of law."429 As Vining appreciates:
"Both lawyer and theologian argue from texts because otherwise
there is nothing particular to talk about .... But there is always some-
thing behind the texts. There is no understanding of them without
interpretation, and no interpretation without creation and imagina-
tion, reaching behind to what is there for us now."430 It is not those
such as Vining, who insist upon the search for real meaning, that
make law dreary, dull, mindless--bureaucratic.431
But there is more. The reader of law's texts who is looking to say
"what the law is" is not looking to dig up something static from the
past, but to create what will be law. As Vining explains,
The question presented by legal rules is less likely to be "I
know what this means, shall I obey?" than "How shall I read
this and with what attitude?" Decision making consists of
weighing purposes, values, factors, channels of thought.
Rules are not self-executing, in law. There is always, in law, a
decision maker, and what are called rules in law are expres-
sions of considerations to be taken into account by a deci-
sion maker. They focus not on themselves as a self-contained
system but upon decision-making activity pointing forward.
Talk of rights and rules of a static kind, projecting an image
of law standing off by itself, obscures the focus that legal
427 See VINING, supra note 1, at 115 ("Close reading, reading in every detail and in
every way, is at the very center of what lawyers qua lawyers do, and other parts of lawyers'
method and the institutional structure of law are designed to make close reading possi-
ble.").
428 it at 6; cf. James Gordley, Mere Brilliance: The Recruitment of Law Professors in the
United States, 41 Ast. J. COMP. L. 367,380-84 (1993) (noting that American legal academics
lack any shared sense of what law and legal scholarship are for); Waiting for Langdell 1, supra
note 384, at 20 ("(1.1aw has never really achieved the status of an intellectual discipline.
Legal academics have not been in control of the materials; we have not been in control of
any method; and so it's not a surprise that after a while, one should turn around and find
that there is not much there.").
42' VINING, supra note 1, at 223.
43° VINING, supra note 28, at 192.
431 CI Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 4, at 94; Waiting for Langdell 1, supra note 384,
at 5-6.
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rules have in fact, always a decision that must be made, at the
edge of lives that have not been lived before, in a world that
has not been seen before. 452
Poised on the brink of a world never before known, the legal decision-
maker does not possess a rule—"the law"—ripe for "application." He
has evidence of legal meaning from the past; he has also the question
what will be law in the world we are now creating.
hi other words, the question "What is the law?," always already
has to be the question, "What ought the law be?" For if the Subject
who will say "what the law is" will say something that ought to be
obeyed, she must be able to say that this should be done or that this
should be avoided. Unable to say this, the Subject can pronounce
something that it may be expedient to pretend to obey. But that same
Subject cannot call for very obedience 459 "Legislation is the arbitrary
which we allow—but also limit. To make the point in its strongest
form, it could be said legislation is lawless behavior, except that by a
paradoxical trick we make legislative statutes materials we use in de-
termining what the law iS."434 The authority of a legal text is not
automatic; it must be earned. "Law moves forward, else it is riot law. It
could not be known otherwise, for it would dissolve into the fractured
world. Law has an inner dynamic, born of its very realism, its axio-
matic concern with the actual. In Christian and Jewish theology this
movement forward is called eschatology. In law it is usually called
working toward justice."435
In Lonergan's terms, this is called being responsibk.436 The de-
mands of that inner dynamic toward the real are not exhausted by
knowing. That desire is for the real—arid it seeks its own extension
from knowledge into action. The transcendental precepts are not
three but four. After you have been attentive, intelligent, and reason-
able in your knowing of what has been put forward as law for a world
332 VINING, supra note 28, at 217-18.
"3 Cf. id. at 212 ("If what a man does is search for meaning, that 'is' of what he does is
not separated from the 'ought' of our lives by such an impassable chasm. Who are we,
lying deep within ourselves, but the selves (in part) that we want to be and wish we were?
One half views law from the outside, perhaps, when one lays it side by side with other simi-
lar phenomena to help place it in one's mind. But when we say law is or authority is, it is
never clear that we distinguish or can distinguish the existence of what we have in mind
from its effective normative claim upon us.").
4J4 VINING, supra note 1, at 253.
433
	 supra note 28, at 108.
436 LONERGAN, supra note 179, at 9, 11.
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that no longer exists, be responsible, in your choosing. 437The fact is
that in one stroke transcendental method, by uncovering and reveal-
ing the single, fundamental, and radical exigence of the human spirit
for full self-transcendence ... shows not only that the human person's
genuine self-realization is self-transcendence, but also that the basic human
'fact" is a drive for "value," that in the most radical sense, the human per-
son's "is" is an "ought. '4"
Responsibility means making one's acting consistent with one's know-
ing of how we ought to live in light of what has been put forward as
law for a past world and in light of the now. Grasping that the inher-
ited data of legal meaning were law for a world that has passed away,
the responsible Subject looks to inner law for guidance in the world
he or she would invest now with /aw. 439 Law's minds are reading texts,
but they are reading not just to know what was law for the past—they
are reading for answers to the question, What now is the law? Mecha-
nistically to "apply" what has been inherited—assuming such a thing is
even possible—is to proceed irresponsibly; the responsible mind cares
about how to live responsibly in the now." ) Joseph Vining has a pro-
found way of putting this:
437 See id. at 20
438 WALTER E. CONN, CONSCIENCE: DEVELOPMENT AND SELF-TRANSCENDENCE 214
(1981).
439 See generally BERNARD LONERGAN, Dialectic of Authority, in A THIRD COLLECTIOII, SU-
pra note 157, at 5-12 (Fredrick E. Crowe, SJ. ed., 1985). See FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at
77-78 ("Antigone expresses the tension between Creon's administering the laws of the city
and Antigone's observing the pious customs of the family. But how does Creon know if the
laws he is upholding and administering are just laws? To a large extent, the laws that lead-
ers and judges employ are normative procedures for making decisions which have been
inherited front prior norms and decisions, and these in turn depend on prior cultural
communities. In other words, there is this fundamental question that any cultural author-
ity may have to face: How reasonable and just are the inherited cultural norms that pro-
vide the standards for communal judgments and decisions? To answer this question, cul-
tural authorities need a transcultural norm that is not dependent on any cultural context,
but that grounds and orders each and every cultural context. Creon's case could be com-
pared to Newton's when he thought he was thinking and measuring in a completely uni-
versal framework but was, in fact, operating in quite a limited framework. However, the
limits of that framework were hidden from hint. Creon, like any civic leader, experiences,
understands, judges, and decides within a cultural horizon whoSe limits are hidden, unless
he can shift front a limited cultural context and move into a transcultural or historical
horizon.").
44° As Mary Ann Glendon explains, "We are now in the process of adding a layer [to
law] that will reflect the circumstances of our own time and whatever intelligence we are
able to bring to bear .... [Ht is incumbent on us to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable
and responsible ... in 'the visions we project.'" GLENDON, 514061 note 335, at 141-42; see
also, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW AND
FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 34 (1989) (in the nineteenth cell-
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Meaning exists now, it is said. That is true .... But discov-
ery of meaning behind a text, it is also said or implied,
would, even if it were possible, be discovery only of a histori-
cal fact, a person bound to time and place, an "is," not a
voice with a claim upon our attention. That is not true. That
is expression only of an assumption against transcendence of
time and place, an assumption that persons and the per-
sonal, acknowledgment of whom is a half-turn away from sci-
ence, must be in history, in process; reflection also of the as-
sumption that to say is only to do, that saying something is
only doing something. Doing, acting, can be put into proc-
ess, its pattern into system or form: it is not beyond process,
system, form. To acknowledge that beyond is to take a full
turn away from science.
That is the full turn taken by law, and that turn is the rea-
son law is the loose thread in thinking that is distinctively
modern or postmodern, confidently positivist, or confidently
historicist. Law pulls constantly away from science, because it
is the companion of responsible action in which suffering is
brought and responsibility taken for it, and suffering is ex-
perienced if action is not taken. Orders are given in law, and
the order given is searched for in the materials of law, the
texts, statements of law.
* * * * *
Just how complete the turn from natural science must be,
how deep the difference might be down to a vision of the
very nature of the universe itself, is in the one word care. For
law, mind is caring mind. Mind that does not care is no mind
to seek, no mind to take into oneself, no mind to obey: it has
no authority."'
If the Subject is to say what the law is, his must be not only a careful
but also a caring mind." 2 The rule, of law would be the meaningful
tury "the notion of legitimacy was increasingly coming to be identified with kgalily, under-
stood as the quality of enactments which are formally correct and issued according to es-
tablished procedures .... The idea that legitimacy can be conferred by law, however, is by
no means self-evident [Ms the bureaucratic, secular state has increasingly injected its
own content and pursued its own aims in family law, the relationship between legality and
legitimacy has become ever more problematic.").
441 VINING, supra note 1, at 31-32.
142 As Anthony Kronman understands, any institution "will always require, at the point
of its actual application to human affairs, a tolerance for compromise and the ability to
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achievement of authentic Subjects; 443 absent minds that care, law is
not ruling. The mind that does not care has disobeyed inner law and
is not pro Canto worthy of obedience. The faith that is necessary for law
is the faith that those Subjects who call for our obedience are them-
selves authentic, innerly lawful.
Legal analysis consists of working with texts.... [T]his is
what the legally trained do when asked to find the law and
say what the law is ....
Are they foolish to engage in this kind of activity? Is it a
front, a cover? Is it beside the point, superfluous or super-
structural? The question is always with us ... [The] answer
[is] of the not-if kind. Not foolish, not superfluous, if law is
to have authority. Not if law is to hold us, evoke our willing
acceptance rather than our resistance. Not if law is to be a
source to be looked to in discovering what we ought to do.
Perhaps we do not or ought not to want that; but if we do
not, then we cannot complain about disintegration, disap-
work, by means of a practical wisdom irreducible to rules toward greater coherence and
overall good sense." Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE
1567, 1611 (1985). The work of scholars suggesting that statutory interpretation inevi-
tably involves, or at all events should involve, "practical reasoning" resembles my own posi-
tion in some respects, but differs sharply inasmuch as I undertook a cognitional analysis
exactly to penetrate the mystique and unpredictability that have attached to "practical
reason" since it got denominated a "faculty."(See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel
A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45
VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992); Brett Scharffs, The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom,
32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 127 (1998); Vincent A. Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial
Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. CoLo. L. REV. 45 (1985)).
"'Michael Novak, a student of Lonergan, puts the same point more generally:
We may take it, then, that the fact of this drive to understand [as expli-
cated by Lonergan] is sufficiently recognized, and that its analysis is well un-
der way. The goal of the drive to understand is to understand all that can be
understood. This intention drives us step by step along the discursive path of
human understanding, and lights our way both by policy and by singular de-
cision through the concrete complexities of what we try to do in the world.
Who am I? At least this: an intelligent subject who sometimes understands
and who sometimes knows; and a subject whose ultimate horizon is all that is
to be understood; whose personal development follows upon fidelity to the
chive to understand both in realistic and objective doing, and in realistic and
objective knowing; and whose intellectual and moral life advances from hoti-
zon to horizon in a rhythm of rest and action.
MICHAEL NOVAK, BELIEF AND UNBELIEF: A PHILOSOPHY OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 106 (1965).
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pearance of authority, of respect, and of self-respect, or loss
of meaning in the modern state.444
The answer, as Vining says, is of the "riot-if' kind. Law and its rule are
only possible, not necessary.
444 VINING, supra note 28, at 40.
445 See id.
The fruit of unauthenticity is decline. Unauthentic subjects get themselves
unauthentic authorities .... Just as sustained authenticity results in increas-
ing responsibility and order, increasing reasonableness and cohesion, increas-
ing intelligence and objective intelligibility, increasing knowledge and mas-
tery of the situation, so sustained unauthenticity has the opposite effects. But
the remedy for the opposite effects lies beyond any normal human proce-
dure. There is no use appealing to the sense of responsibility of irresponsible
people, to the reasonableness of people that are unreasonable, to the intelli-
gence of people that have chosen to be obtuse, to the attention of people that
attend only to their grievances .... I have placed the legitimacy of authority
in its authenticity. But besides the legitimacy of authority, there also is the as-
sertion of that legitimacy, its legitimation. Legitimation is manifold. It occurs
on any of the many differentiations of consciousness. In early human society
it is a matter of myth and ritual. In the ancient high civilizations it became a
matter of law. Among the loquacious and literary Greeks law was reinforced
first by rhetoric and later by logic. Historians discovered that different laws
obtained at different times and places. Systematizers sought to draw up codes
that would express the eternal verities for all times and places. Philosophers
sought principles that would underpin this or that system. But if the legiti-
macy of authority lies in its authenticity, none of these solutions is adequate.
LONERGAN, 571,TR note 439, at 9, 11. A position that comes close to my own is Joseph Vin-
ing's, summarized in his essay, Law and Enchantment: The Place of Belief, 86 Mimi. L. REV.
577 (1987). Steven D. Smith is right to wonder whether Vining thinks that legal theory
shares the faith in transcendent authority found in religious belief." Smith, supra note 236,
at 158. But what Smith's analysis misses that Vining's and mine insist upon, is that it is Sub-
jects that transcend, and not by the notorious "blind faith" but through the conscientious
application of their cognitive equipment. See id. at 158-59. But while I have emphasized
Vining's and my agreement that law that is caring is a world apart from the 'science" that is
scientistic, my position differs from Vining's inasmuch as I have u'aced caring mind to the
structures by which the Subject knows not only meaning but the natural world. As Loner-
gan captures the point, "Being a scientist is just an aspect of being human, nor has any
method been found that makes one authentically scientific without heading one into be-
ing authentically human." LONERGAN, SUP/II note 439, at 21; see aso Jerry Frug, Argument as
Character, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871-74 (1988) (rejecting Enlightenment "reason" as foun-
dation for law in favor of rhetorical argumentation and, ultimately, the character that
alone makes it succeed).
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EPILOGUE
Need it be said that we do not have to obey even ourselves?
—Joseph Viiiing446
I worked out a transcendental argument to convince you, the
reader, to choose intelligence—to T.S. Eliot's mind, the only
method.The point was to show you what you are in fact doing when
you are knowing—in the hope that you will choose to do more of it.
What transcendental or any other argument can do, is very limited.
Inner law is an invitation; it is constraining, coercive only in the sense
that its satisfaction is a necessary condition of ordered, worthy human
living. You are always "at liberty" to deny the conditions of the cogni-
tive success you demonstrate. You are also always "free" to be inatten-
tive, unintelligent, unreasonable, irresponsible.
The avoidance of lawlessness must begin on the inside, in an act
of will. Our 'taking' [of the world] is not forced upon us; it would be
a decision."447 I can always be the obscurantist. "[T]hat I understand
you is something of a choice ... . "448 Nothing makes me do k. I do it
only if care to understand you. We shall have a rule of law if, but only
if, Subjects care to obey the transcendental precepts.
When people give up choosing performative self-contradiction,
when people begin to live by demands of the question—choosing to
be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible—we use such words
as conversion.449 Not all conversions are religious, but perhaps some
are. There is, in any event, no alternative, no short cut. There are only
Subjects—and they either use their intelligence or they do not. But to
448 VINING, supra note 28, at 95.
447 VICTOR PRELLER, DIVINE SCIENCE AND THE SCIENCE OF GOD: A REFORMULATION OF
THOMAS AQUINAS 172 (1967); See also DAVID BURRELL, ANALOGY AND PHILOSOPHICAL LAN-
GUAGE 242 n.33 (1973) ("[T] he real as intelligible is the product of a decision: a decision
to accept as sufficient the reasons which support one's claim to know."(quoting Michael
Novak)); RICHARD RORTY, Texts and Lumps, in OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH
(PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS VOL. 1) 78, 81 (1991) ("Facts are hybrid entities; that is, the
causes of assertibility of sentences include both physical stimuli and our antecedent choice
of response to such SDIBUIL").
448 VINING, supra note 1, at 17.
449 Lonergan has a fully-elaborated taxonomy of conversion. For a summary see Lon-
ergan, supra note 179, at 338 ("[Olbjectivity is reached through the self-transcendence of
the concrete existing subject, and the fundamental forms of self-transcendence are intel-
lectual, moral, and religious conversion. To attempt to ensure objectivity apart from self-
transcendence only generates illusions."); see also FLANAGAN, supra note 138, at 262-68
(explaining "method as conversion"); LONERGAN, Dirt{ note 30, at 624-26 (observing
place of satire and humor in conversion).
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live intelligently is not just a choice, but also an exigence. For as Paul
Kahn asks ominously, "Are there angels to govern us? No. We can rely
only on ourselves. And we are not angelic. Are we adequate to the
task? Only history can tell."4" Life obedient to inner law is contin-
gent. One always can choose to play the buffoon—as can an entire
culture, for a season.
950 KAHN, Mira note 5, at 25.
